Click to read:
"The Peace terms were really written in the Armistice to Germany..."
6) Norman Davis, Thomas W. Lamont, AMMISSION, telegram to Secstate,
for Leffingwell,
5-27, 1919, excerpt, Thomas W. Lamont Papers, Baker Library, Harvard,
164-13, explaining the need for financial aid to Europe.
"...We are in thorough accord with you as to the necessity of getting
back
at the earliest possible moment to normal conditions and channels of
trade
and credit. We are lending all the weight of our influence to this
policy
and are glad to state that the soundest minds of the British, French
and
Italian delegation are now in agreement with us and are endeavoring
to
take steps necessary to permit and encourage their nationals to work
on
this principle ..There is, however, possibly one point that comes home
to
us here on the spot probably more forcibly than it does to you and
that
is, in considering the European economic and financial situation, the
American people must be brought to realize that they must extend aid
not
on grounds of humanity and generosity but on grounds of almost immediate
self-interest... For your information, President continues to be much
impressed with the importance of this situation and at his request
we have
conferred with him more than once on this point. He has also asked
us to
confer informally with some of the soundest men here among the Allies
with
a view of ascertaining actual facts with respect to their several
countries, their views as to the requirements in general, and what
they
propose concretely in means and extent, to meet the situation, within
the
limitations and principles which you and we feel must be adhered to.
As a
result of our own studies and the various conversation we have come
to
certain tentative conclusion as to the requirements and the direction
which should be taken to meet them. These we will endeavor to outline
to
you roughly as follows: (a) credits for the newly constituted countries
such as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Baltic States, Roumania and Great
Serbia,
for the establishment of stable currencies, the purchase of raw materials,
and of transportation and agricultural equipment, (b) Raw materials
for
France, Italy and Belgium for restocking their factories and for
reconstruction; (c) working capital for Germany and the enemy states
to be
employed in the purchase of hood and raw materials in order to enable
them
to resume their industrial life and incidentally to make substantial
payments in the future for reparations which would add considerably
in
solving the financial difficulties of the Allied Countries. ...
As to (c) all of the politicians over here , from the start had
the naive idea that they could take away from Germany all her
liquid capital, say five billion dollars, within the next two
years, and that then American would be delighted to replace this
working capital by fresh credits to Germany which would enable
her to continue her economic life uninterruptedly and make
handsome reparation payments. The sound people have always
realized the absurdity of this proposition, and at last the
politicians have come to realize it. Accordingly, the British and
the French are now putting their heads together (and we are
assisting them as best we can) to suggest some handling of the
reparation clauses in a way that will not deprive Germany of all
her working capital and will thus enable her to get in shape to
meet her subsequent reparation payments. This might be done be
permitting Germany to retain enough assets for working capital
and possibly to issue something in effect like Receiver's
Certification. Just what form such a plan could take is yet
uncertain. It would require changes in present peace conditions
and after oral conferences with the German Delegates themselves.
Naturally on this point we Americans are not taking the lead.
... ... We are of opinion that inspire of credit resources
available to England, France and italy, it will nevertheless be
difficult if not impossible for them within the next three years
to overcome their unfavorable trade balance sufficiently to be
able to meet the interest on their obligations held by us.
We believe that this is the advantageous line and that it would
assist most materially in meeting situation if authority were
secured to fund without interest for a period of three years the
maturing interest on foreign government obligations held by
Treasury..."
7) E.M. House Diary of the peace conference, excerpt, Sterling Library, Yale, v. XVI, 5-30, 1919:
"Clemenceau declared that he intended to stand firm against any
substantial reduction in the terms of the Treaty no matter what
the consequences. In my opinion if he does this, he will win. I
am not sure that his policy is best. The Treaty is not a good
one, it is too severe, and notwithstanding the President believes
it is well within the Fourteen Points, it is far afield from
them. However, the time to have made the Treaty right was when it
was being formed and not now. It is a question if one commenced
to unravel what has already been done whether it should be
stopped. It is also a question as to the effect upon the Germans.
I desired from the beginning a fair peace, and one well within the
Fourteen Points,and one which could stand the scrutiny of the
neutral world and of all time. It is not such a peace, but since
the Treaty has been written I question whether it would be well
seriously to modify it."
9.) E.M. House Diary, excerpt, Sterling Library, Yale, v. XVI, 6-2, 1918
"...Clemenceau said George wanted the Germans admitted immediately to
the
League of Nations I replied that I sympathized with this too, but there
again, I wanted to fight it out when the Treaty was being made and
not now
after it had been unanimously agreed upon. I asked what explanation
he,
Clemenceau, could give for not wanting the Germans under control of
the
League of Nations. He said he did not care, only he did not want them
in
at once, that in a little while he was perfectly willing, but they
must
not come in at the very start.
