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Sociology: A Lost Connection in Social Psychology

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For the first half of the 20th century, sociology was one of the closest allies of social psychology. Over the past four decades, however, the connection with sociology has weakened, whereas new connections with neighboring disciplines (e.g., biology, economics, political science) have formed. Along the way, the sociological perspective has been largely lost in mainstream social psychology in the United States. Most social psychologists today are not concerned with collective phenomena and do not investigate social structural factors (e.g., residential mobility, socioeconomic status, dominant religion, political systems). Even when the social structural factors are included in the analysis, psychologists typically treat them as individual difference variables. Sociologist C. Wright Mills famously promoted sociological imagination, or the ability to see distal yet important social forces operating in a larger societal context. By comparing sociological perspectives to psychological perspectives, this article highlights the insights that the sociological perspective and sociological imagination can bring to social psychology.

Keywords *history, sociology, cultural psychology*

> We cannot (at least in the case of society-forming animals such as human beings) study psychology . . . save within larger sociological wholes.
>
> Tolman (1938, p. 239)

The eminent animal psychologist Edward Tolman stated in his 1938 *Psychological Review* article that sociology is fundamental to psychology and psychology fundamental to physiology. Today, Tolman's sentiment seems strange, perhaps even outrageous, as many prominent psychologists are increasingly moving toward the biological end of psychological science. Indeed, the popular view today seems to be that physiology is fundamental to psychology and that psychology is in turn fundamental to sociology. The goals of this article are twofold: (a) to draw social psychologists' attention to the history of social psychology and the shifting relationship between social psychology and sociology and (b) to promote a renewed connection with the appreciation of sociology in psychological science that Tolman envisioned in the first half of the 20th century.

Almost exactly 100 years ago, social psychology was born with the publication of two introductory textbooks, one written by a sociologist (E. A. Ross, 1908) and the other written by a psychologist (McDougall, 1908/1921). Although sociologists celebrated the centennial with a special conference devoted to Ross's 1908 book, few social psychologists celebrated the centenary (for an exception, see Reis, 2008).[1] We believe that social psychologists' neglect of this historical fact reflects three points: (a) McDougall's book is not widely considered to represent contemporary social psychology

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because of its focus on the highly dispositional concept of instincts (Cartwright, 1979), (b) social psychologists today are not well aware of Ross's textbook or "sociological" social psychology in general, and (c) social psychologists do not care much about history. Indeed, many social psychologists are trained to be up-to-date on recent developments but are not trained to be classically oriented (Nisbett, 1990; for citation patterns in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, see Quiñones-Vidal, López-García, Peñaranda-Ortega, & Tortosa-Gil, 2004).

A well-accepted definition of social psychology today is "the scientific study of the feelings, thoughts, and behaviors of individuals in social situations" (Gilovich, Keltner, & Nisbett, 2005, p. 5). If we grant that "social situations" typically include groups, institutions, culture, and society, it becomes apparent that sociological perspectives can be useful to social psychology. The unfortunate fact, however, is that the relationship between social psychology and sociology has become much weaker over the past half century, and sociological perspectives are less and less visible in mainstream modern social psychology practiced in the United States today (for historical accounts, see Bar-Tal, 2006; Greenwood, 2004). As we celebrate the centennial of social psychology as an independent discipline, this article calls for a renewed connection with sociology and the appreciation of what sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959) called "sociological imagination" in social psychology. The article is organized as follows: We first compare sociological perspectives on social psychology to psychological perspectives. We then review the history of social psychology to reveal how and why social psychology was fragmented into two branches. Finally, we discuss what a sociological perspective can contribute to the enterprise of psychological social psychology.

HOW ARE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES DIFFERENT FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES?

Although sociologists and social psychologists share interests in similar topics such as the self, close relationships, and groups, sociological perspectives are quite distinct from psychological perspectives. In this section, we review two sociological perspectives and illustrate how these differ from contemporary psychological perspectives. As a shorthand, we refer to these perspectives as macro and micro sociology.[2] Macro-sociological perspectives are characterized by a focus on large institutions and social structures and how they influence individual and group psychology (e.g., Emile Durkheim's classic study of suicide). Micro-sociological perspectives focus on small, typically face-to-face, groups and how individual psychological forces both emerge from and shape social interactions (e.g., Erving Goffman's analysis of self-presentation).

Macro Sociology. This sociological perspective centers on sociologists' concern with social structures and the collective. It defines sociology as the scientific study of the development, organization, functioning, and classification of human societies (Macionis, 2005). As advocated by the early work of Durkheim (1897/1951), sociologists view institutions, large social and cultural structures, and other collective phenomena as the key objects of analysis; they also emphasize the power of the society over that of individuals. Durkheim famously distinguished sociology from psychology as follows:

> Sociological method as we practice it rests wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be studied as things, that is, as realities external to the individual. . . . If no reality exists outside of individual consciousness, [sociology] wholly lacks any material of its own. In that case, the only possible subject of observation is the mental states of the individual, since nothing else exists. That, however, is the field of psychology. (pp. 37-38)

For example, although suicide appears to be an individual's behavior, Durkheim explored collective factors that are associated with this seemingly personal problem. He showed that the same collective factors, namely, the degree of social integration and moral regulation in a society, are associated with the variations in the suicide rates across many different societies. He also showed that there is continuity in the suicide rates of different societies even though membership in those societies changes over time. With this observation, Durkheim demonstrated that "collective tendencies have an existence of their own, *sui generis*" (p. 309), independent of individual members; he called these "social facts." A social fact, such as the suicide rate, is not a mere aggregate of individual behaviors or personal psychological tendencies; rather, it is an autonomous "thing in-itself." A social fact is a group-level attribute that emerges from social interaction as an objective force "external" to and "coercive" of individual behavior. According to Durkheim, therefore, the nature of suicide can be found not only in the individuals who committed suicide but also in the collective reality created by a particular society, group, organization, or institution. This focus on emergent social facts lies in stark contrast to the methodological individualism advocated by Floyd Allport (1924): "There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals" (p. 4). In contrast to Durkheim's collectivist perspective, Allport's individualist perspective reduces social facts to psychological facts.

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Like Durkheim (1897/1951), Mills (1959), the prominent American sociologist, maintained that many troubles human beings face are not merely personal but public issues and that without understanding social structures, personal troubles cannot be solved. For instance, Mills argued that if in a city of 100,000 only one person is unemployed, it reflects a purely personal problem of a single unemployed individual. However, if 15 million are unemployed in a nation of 50 million, one cannot attribute the problem to the individual and expect to find a solution at the individual level. Mills pointed to the tendency to see phenomena such as "unemployment," "divorce," and "crime" as personal problems. This is akin to the fundamental attribution error in social psychology (L. Ross, 1977). However, Ross's fundamental attribution error is mainly concerned with the overestimation of dispositional factors and the discounting of immediate situations (or micro context), whereas Mills famously advocated the development of a "sociological imagination," or the ability to look beyond personal experience and immediate situations to see the influence of social forces operating in a larger societal (or distal, macro) context. For example, the political scientist Paul Frymer (2005) has employed sociological imagination to refigure thinking about individual acts of racism. Noting that most political scientists conceptualize racist acts as the result of individual psychological attitudes ("irrational biases"), Frymer argued that "we need to examine the ways in which institutions encourage racist acts by motivating people to behave in a racist manner or behave in a manner that motivates others to do so" (p. 373). Thus, Frymer drew a distinction between individual and institutional racism. In the former, racism is the result of individuals' racist attitudes. In the latter, racism emerges from institutions that use rules and incentives to funnel behavior toward racist outcomes. Under these social conditions, individual actions that have discriminatory consequences can occur *whether or not individuals harbor racist attitudes*. Frymer's sociological imagination allowed him to look beyond personal motivation as the foundation of racism to see how racist institutions "use" individuals to maintain systems of inequality.

In the same tradition of connecting macro factors to individual lives, Karl Marx (1884/1964) linked the capitalist economic system to individual and group experiences of alienation. Similarly, in his work on the protestant work ethic, Max Weber (1905) tied values and norms to economic behavior and societal change. Although social psychologists are not willing to infer beyond immediate causal factors (e.g., person or situation in attribution), sociologists are willing, and encouraged, to use sociological imagination to entertain the possibility of distal, macro factors in which personal actions emerge. To sum up, the first type of sociological perspective, macro sociology, looks at the social world from a higher vantage point and recognizes macro factors as contributors to individual behavior. This contrasts with the social-psychological approach that employs a more restricted and immediate notion of situation.

Micro Sociology. By focusing on the importance of the types and norms of social interactions in understanding society, the second type of sociological perspective is more "psychological" than the one reviewed above. According to this perspective, "sociology is the scientific study of interactions and relations among human beings" (McIntyre, 2004, p. 3). Sociological works in this perspective emphasize the collective forces of socialization and interactions, namely, the power of groups and institutions, ranging from family, friends, play groups, and work groups to cooperations. Cooley's (1902) looking-glass self and G. H. Mead's (1934) social self highlight the importance of socialization processes in the development of the self and self-control. Through interactions with family, neighbors, schoolmates, and colleagues, we learn to understand what other people are thinking and adjust our behaviors according to others' perspectives. Cooley (1909), for instance, stated,

> The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we." (p. 117)

Thus, the development of a self highly in tune with societal norms (i.e., Mead's notion of the social self) is critical to the creation and maintenance of civil society because the reproduction of social order depends in large part on the internalization of group identity in the self. The lack of an appropriate social self poses a risk to the society (as also discussed by the social disorganization school of sociology; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1920).

This brief review of the two types of sociological perspectives suggests some major contrasts between psychological and sociological perspectives that we review next. We would like to note that by *psychological perspectives* we are referring to the mainstream social psychology that is mostly American in origin. European, and to some extent Asian, Australian, and Canadian, social psychologies present many exceptions to our characterization of "psychological perspectives" (e.g., Moscovici & Duveen, 2000; Scherer, 1993). Moreover, as we note, there are social psychologists and social-psychological research

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Table 1. The Types of Variables Typically Investigated in Sociology and Psychology

	Types of Variables	
Discipline	*Independent*	*Dependent*
Sociology	Structures Institutions Organizations Social network Discourses Situations Identities	Individuals' or collective Actions Responses Interpretations Emergent properties at macro level
Psychology	Stimulus conditions Psychological states Individual differences	Individuals' Cognitions Feelings Behaviors

SOURCE: Modified from Tolman (1952).

areas that deviate from our description. Our description fits well the social-psychological research found in the field's most prestigious journals and has been noted to have "all the characteristics of a paradigm: models of prominent scholars, control of publication in journals, dominance in organizations, ways of training students, recruitment in jobs, rewarding system, published textbooks that present the scope of social psychology" (Bar-Tal, 2006, p. 342). The areas of divergence between mainstream psychological and sociological perspectives in social psychology are in the levels of analysis, basic assumptions, preferred methodologies, and areas of interest. Below, we spell out these differences separately.

Level of Analysis. Table 1 summarizes major differences between sociological and psychological social psychologies in terms of independent and dependent variables. Psychological social psychology is first and foremost concerned with variables within the individual or in the individual's immediate social context. An individual's feelings, thoughts, and actions measured by self-reports or reaction time often serve as dependent variables (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007). In contrast, sociological perspectives explore variables higher on the continuum of social complexity and further removed from the individual. Macro sociology extends variables of interest beyond individuals and their micro environment to macro factors that emerge from the interactions of large groups of people, such as social classes and organizations. Aggregated feelings, thoughts, and actions (e.g., attitude toward alcohol of church members, average wine consumption) as well as collective action (e.g., legalization of gay marriage) often serve as dependent variables. Micro sociology focuses on what emerges from the dynamic relationship between individuals and their immediate social environment. The currently popular research topics of social network analysis and social capital exemplify sociologists' focus on higher levels of analysis and emergent properties when trying to explain individual-level outcomes (Coleman, 1988; Fowler & Christakis, 2008; Granovetter, 1973; Portes, 1998; Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006). In short, macro, emergent, and dynamic social properties are at the heart of sociological perspectives, whereas psychology deals with effects that are more "proximal, local, short-term, and decomposable" (Danziger, 2000, p. 329).

Basic Assumptions. Psychological social psychology has been modeled on the natural sciences (Pepitone, 1981; Rozin, 2001). This implies a certain epistemological model with norms such as empiricism, objectivism, and universalism, meaning that psychological laws should be true, independent of time or place. Sociology, in contrast, has never fully aligned itself epistemologically with either the natural sciences or the humanities. Consequently, until recently, sociology has been characterized by a tension between an explanatory (*erklären*) tradition, which tries to establish causal laws, and an interpretive (*verstehen*) tradition, by which particularities of certain times and places are an object of exploration (Giddens, 1987, p. 18).

Method. The natural science model of psychology is manifested in the dominance of the experimental method. For reasons we explain below, particularly after World War II, the testing of theory-driven hypotheses with experimentally manipulated variables became social psychologists' preferred method (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998; Danziger, 1990; Stam, Radtke, & Lubek, 2000). Sociologists who are influenced by the explanatory tradition, though still interested in hypothesis testing, are less likely to conduct experiments and more likely to rely on surveys (McIntyre, 2004). Those influenced by the interpretive tradition, in contrast, typically downplay methods designed for hypothesis testing in favor of participant observation, ethnography, interviewing, and other field methods oriented toward "thick description" (Geertz, 1973; Luker, 2008).

Areas of Research. Level of analysis, basic assumptions, and methodological choices constrain what research questions will be more relevant, more significant, or more convenient to study. The experimental method allows for a high degree of control, yet at the same time it leads to the marginalization of variables that cannot be easily manipulated. This is reflected in the popular research areas of psychology versus sociology. According to McIntyre's (2004, p. 41) introductory textbook, popular topic areas in sociology are (in alphabetical order) age, art, collective

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behavior, culture, demography, deviance, economy, education, environment, family and sex, formal organizations, gender, health care, law, mass media, military, political institutions, race and ethnicity, religion, science and technology, small groups, social change, social movements, socialization, sports, stratification, and work and occupations. Among these, culture (e.g., Heine, 2008; Kitayama & Cohen, 2007), race and ethnicity (e.g., Pettigrew, 2004; Twenge & Crocker, 2002), gender (Eagly, Beall, & Sternberg, 2004), education (e.g., Aronson, 1990), law (Wells & Olson, 2003), and small groups (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997) are active research areas of social psychology as well as sociology. In contrast, very few social psychologists today investigate art, demography, deviance, economy, family, formal organizations, health care, science and technology, sports, or work and occupation.

Overall, sociologists show a concern with many broad life domains that are of interest to a range of audiences (e.g., art, sports) and by which many people are affected daily (e.g., economy, education, health care, law, mass media, science and technology, work), whereas social psychologists pay less attention to these life domains (Rozin, 2001). Let us note, though, that this limited range of interests did not always characterize social psychology. Rather, as we review below, the narrowing of interests in social psychology reflects fairly recent historical changes in its basic assumptions and preferred methodology. Illustrating this point, the 1968 *Handbook of Social Psychology* edited by Lindzey and Aronson included chapters on a wide variety of topics such as "Psychology and Economics," "Laughter, Humor, and Play," "Collective Behavior: Crowds and Social Movements," "Esthetics," "A Social Psychology of Education," "Social Structure and Behavior," and "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems."