It is the old man's purpose to keep me fully informed ,for
although he knows that I do not sympathize with the excessive
harshness of the Treaty, neither do I sympathize with the desire
to run the minute it is assailed. The President said he took
practically no part in the discussion except at one time to come
to Clemenceau's aid in regard to the Saar Valley."
10) Thomas W. Lamont to Florence Lamont, 6-7, 1919, excerpt,
Thomas W. Lamont
Papers, Baker Library, Harvard, 165-25:
responds to what he perceives as Florence's criticisms of the treaty:
"The
real answer to all this is that Great Britain's Board of Trade and
her
other commercial interests determined to get out of this Treaty every
bit that they possibly could, and again and again those interests have
lined up with the French against the Americans in putting over something
that would mean advantage to the British commercial interests. America
came over here asking not a dollar and looking for no commercial value.
She is maintaining that position all the way through. Great Britain,
on
the other hand, has been on the make from start to finish. As we figure
it, she is going to wind up in a much stronger commercial position
that
she ever has before. She has let us do the feeding of Europe. American
hs
spent hundreds of millions of dollars in feeding Europe as contrasted
with
tens on the part of Great Britain, Great Britain maintaining, meantime,
that she had not the ability to contribute her share. And now what
do we
find? We find this: the Hoover organization is winding up its work
on July
1st, feeling that harvest time is arriving, and it is possible for
the
smaller nations to begin to look out for themselves. And now we find
that
Great Britain, who was too poor to help out in feeding during all this
critical time, is writing to the smaller nations that, now that the
Hoover
organization is quitting on them, Great Britain will see about taking
care
of them, but only in the event that they will do all their business,
grant
their concession, &c, &c, to Great Britain. I came over there
pro-British,
but I go back anything but that.
Talk about liberal minded Englishmen? They all make me sick. If
they had one-tenth the courage of their convictions they would
have stood by the Americans and helped us get the sort of Peace
we wanted. Instead of that, they threw us at every turn.
You say that President Wilson ought to come out and say "The
Peace is a poor one, I know; it is the best that I could do."
"Well, perhaps he ought to say that; and he ought to add that "It
is the best I can do in view of the fact that the noble-minded
British threw me at every turn, laughed at my 14 points, lined up
with the French, and wore me out morning, noon and night." This
is the real truth, and those liberal minded British friends of
yours might just as well know it. If I am not able to go to
England, I shall have less regret, because they are a set that I
do not care to talk with."
Handwritten: "This is the way I feel today. Perhaps I shan't be
so mad tomorrow."
11) Wilhelm Cuno to Schinkel, 6-17, 1919, Hapag 21, Hamburg,
Staatsarchiv
"... Die hiesige Tätigkeit [in Weimar] ist eine ebenso
unerfreuliche und verantwortliche, wie diejenige in Versailles
nur mit dem Unterschiede, dass jetzt der Zeitpunkt gekommen ist,
wo tatsächlich Ja oder Nein gesagt werden muss mit allen
Folgerungen, die sich aus jeder dieser beiden Entschliessungen
für das deutsche Reich und Volk ergeben. Ich trete nach wie vor
entschlossen und mit allem Nachdruck für die Ablehnung ein,
verhehle mir aber keinen Augenblick, dass die Gefahr einer
Annahme bei der hiesigen Stimmung, bei der Zusammensetzung des
Kabinetts und der ihm angehrenden Parteien ausserordentlich
gross ist. Genaues lässt sich aber erst erfahren, wenn der
Wortlaut der Antwort vorliegt und die Herren aus Versailles hier
eingetroffen sind, was späestens morgen früh der Fall sein
wird.."
13) Peltzer to Cuno, 8-27, 1919, Hapag 1480, Hamburg, Staatsarchiv
"Wir hatten von Warburgs für L 10.000,- Coupons Buenos Aires
Anleihe gekauft, welche in Holland nur mit einem Affidavit zu
verkaufen sind, dass sie kein deutsches Eigentum sind.
Infolgedessen sind diese Coupons nur etwas unter dem
tatschlichen Wert verkäuflich. Herr Huldermann wollte damit
warten, bis die Ratifikation des Friedens eine Hinübersendung
nach drüben möglich machen würde, wobei er hoffte, den
vollen
Wert zu erlösen. Für uns ist aber heute alles die
Verfügungsfähigkeit über unser Geld, uns deshalb habe
ich
vorgezogen, auch diese Coupons durch Warburg veräussern zu
lassen, um damit unsere verfügbaren verzinslichen Depositen in
Holland zu vermehren. Es käme evt. in Frage, einen Teil dieser
Depositen später nach der Bank von van Aalst zu verbringen, um
ihm bare Mittel von uns zu zeigen. Das könnte von Vorteil für
die
Beurteilung sein, die van Aalst von uns haben mag."