This is not to say that social psychologists have completely ignored these areas. There are many social psychologists working in related fields of health psychology, sports psychology, organizational behavior, and environmental psychology. Various applied social psychology texts written or edited by social psychologists present social-psychological research that informs everyday concerns (e.g., Brewer & Hewstone, 2004; Buunk & Van Vugt, 2007; F. W. Schneider, Gruman, & Coutts, 2005; Schultz & Oskamp, 2000; Semin & Fiedler, 1996). And many social psychologists publish in journals such as *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* and *Journal of Social Issues* that serve as outlets for research on issues such as crime, social movements, terrorism, the environment, homelessness, smoking, disabilities, and so on. Finally, many prominent social psychologists have done research that addresses larger-scale everyday problems. Although we could not present an exhaustive list here, some examples are research on conflict resolution (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000), gender inequality (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Eagly et al., 2004; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Wood & Eagly, 2002), proenvironmental behavior (Bator & Cialdini, 2000; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Darley & Gilbert, 1985; Gonzales, Aronson, & Costanzo, 1988), condom use (Stone, Aronson, Crain, & Winslow, 1994), justice (Darley, Tyler, Bilz, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2003), and volunteerism (Omoto & Snyder, 2002). Yet, as we noted, this kind of research is increasingly pushed toward the periphery of social psychology. Attesting to this point, Bob Cialdini (2009) recently announced his premature retirement from the field, among other reasons because he could not publish field studies in the field's flagship journal, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.

What were the historical changes that led to the gradual divergence of the fields in levels of analysis, basic assumptions, preferred methodologies, and topics of interest? What made social psychology become so fascinated with controlled laboratory experiments? In the next section, we identify the time course and likely causes of the loss of the sociological perspective in social psychology.

THE SHIFTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Sociology and social psychology were indistinguishable in the early 1900s (G. W. Allport, 1954). Many writers who are regarded as the founders of psychology, such as Wundt, McDougall, and Freud, wrote about both individuals and society. Yet, over time, psychologists have stopped writing about society and psychology has drifted apart from sociology, particularly in the second half of the 20th century, as social psychology has increasingly neglected objective, macro-societal conditions and focused almost exclusively on individuals' interpretations and construals of situations (for a historical overview, see Cartwright, 1979; Greenwood, 2004; Oishi & Graham, 2008).

At the turn of the 20th century, "psychological" social psychology (social psychology practiced by psychologists) and "sociological" social psychology (social psychology practiced by sociologists) were like twins. As stated above, they were born in the same year 100 years ago, when the first social psychology textbooks were published, one by the sociologist Edward Ross and the other by psychologist William McDougall. Ross (1908) tried to build social psychology from the top down, focusing on the interpersonal and collective processes of imitation and suggestion. Using these concepts, he tried to explain phenomena such as fashion, customs, public opinion, and social conventions. McDougall (1908/1921), in contrast, aimed to build social psychology from the bottom up, concentrating on human

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instincts, or "innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action" (p. 20). McDougall viewed socialization processes as fundamental to the creation of civilized society, by curbing some destructive instincts and nurturing prosocial instincts.

Despite these different emphases, E. A. Ross (1908) and McDougall (1908/1921) agreed that the ultimate goal of social psychology should be the creation of civilized society and that imitation, sympathy, and suggestion would play central roles in the development of social psychology. When reviewing the history of social psychology, Gordon Allport (1954) summarized the extant historical surveys of the field by noting that the boundary between psychological social psychology and sociological social psychology was not rigid. In fact, Ross's book was reviewed by the psychologist Charles Ellwood (1908), whereas McDougall's book was reviewed by the sociologist George H. Mead (1908).

Despite the fact that McDougall was the first psychologist to write an introductory textbook on social psychology, he did not have any enduring influence on American social psychologists. His ideas were not entirely compatible with, and could not compete with, schools of thought that came to dominate psychology at the beginning of the 20th century, such as objectivism, experimentalism, and behaviorism (Pepitone, 1981). Moreover, as Cartwright (1979) observed, "McDougall's theory of instincts never really had a chance, not so much because it was wrong, which it may very well have been, but because it was antithetical to American culture" (p. 86). According to Cartwright, the American political ideology of individualism, belief in the mutability of human nature, and human progress through scientific research and technology made attitude change, social learning, action research, and public opinion central topics of social psychology, pushing McDougall into irrelevance.

Forces that were separating sociology and psychology were already in place as early as the 1920s (Greenwood, 2004). Although sociologists distinguished themselves from psychologists by stressing the ontological status of social entities (e.g., Durkheim, 1897/1951), some psychologists were moving toward a more individualistic focus as manifested in F. H. Allport's (1924) words:

> There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals. . . . Social psychology is the science which studies the behavior of the individual in so far as his behavior stimulates other individuals or is itself a reaction to their behavior. (pp. 4, 12)

The same spirit was reflected in the chapter on experimental social psychology in the 1935 *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Murchison, 1935). The chapter claimed that the social world could be examined through the same paradigms used to study the physical world or nonhuman animals: "Particularly is it to be borne in mind that in this objective stimulus-response relationship to his fellows we have to deal with no radically new concepts, no principles essentially different from those applying to non-social situations" (Dashiell, 1935, p. 1097).

In this interwar era, theoretical and empirical work from a less individualistic and applied perspective coexisted with the more individualizing and positivistic trend. Leading social psychologists of the 1930s and 1940s such as Kurt Lewin, who is considered the father of modern psychology, Gardner Murphy, Theodore Newcomb, Rensis Likert, and Muzafer Sherif conceived of social psychology in more relational terms (for a discussion of how Lewin's vision of social psychology differed from that of Allport's, see Berscheid, 2003). During this period, although "psychological" social psychology was forming an identity independent of "sociological" social psychology, the two fields were still closely linked, as indicated by G. W. Allport's (1954) historical survey. Psychological social psychologists routinely published their work in sociology journals, suggesting the close ties between the fields. For instance, Lewin's (1939) celebrated article on field theory was published in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Similarly, Sherif, another influential social psychologist, published a series of articles in sociology journals, including his famous article on social norms in *Sociometry* (1937) and another on the reduction of intergroup conflict through the establishment of superordinate goals in the *American Journal of Sociology* (Sherif, 1958).

World War II brought sociologists and social psychologists together in interdisciplinary programs of military and civilian behavior (Farr, 1996; Greenwood, 2004). This era of interdisciplinary social psychology culminated in the multivolume *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, et al., 1949; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). Following World War II, interdisciplinary programs were created in multiple institutions such as Michigan, Harvard, Yale, Berkeley, and Columbia. These programs, however, were mostly short lived, and, in the aftermath of World War II, the two disciplines have grown further and further apart (for this history, see Hilgard, 1987).

How can we explain this distancing away from sociology in the years following World War II? One of the main reasons was that, over time, social psychology came to reflect the institutional and intellectual context in which it developed, namely, psychology departments (Farr, 1996; House, 1977). Most of the interdisciplinary programs that were founded after World War II have not survived, mainly because they could not bridge the cultural differences between sociologists and psychologists

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and because institutional forces were pulling them apart (Berkowitz, 1999; Jones, 1985). Traditional departmental structure in universities forced social psychologists to declare themselves either sociologists or psychologists, even if they were part of interdisciplinary programs. These interdisciplinary programs could not withstand the pressures of an increasingly competitive academic job market and a publishing industry that ever more emphasized disciplinary specialization.

Failed at interdisciplinarity, American social psychology became even more identified with psychology as a whole. Now social psychologists were "psychologists first and members of the social science fraternity second" (Berkowitz, 1999, p. 161). This identification had multiple repercussions for the development of social psychology over the next decades. By becoming part of psychology departments and identifying with psychologists, social psychology came under the influence of major currents in psychology and adopted its norms (Pepitone, 1981). These norms included a positivist, empiricist, and universalist epistemology and experimental methodology, which had characterized psychology since its early days.

One of the pressures to embrace mainstream psychology's values was the marginal status of social psychology in psychology departments. In the days after World War II, social psychologists did not enjoy a high status among their psychologist peers (Zimbardo, 1992). Ellen Berscheid (1992) recalled how in the early 1960s, when she was a graduate student, social psychology was often ridiculed by other psychologists from the lectern for being soft headed and sloppy. The gravity of the situation becomes more apparent when one considers that Berscheid was a student at the interdisciplinary Laboratory for Research in Social Relations at the University of Minnesota—one of the earliest and most prestigious centers for social psychology, home to renowned faculty members such as Leon Festinger, Elliot Aronson, Stanley Schachter, and Hal Kelley as well as sociologists, anthropologists, and so on. High status was accorded to the behavioral and cognitive experimentalists of the day, and social psychologists had much to gain by becoming "real scientists."

A comparison between the 1954 and 1998 editions of the *Handbook of Social Psychology* clearly illustrates the change from the acceptance of multiple methods to a focus on experiments. The *Handbook of Social Psychology,* edited by Gardner Lindzey in 1954, included various research methods, from experiments (Edwards, 1954) to interviews (Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954), content analyses (Berelson, 1954), systematic observational techniques (Heyns & Lippitt, 1954), attitude measures (Green, 1954), sociometric measurement (Lindzey & Borgatta, 1954), and cross-cultural comparisons (Whiting, 1954). Social psychologists today rarely use interviews, observation, or sociometric techniques (Rozin, 2001). Indeed, the fourth edition of the *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998) contains no chapters on these methods. It should be noted, however, that the *Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology* (Reis & Judd, 2000) does include a broader array of methodologies, including naturalistic studies, content analyses, and semistructured interviews, indicating that these methodologies are still within our field's repertoire.

The methodological orientation toward laboratory experiments in the 1960s and 1970s seems to have contributed to social psychology's drift from sociology, which does not typically rely on laboratory experiments (McIntyre, 2004). Psychologists' reliance on experiments in part reflected differences in the questions of interest to sociological versus psychological social psychologists, and yet it further reinforced these differences. Most celebrated laboratory experiments in social psychology were produced around this period (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Darley & Latané, 1968; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Milgram, 1963; Schachter & Singer, 1962), using a highly staged, emotion-provoking situation created in a research laboratory. Although few social psychologists today create high-impact laboratory situations in their experiments (for a notable exception, see D. Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999), these classic experiments became the archetypes of social psychology (Aronson et al., 1998; Rozin, 2001).

With the emphasis on intrapsychic phenomena and laboratory experiments in the 1960s and 1970s (for a recent history, see S. E. Taylor, 1998), psychological social psychologists increasingly estranged themselves from sociologists. Steiner (1974) wrote,

> By the 1960's social psychology had become much more individualistic. Interest in the group had waned and research was generally on intra-individual events or processes that mediate responses to social situations. . . . By the late 50's social psychology had turned inward. It had largely renounced or postponed its concern for larger social systems, and had centered its attention on internal states and processes: dissonance, attitudes, attributions. (p. 94)

Once experimentation was declared *the* method of choice, experiments took on a life of their own. Gradually, research done at other labs replaced life outside the lab as a source of inspiration for research hypotheses (Berkowitz, 1999). This is one of the reasons why social psychologists have increasingly distanced themselves from everyday social phenomena, which in turn has encouraged them to mainly focus on abstract concepts and highly theoretical analyses.

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The growth and institutionalization of social psychology through organizations and journals were also responsible for the separation of social psychology from sociology (see House, 1977; Stryker, 1989). Along with its publication, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* the founding of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology in 1965 was a landmark for the experimental turn in social psychology. The first volume of the *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* series was published in 1964. In 1965, the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* became the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.* Once social psychology had its own specialized journals and organizations, sociology became less relevant. Social psychologists were dependent on their peers' approval for funding and publications. The result, in Berkowitz's (1999) words, was that social psychologists

> think relatively little of those in other fields or the public at large. The problems they select for study and the concepts they employ in their teachings and writings are increasingly designed to appeal to others in their field rather than other possible audiences. (p. 165)

The increase in research output and demand for specialization that came with the growth of the field also made it increasingly difficult to venture beyond one's specialization.

The weakened association between psychological and sociological social psychologies can be seen through publication patterns of social psychologists. As exemplified by Lewin (1939) and Sherif (1937, 1958), social psychologists from the 1930s to 1950s routinely published in sociology journals, such as *American Sociological Review*, *American Journal of Sociology*, and *Sociometry* (now renamed *Social Psychology Quarterly*). Although social psychologists today still publish in sociology journals (e.g., Clore & Pappas, 2007; D. Cohen et al., 1999; Deaux et al., 2007), it is not as frequent as in the past. As of 2008, 40 psychologists have received the distinguished scientist award from the Society of Experimental Social Psychology. Our analysis of the publication patterns of these 40 award recipients revealed that the number of sociology publications in *American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, and *Sociometry* or *Social Psychology Quarterly* has been decreasing over the years. For these 40 eminent social psychologists, the number of sociology publications was negatively associated with the year of award ($r = -.32$, $p < .05$) and the year of PhD ($r = -.31$, $p = .05$). Because recent social psychologists have more publications than the earlier ones in general (the correlation between year of PhD and total number of journal articles published was $r = .48$, $p = .001$), we also computed the percentage of sociology publications in each scientist's total publications. The percentage of the sociology publications was negatively associated with the year of award ($r = -.41$, $p < .01$) and the year of PhD ($r = -.40$, $p = .01$; see Figure 1). Furthermore, the fourth edition of the *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Gilbert et al., 1998) no longer includes chapters on social psychology's connections with sociology, whereas previous editions contained such chapters. Thus, the severance of social psychology from sociology for the past 40 years or so is evident in the pattern of publications of prominent social psychologists.



Figure 1 The mean percentage of sociology publications among 40 distinguished scientist award recipients from the Society of Experimental Social Psychology by cohort (year of PhD)

NOTE: $N = 9$ for pre-1945; $N = 10$ for 1946 to 1954; $N = 10$ for 1955 to 1964; $N = 11$ for 1965 or later. Sociology publications included are those published in *American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review*, and *Sociometry/Social Psychology Quarterly*. Error bars indicate standard error.

These shifts in social psychology led to self-reflection and resistance, culminating in the so-called "crisis in social psychology" in the 1970s. Critics commented that social psychology had become too narrow and trivial, disconnected from real life, not generalizable to outside the lab, of little social relevance, and reductionist (Gergen, 1973; Helmreich, 1975; Katz, 1972; McGuire, 1973; Ring, 1967; Sherif, 1977). One key concern among the many voiced during this crisis was that social psychology had become too individualistic and dismissive of the larger social context. In 1979, the prominent social psychologist Dorwin Cartwright expressed his concern about the field's separation from sociology and social psychologists' exclusive focus on immediate, subjective contexts rather than on macro, distal, objective contexts:

> The major theoretical advances in recent years have also been primarily concerned with cognitive processes within individuals. . . . The cognitive representations of

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> the external world together with motivational forces arising from needs and internalized values unquestionably exert profound influences on behavior. But behavior itself is a transaction between an individual and the *objective* environment, not its cognitive representation, and the effectiveness of *social* behavior depends upon much more than beliefs and intentions. (p. 89)

Another criticism was that psychology lacked real-world relevance and failed to reach out beyond the confines of academia:

> Communication between the ivory tower and the real world of family, school, and the workplace has never been good; mostly it has been nonexistent. In the tower, basic researchers play their interesting little games with 2 x 2 designs while therapists, educators, and managers attempt to cope with real people. . . . Promotion to tenure and beyond is best achieved by publishing as many short, neat, and methodologically simple papers as possible. . . . The faculty member who commits him- or herself to a long-term, messy evaluation study is definitely at risk. (Gerard, 1983, p. 876)

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the "crisis" in social psychology seemed to have abated, and it is not clear whether it has led to any changes in the discipline. In his 1985 *Handbook of Social Psychology* chapter, Jones wrote that the crisis had already begun to take its place as a minor perturbation in the history of the field, barely affecting its intellectual momentum. Yet the grounds for the criticisms voiced during the crisis period continue to characterize mainstream social psychology. Even after the crisis has been relegated to the annals of social psychology, many distinguished social psychologists have repeatedly pointed to these underlying issues. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology in 1990, Berscheid (1992) listed the many ways in which social psychology made progress and then went on to say, "Not everything has improved over the past 25 years. We still do not have an epistemology well suited to our endeavors, which makes people uneasy when they think about it, which isn't very often anymore" (p. 531). Looking back at 100 years of social psychology, Morton Deutsch (1999) commented that the individualistic American ethos may have contributed to the neglect of social reality in current social psychology:

> I think this image has influenced much of American social psychology, which has been too focused on what goes on in the isolated head of the subject, with a corresponding neglect of the social reality in which the subject is participating. (p. 29)

Bertram Raven (1999) noted that the increasing emphasis on experimental research has led social psychologists "to ignore nonexperimental research, including historical, biographical, and political analyses that do not lend themselves to our accepted format" (p. 130). Rozin (2001) criticized social psychologists' obsession with tight experimental control and theory-driven research and the lack of appreciation for informed curiosity.

In its rare self-reflective moments, social psychology continually returns to the same theme: the loss of the sociological perspective in social psychology. There seems to be consensus that the majority of social psychologists, particularly in the United States (see Scherer, 1993), have neglected objective, chronic, macro environments and have focused instead on how individuals interpret and process the objective world (Sampson, 1981; Smith & Semin, 2004). At the same time, the topics published in the field's most prestigious journals have become largely limited to those that lend themselves to experimental studies, resulting in the virtual elimination of many vital topics from social psychologists' horizons of inquiry. Like many other critics, we believe that the loss of the sociological perspective is unfortunate, considering that the main goal of social psychology is to understand human cognitions, emotions, motivations, and actions in their social contexts (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2007; Gilovich et al., 2005; Van Lange, 2006). The macro-societal perspective is an important ingredient in attaining this lofty goal (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2006; Cartwright, 1979; McGuire, 1973).

To redress the separation between social psychology and sociology, Cartwright (1979) presented a broader definition of social psychology, which includes the perspectives of both psychological and sociological social psychologies: "Social psychology is that branch of the social sciences which attempts to explain how society influences the cognition, motivation, development, and behavior of individuals and, in turn, is influenced by them" (p. 91). The emphasis on reciprocal relations between individuals and society is akin to the famous definition of cultural psychology as the mutual constitution of culture and psyche (Shweder, 1991). Despite the obvious similarity in approach, cultural psychology developed without a close connection to sociology in the 1990s (for details, see Greenwood, 2004; Oishi & Graham, 2008; Schooler, 1996). Thus, the popularity of cultural psychology in social psychology has not yet encouraged social psychologists to take sociological perspectives seriously (for a sign of hope on this point, see, however, Markus & Hamedani, 2007). In fact, as we discuss more below, it appears as though the influence has been almost entirely in the other direction—that is, nascent subfields in cultural sociology have used findings from social-psychological experiments to challenge sociological understandings of culture (see, e.g., Cerulo, 2002; Illouz, 2007).

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Interestingly, as the link to sociology has weakened, the past few decades have seen an explosion of interdisciplinary research in social psychology, ranging from neuroscience (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2002), immunology (e.g., Petrie, Booth, & Pennebaker, 1998), and evolutionary biology (e.g., Schaller, Simpson, & Kenrick, 2006) to political science (e.g., Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008), behavioral economics (e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003), and anthropology (e.g., Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998). Indeed, as neuroscience and biology came to be seen as fundamental to social psychology among leaders of our field (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2002; S. E. Taylor, 2004), the link with sociology, our closest discipline until the 1960s, has faded.

Considering the state of neighboring disciplines, such as sociology, political science, and consumer behavior or marketing, it is surprising that social psychology does not have its camps of quantitativists and qualitativists. Unlike those fields with related subject matters, social psychology is a field united by its methodology. This methodology, we believe, is also what led to the success of social psychology. Zimbardo (1999) noted, “Sociologists asked the big questions but never quite had good enough answers, whereas it became evident that psychologists were asking low-level questions but were good at methodology and analysis” (p. 143). Imaginative experimental designs combined with analytical sophistication allowed the accumulation of an impressive body of knowledge and led to a strong field of social psychology with increasing impact and interdisciplinary activity. Now that social psychology is a strong enterprise, it can further its reach by utilizing a sociological imagination, without relaxing its analytical standards. In the next section, we review the promises of such an expansion.

HOW CAN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

There are numerous ways in which sociological perspectives can enrich psychological social psychology. Below we review several successful cases of incorporating sociological perspectives to social psychology, ranging from the application of Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical perspective to the self (e.g., Jones, 1964; Schlenker, 1980) and stereotypes (e.g., Sinclair, Hardin, & Lowery, 2006), to the use of “sociological imagination” in the search for the origins of violent culture (D. Cohen et al., 1999; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) and cultural values (Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008), and to the demonstration of emergent properties at the levels of group (Schopler, Insko, & Wieselquist, 2001) and neighborhood (Silver, Mulvey, & Swanson, 2002).

As described above, sociological perspectives are concerned with attention to collective reality, social structures, and social facts (a macro-sociological perspective) on one hand and attention to human interactions and relationships (a micro-sociological perspective) on the other hand. The micro-sociological perspective is closer to the psychological perspective and indeed has been visible in several programs of research in social psychology, demonstrating how a sociological perspective can add value to psychological theorizing and research. For instance, the micro-sociological approach is visible in research on ingratiation (Jones, 1964) and other impression management strategies (e.g., Jones & Berglas, 1978; Schlenker, 1980). Ned Jones, Barry Schlenker, and their colleagues maintained that the types and norms of social interactions are central to understanding the nature of the self (e.g., Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Tice & Baumeister, 2001). As is clear from their introductory chapters, Jones (1964) and Schlenker (1980) were inspired by the sociologist Goffman, in particular *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Goffman, 1959), who was in turn deeply influenced by Mead. The dramaturgical perspective on human interactions proposed by Goffman highlights the often implicit rules and strategies of interpersonal symbolic exchange through which social actors create and maintain a shared sense of reality and establish their social identities. Cooley, Mead, and Goffman’s work further inspired Hardin and Higgins’s (1996) influential shared reality theory, the main propositions of which are

> (1) experience of reality or meaning is created and maintained for the individual when it is mutually shared with others; (2) social interaction is predicated upon and regulated by the establishment of shared reality, and (3) the shared reality that is achieved in social interaction in turn functions to regulate the self, closing the self-society circle. (p. 30)

Hardin and Higgins’s shared reality theory has brought an interpersonal perspective to the traditionally highly intrapsychic focus of research on attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices (for empirical examples, see Sinclair et al., 2006; Sinclair, Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2005).

In addition, Goffman’s later work on stigma and spoiled identity (Goffman, 1963) led to the explication of the role of social inequality, status, and expectations in social interactions and identity. Goffman’s work on stigma and spoiled identity not only became a springboard for research on social stigma (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) but also inspired the research on power and status now popular in social psychology (J. A. Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005). The recent attention that social psychologists have paid to power, status, and inequality is a welcome sign that some researchers are starting to take social structural factors seriously (e.g., Fiske, 1993). It is unfortunate,

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however, that contemporary social psychologists in this area do not typically pay homage to Goffman and other sociologists' work; instead, many of them cite evolutionary psychology as a source of inspiration (e.g., Maner, Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche, 2007). Here, we believe that evolutionary and sociological perspectives have converged on the critical importance of power and status in society and human interactions and together have provided fertile theoretical backgrounds for empirical research on social power (for a similar view, see Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008).

Although the micro-sociological perspective is clearly still alive and well in some research topics in social psychology, the macro-sociological perspective is harder to come by in social psychology. A wonderful example of sociological imagination in social psychology is Dov Cohen's research program on the culture of honor (e.g., D. Cohen et al., 1999; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Nisbett and Cohen (1996) presented individual-level experimental and survey data as well as regional crime and punishment statistics, legal codes, and newspaper stories to document the social norms of toughness, self-defense, and violence in the American South. They used economic and historical factors such as mode of production and immigration history to explain the creation and maintenance of the Southern culture of honor. They pointed out that herding was the major economic activity in the Southern United States in the 18th century and this area was settled primarily by Scotch-Irish who had been herders for centuries. Because herds are at a constant risk of being raided, herding people the world over protect their herds with a reputation for toughness and a ready response to any insults that may threaten their reputation. The lack of a police force was another factor that added to the importance to protecting one's own lot. This program of research superbly exemplifies the sociological imagination, the ability and willingness to entertain the possibility that distal, macro factors can explain a very psychological phenomenon such as violence.

Similarly, Mark Schaller and his colleagues (Fincher et al., 2008; Schaller & Murray, 2008) used the sociological imagination to explain the link between a distal, macro factor such as historical pathogen prevalence and cultural values and personality traits of extraversion. These researchers dared to imagine such a link and indeed demonstrated that a historically high rate of disease prevalence in a region is associated with more collectivism, a more restricted female sexuality, lower scores in extraversion, and lower scores in openness to experience. Such a psychological outlook presumably helps to protect individuals against disease transmission by limiting contact. Like Cohen, these researchers obtained a large dividend by using their sociological imagination, seeing the distal yet important role that historical pathogen prevalence has played in the creation and maintenance of cultural values and personality traits.

As discussed above, beyond employing distal factors in the understanding of lower level phenomena, utilizing sociological imagination in a macro sense may also take the form of a theoretical shift from conceptualizing the social as an aggregate of individual psychological processes to conceptualizing the social as an irreducible whole that emerges out of the interaction of individuals. Some examples of emergent phenomena can be found in psychological studies of groups. Concepts such as groupthink, deindividuation, and group polarization refer to phenomena emerging from the interactions of group members. Perhaps the strongest example of this theoretical perspective is social identity theory, which is based on the presumption that group processes cannot be reduced to interpersonal processes among group members (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Group cohesiveness, for example, is not simply the sum of group members' interpersonal attraction to each other. Instead, groups are held together by a social attraction that is triggered by common membership in a valued group, even when group members do not show strong interpersonal liking for each other (Hogg, 1992). When they identify with a group, individuals incorporate the group into their self-concepts, and this leads to the emergence of a higher order self as a group member. For example, people are far less cooperative when they play a prisoner's dilemma game as a group rather than as individuals (Schopler et al., 2001). This individual–group discontinuity effect shows that there is a shift in cognition and behavior when people are in groups and that group behavior is not a linear function of individual behavior.

Research on subjective well-being illustrates how the same issue can be examined with an eye toward emergent collective properties versus aggregated individual properties. Sociologist Eric Silver and his colleagues (2002) found in the National Institute of Mental Health's Epidemiological Catchment surveys that the rates of schizophrenia, major depression, and substance abuse disorder were higher in residentially mobile *neighborhoods* than in residentially stable neighborhoods, controlling for individual-level variables such as age, gender, race, education, and income. Using a group-level unit of analysis—neighborhoods—these researchers showed that even when residents themselves do not move, those living in highly mobile neighborhoods seem to be negatively affected by the residential moves of their neighbors. Similarly, Fowler and Christakis (2008) showed that happiness is distributed in social networks such that it reaches out to three degrees of separation. Their research demonstrates that a our happiness is related to the happiness of our friends, our friends' friends, and our friends' friends' friends. These findings

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indicate that well-being, like Durkheim's conceptualization of suicide, is a social fact sui generis and that knowledge about one's social networks provides important information about one's well-being. Yet psychological theorizing and research on well-being have failed to incorporate relevant relational and collective phenomena, instead focusing on intrapsychic phenomena such as personality traits, health, values, social and financial status, and one's interpretation of the quality of social relationships (for review, see Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; however, for an exception, see Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995). Psychologists have not used Mills's (1959) "sociological imagination" and have not seen collective forces behind subjective well-being. Even when they include socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, and residential mobility in analyses, psychologists usually treat them as individual difference variables (see our own work for examples: Oishi, 2002; Oishi, Lun, & Sherman, 2007). Attention to collective phenomena, such as social networks and neighborhood characteristics, will broaden psychological theorizing and research in subjective well-being by refiguring well-being as an emergent collective property.

The lack of a sociological imagination is true not only in subjective well-being research but also in most popular research topics in social psychology. Researchers of attitudes and persuasion typically investigate individual-level factors (e.g., preexisting attitudes, personality, mood, and mental situation at the time of judgments) and immediate situations (e.g., the presence of another person, object, or goal) as principal variables. So do researchers of stereotypes and prejudice (with the notable exception of social dominance theory; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), helping, self, morality, aggression, and conformity. It is *individuals'* stereotype and prejudice, helping behavior, self-concepts, self-regulation, moral judgments, relationship quality, aggressive behavior, and conformity that researchers try to assess, predict, and modify, not collective stereotypes, collective helping, collective regulation, and so forth.

Concepts such as stereotypes and prejudice, however, imply a collective reality from the outset. Groups and communities tend to share similar stereotypes and prejudices, and at least some stereotypes persist over time, regardless of whether individual members of the group and community change (Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002). Similarly, groups and communities tend to share similar political attitudes. Despite the change in its residents, certain political attitudes (e.g., pro-Republican) of a community persist over time (Bullock, Hoffman, & Gaddie, 2006). Likewise, some groups (e.g., sororities, sports teams, bands) seem to have a stronger self-regulation and to be more prosocial and less aggressive than others, again despite the changes in membership over time.

In each case, there is no doubt that biased selection and biased attrition do play some role (B. Schneider, 1987). Some new members or residents gravitate toward a particular group or community because the community reflects beliefs and behaviors that already characterize these new members, and members who do not fit these general tendencies of the group are more likely to exit the group. Thus, to some extent, it is not the group per se but the members' personality, values, and characters that give rise to group-level phenomena. However, it is also true that there is a group-level reality that cannot be explained by the aggregate of individual members alone.

One of the major obstacles to social psychologists' attempts to take on the collective, emergent property idea was the lack of proper research methods. In this respect, the recent development of agent-based modeling (ABM; Smith & Conrey, 2007) is significant. An agent-based model simulates a system made of agents who have traits, goals, and strategies and allows researchers to investigate emergent phenomena, namely, the population-level processes that emerge out of the repeated interactions of these agents. Smith and Conrey (2007) wrote, "ABM is a tool to conceptually bridge between the micro level of assumptions regarding individual agent behaviors, interagent interactions, and so forth and the macro level of the overall patterns that result in the agent population" (p. 88). Research using ABM has, for example, shown that complete segregation of neighborhoods may result from an understandable agent-level desire to avoid being in the minority in a neighborhood (Schelling, 1971). Agents need not hate each other or want to escape from members of other races; all it takes is a desire not to be in the minority. These results show that emergent phenomena may sometimes be counterintuitive and that ABM may be an effective tool to build theories that cross levels of analysis.

REBUILDING THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

As we have argued above, we believe that a willingness to entertain the possibility of an irreducible collective reality (sui generis; Durkheim, 1897/1951) and the acquisition of "sociological imagination" (Mills, 1959) will enrich established research areas (e.g., aggression—D. Cohen et al., 1999; cooperation—Schopler et al., 2001; stereotypes—Schaller et al., 2002; well-being—Silver et al., 2002), spark a renewed appreciation for research on group and social norms (e.g., Kameda, Takezawa, & Hastie, 2006), and open up new research areas in social psychology (e.g., cultural

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psychology—Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; evolution of values and personality—Fincher et al., 2008). There are conceptual models within social psychology that provide the specific strategies for bridging the gap between social psychology and sociology. For example, in a largely forgotten 1952 article, Tolman provided a simple roadmap for understanding the differences and similarities between psychology and sociology (as well as anthropology). Dividing both disciplines into their independent, intervening, and dependent variables, he showed what research that crosses the boundaries between the disciplines might look like (for a more comprehensive view, also see Parsons & Shils, 1951/2001). Though his simple schema reflects the state of both disciplines in the 1950s, we nevertheless recommend this article as a starting point for social psychologists and sociologists wishing to enter into dialogue. Likewise, Cacioppo and Bernston (1992) proposed the multilevel analysis doctrine in the context of social neuroscience, in which they emphasized the connections among biology, psychology, and sociology. The doctrine is composed of three principles:

1. The determination of a phenomenon at multiple levels of organization
2. Nonadditive determinism, meaning that properties of the collective cannot always be predicted from the properties of the parts (emergence)
3. Reciprocal determinism, meaning that there are mutual influences between higher and lower levels of organization

Although social neuroscience research so far has focused mostly on downward connections to biology and neurosciences, a connection to sociology embodies all the principles of multilevel analysis at higher levels of organization. Similarly, we suggest drawing on European social psychology, such as the work of Serge Moscovici (e.g., Moscovici & Duveen, 2000) on social representations, to find well-established research traditions in social psychology with strong links to the Durkheimian perspective (for a Durkheimian perspective on morality, also see Haidt & Graham, 2009). We have also identified four research areas in contemporary social psychology, proponents of which have already begun to bridge the gap between social psychology and sociology by incorporating sociological imagination into their work. In what follows, we attempt to match these trends to contemporary research areas in sociology proper to strengthen these connections.

Social Identity Theory and the Sociology of the Self. A longstanding connection between social psychology and the sociological perspective can be found in research on the self. For instance, Baumeister's (1986, 1987) influential theory of self and identity is deeply sociological, as he traces historical changes in the nature of relationships between individuals and society.[3] Baumeister's concept of the public self is similar to Mead's (1934) social self in its attention to external control of deviant behaviors. Likewise, the impact of Cooley (1902, 1909) and Mead is apparent in Markus and Kitayama's (1991) interdependent self, Cross and Madson's (1997) relational self, Snyder's (1987) self-monitoring theory, and Swann's (1984) self-verification theory, among many other interpersonal theories of the self (for a recent review, see Vohs & Finkel, 2006). Although these theories focus on interpersonal relationships, psychological research on the implications of the social self in group or collective behaviors is more limited. Thus, even when the self is conceptualized as deeply social, research on the self is concentrated more in the relational rather than in the collective self (see Sedikides & Brewer, 2001).

The notable exception in this domain is social identity theory, which incorporates the collective perspective in a more compelling way by viewing an individual's self-concept as not simply influenced by but inextricably linked to the in-groups with which individuals identify as well as the out-groups from which they distinguish themselves (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995; Turner et al., 1987). As discussed above, social identity theory demonstrates that group identifications are incorporated into the self-concept at a deep psychological level and shape cognition and behavior to the extent that those identifications are strong and contextually salient (see, e.g., Ellemers et al., 2002; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996). Clearly, this research program continues in the Meadian tradition by taking the concept of group "role" as central to the construction of a stable, reflexive, coherent self-concept; however, it conceptualizes the self as more deeply social by further dissolving the (false) boundary between individual and group identity.

Research on the self by sociologists long ago abandoned the concept of role, instead adopting the postmodern, Foucauldian view that the self is a fluid, flexible embodiment of the discourses, or narratives of power, and struggles for identity in which it is suspended (see, e.g., Butler, 1990; Foucault, 1979, 1988; S. Hall, 1996). Consequently, the rugged, stable, reflexive self of Meadian symbolic interactionism fell into disfavor in sociology in the 1970s and 1980s (Callero, 2003). In recent years, however, a neo-pragmatist movement has arisen in sociological writings on the self, which has reinvigorated interest in Mead and the concept of role without sacrificing the important concepts of discourse, narrative, and power gained from encounters with postmodern theory (see, e.g., Callero, 2008; Dunn, 1997; MacIntyre, 1984; C. Taylor, 1989; Wiley, 1994). We view this return to pragmatist theory in

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sociology as an invitation for renewed dialogue between social psychology and sociology on issues of self and identity that neither overestimates the fixity of the self-concept nor underestimates the influence of power and group conflict in the making of fluid identity projects.

Intergroup Emotions Theory and the Sociology of Emotions. Closely related to social identity theory is intergroup emotions theory, which posits that group-based emotions are sometimes distinct from and more salient than emotional reactions based on concern for the individual self (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993, 1999) and that group-relevant events can shape individuals' experiences of emotion (e.g., Bernhardt, Dabbs, Fielden, & Lutter, 1998; Hirt, Zillmann, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992).

As in social psychology, in sociology there has been an increasing interest in emotions. Unlike intergroup emotions researchers, however, sociologists of emotion have taken a more structural and historical approach, attempting to demonstrate the influence of social forces at the macro level on individual and group-based emotions at the micro level (e.g., Barbalet, 2001; Collins, 2004; Hochschild, 1979; Scheff, 1990). Both intergroup emotions theory and the sociology of emotions conceptualize emotional life as irreducible to the individual psyche; however, the sociological perspective highlights the importance of broad historical changes that transcend the group level. For example, Eva Illouz (2007) argued that the way Americans talk about and manage their emotions has changed dramatically with the rise of postindustrial capitalism. She showed that Americans increasingly understand their most personal, private relationships using market metaphors, while they are simultaneously encouraged to become more sensitive and emotionally "intelligent" in their public, work relationships. Thus, Illouz concluded that individuals' emotional lives are shaped by the culture of capitalism via the institutions of "emotional capitalism," such as self-help literature, women's magazines, human resources management programs, talk shows, and Internet dating sites. Macro-historical studies like this one challenge social psychologists to take into account not only evolutionary pressures and individual influences on emotions but also epochal social and cultural transformations. At the same time, the internal validity of experimental studies on intergroup emotions challenges sociologists to better specify exactly how historical discourses about emotions shape individual experiences through mundane cultural institutions.

Situated Social Cognition and Cognitive Sociology. The psychological meta-theoretical approach of situated social cognition maintains that cognition is not a result of abstract symbolic computations but instead emerges out of a dialogue between the person and the social context (Smith & Semin, 2004). Cognition is thus "socially situated," meaning that a focus on internal representations alone does not do justice to the scope of human cognition. From this perspective, social cognitions, such as stereotyping, are indexical to the situation and can be malleable depending on one's goals or on the communication context. In other words, the cognitive schemas with which individuals negotiate the world are differently deployed depending on the configuration of social relationships in a given space of interaction. Unlike most psychological research on social cognition, this approach "invites researchers to specify not only psychological processes and their effects but also their boundaries" (Smith & Semin, 2007, p. 133). Thus, cognition is seen as intertwined with the situation and thus irreducible to individual psychological processes. Moreover, it must be studied with an eye toward social group boundaries.

The socially situated cognition perspective is remarkably consistent with findings from the emerging field of cognitive sociology (e.g., Cerulo, 2002; Cicourel, 1974; Dimaggio, 1997; Zerubavel, 1997). Cognitive sociology conceptualizes thinking as social in both its content and processes but has relied on both social psychology and cognitive neuroscience to demonstrate the veracity of these conclusions more concretely. Some cognitive sociologists have come to the same conclusion as proponents of situated social cognition: Knowledge and culture are perhaps less unitary, stable, and structured than previously imagined. Culture may not be a rigid, persistent system of meanings; rather, it may be more like a loose collection of meaningful symbols and strategies that can be used creatively depending on an actor's location in social space (Dimaggio, 2002; Swidler, 1986). We suspect that increased communication between these two perspectives may help specify a convincing "meso-level" theory of cultural cognition that is neither too individualist nor too collectivist. To this end, psychologists would do well to familiarize themselves with the "toolkit" theory of culture in sociology (Swidler, 1986; Vaisey, 2009) as well as the sociological research program known as "ethnomethodology" (Garfinkel, 1967). Both take for granted certain kinds of cultural cognition that social psychologists are well positioned to test empirically.

Social and Transactive Memory. The sociologist Jeffrey K. Olick (1999) has distinguished between two paradigms in the social-scientific study of memory: collect*ed* memory research and collect*ive* memory research. In the former, group memory is conceived as "the aggregated individual memories of members of a

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group" (p. 338). Memory is social, according to this perspective, because social forces influence an individual's perception of the past. Group memory is seen as the collection of situated individual memories into an average representation of past events; thus, group memory can be reduced to individual memories. In the collective memory paradigm, by contrast, social memory is conceptualized as an emergent property sui generis. In this more radically collective notion of social memory, it is more proper to say that groups remember and individuals participate in this collective act. According to this perspective, individuals are socialized into "mnemonic communities": groups with shared systems of symbols, rituals, and narratives for reconstructing the past that precede and outlast any single individual's memory. From this perspective, group structures make individual memory possible in the first place by demarcating what is and is not memorable and by institutionalizing how to remember certain events. In short, the collective memory paradigm posits that individuals are not simply influenced by social context when they remember; rather, individuals cannot remember "in any coherent or persistent fashion outside of their group context" (Olick, 1999, p. 334).

Generally speaking, mainstream psychological work on social memory has operated under the *collected* memory paradigm, focusing on individual processing biases that result from social influences. Social psychologists studying transactive memory, however, have conceptualized memory in a more collectivist sense. Transactive memory research involves experiments with dyads, groups, and teams to reveal how social memories emerge within systems of group communication and thus cannot be reduced to individual memory (Peltokorpi, 2008; Wegner, 1995; Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991; Wittenbaum, 2003). This line of research has shown how dyads or groups engage in a division of labor in memory tasks, thereby creating a distributed system of memory and increasing the memory capacity of the collective (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Thus, although individual memory is important for transactive memory, it cannot be understood without reference to the networks of communication and external memory storage within which individual memory is suspended.

Sociological perspectives on memory fit into a wider research program known as social memory studies, which also includes work by historians, political scientists, literary theorists, anthropologists, and, to a limited extent, social psychologists (for a review, see Olick & Robbins, 1998). Research in this tradition has been cross-disciplinary from the start, claiming both Maurice Halbwachs (one of Durkheim's students) and the psychologist F. C. Bartlett as forefathers. Like transactive memory, social memory studies see memory as collective rather than collected. Unlike transactive memory researchers, sociologists have taken a more macro-historical approach to the study of memory, illustrating how collective representations of the past shape and are shaped by present group identities. For example, though the German Holocaust is directly remembered by those individuals who experienced it, collective memory researchers have shown that cultural institutions in Germany and beyond have objectified those memories in stories, monuments, commemorative rituals, archives, and museums creating collective representations of Nazi Germany that can be passed down from generation to generation (see, e.g., Olick, 2005). These institutionalized group memories are of great political importance and are thus continually subject to contestation and revision in light of different national and group interests. As this example suggests, the macro perspective of social memory studies challenges researchers of transactive memory to be more cross-cultural, comparative, and historical. At the same time, research on transactive memory challenges social memory studies to be more specific about how collective memory works on the small group level and thus how the forces of group memory "get into" and affect particular instances of collective and individual remembering.

Although the sources discussed above by no means exhaust the potential for rebuilding the bridge between social psychology and sociology, we feel that they represent excellent starting points. Moreover, they show that it is not only psychology that stands to benefit from this renewed dialogue but sociology as well. Thus, we agree with Sheldon Stryker, who in 1989 identified what social psychologists on each side of the disciplinary divide may miss by ignoring the other:

> [The costs] have to do with the limitations of partial perspectives and the inability to overcome these limitations absent the integration of the insights available in each of the social psychologies; with the strong possibility of theoretical misspecification, failures of understanding resulting from the absence of critical variables in our analysis; with blind spots arising out of disciplinary myopia; with the losses entailed in not taking advantage of the full range of intellectual, theoretical and methodological resources available on both sides of the social psychological fence. (pp. 49-50)

Although we have focused on the implications for psy chology, like Stryker, we believe that mutual recognition between sociological and psychological social psychologies will benefit both disciplines.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

One hundred years ago, sociology and psychology together created a new discipline called social psychology

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(McDougall, 1908/1921; E. A. Ross, 1908). Sociology continued to be one of the closest allies for psychology throughout the first half of the 20th century (G. W. Allport, 1954; Hilgard, 1987). As noted at the beginning of this article, the renowned experimental psychologist Tolman (1938) maintained that psychologists cannot study the behaviors of individuals without considering larger sociological wholes and that sociology is fundamental to psychology for this reason. Unfortunately, this sentiment has disappeared from mainstream American psychology for the past four decades; the connection with sociology has been weakened and a sociological perspective has largely been lost in social psychology (Bar-Tal, 2006; Cartwright, 1979; Greenwood, 2004). The sociological perspective offers several benefits to social psychology. The theoretical orientations of social psychology have become increasingly intrapsychic, within a participant's head (e.g., cognitive representation, construct accessibility) or heart (e.g., emotion, motivation), over the past 40 years (Greenwood, 2004; Smith & Semin, 2004). The sociological perspective and sociological imagination will help psychologists pay attention to people's natural social habitats and broaden research attention to activities in daily chronic situations, like the earlier generation of social psychologists did (e.g., Asch, 1952; Lewin, 1939; Newcomb, 1943; Sherif, 1954).

Over the past three decades, social psychology has weathered its crisis and established a strong presence as a methodologically sophisticated discipline (Wilson, 2006). The psychological perspective came to dominate the social psychology scene—so much so that sociological perspectives became marginalized. This marginalization is apparent in the small number of sociological social psychology textbooks (Jones, 1985) and the fact that many of the existing sociological texts qualify their perspective in their titles, such as in *Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology* (Cook, Fine, & House, 1995) or *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives* (Rosenberg & Turner, 1990). In our opinion, wedding some sociological imagination to the methodological and analytical strengths of psychological social psychology will help expand the scope of social psychology such that it can become the truly *grand* branch of social science that Lewin (1939, 1951) and Cartwright (1979) envisioned (for recent examples, see Anderson & Bushman, 2002; G. L. Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Schaller & Murray, 2008). As we celebrate this historic moment in social psychology, we hope that a renewed connection with sociology and the adoption of the sociological imagination will invigorate the future of social psychology.

NOTES

1. The conference titled "Social Psychology: A First 100 Years" was held on September 26 and 27, 2008, at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where Edward Ross was a faculty member (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/socpsych/centennial.php).

2. The macro–micro distinction is just one of many typologies that could be used to characterize sociology. However, we have found this distinction to be the most useful one for our purposes. We are certainly aware of the many fruitful attempts to link these two perspectives (and thus dissolve the distinction) in social theory (see, e.g., Alexander, Giesen, Munch, & Smelser, 1987; Collins, 2004).

3. Roy Baumeister's sociological imagination is not surprising considering that he completed a postdoctoral fellowship in sociology.

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