C. R. Lovin writes in Choice, June 1999:
"This collection is a rare occurrence - an excellent work put together by a committee. It includes articles delivered at a 1994 conference at the University of California at Berkeley, written by 24 of the foremost international scholars on the Paris Peace Conference and its aftermath. Even though the thesis that the treaty was fundamentally flawed and led to Hitler and WW II has long since been revised by a variety of multiarchival studies, the historical profession has been slow to accept the new orthodoxy. Representing as it does the best in contemporary scholarship, this volume should deal a death blow to the older view. Its judgments underscore "the successes of the German compact,"  recognize that it "lent itself to future revision" that did occur, agree that it led to "an era of temporary stability," and suggest that it would have been further adjusted had it not been for the worldwide depression. The articles are all new, based on archival research and assessment of the relevant secondary literature, and are critiqued by a second scholar. Includes an excellent bibliography. An important work that should be in all academic libraries. Upper division undergraduates and above."
 

Bullitt Lowry writes in the Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, 2, April 1999:
"In 1994, the German Historical Institute sponsored a conference on the Treaty of Versailles in partnership with the University of California, Berkeley's Center for German and European Studies. This volume, the fruit of that cooperation, includes the work of twenty-seven well chosen scholars from seven nations, who direct their attention toward France, Britain, and Germany.
    As the editors explain in the Introduction, the intent is to explain whether the collapse of the Versailles system "stemmed from inherent weaknesses of the treaty or from postwar revisionism and economic instability" (p. 1). In the selections printed, the caricatures of John Maynard Keynes and Ray Stannard Baker penned are not only laid to rest, but stakes of fact are driven through their hearts. Absent, also, are simplistic "too harsh or too lenient" generalizations and facile judgments on "Wilsonianism versus the balance of power, the new diplomacy facing the old." An explicit theme of this collection, however, is the persistence of those legends not only in the popular mind, but also in the work of scholars.
    The volume has five selections, the first being a look at war aims and the Armistice. Klaus Schwabe looks at Germany, and David Stevenson presents a particularly cogent examination of French policy. Alan Sharp comments, sensibly and accurately, on those essays as well as on articles concerning British and United States policy.
    The second section probes the peacemakers and their home fronts. Particularly noteworthy is Georges-Henri Soutou's dissection of Clemenceau's multi-tiered policy, and the other essays are instructive. Lawrence Gelfand, for example, carries forward his classic study of the Inquiry into an examination of the American Mission at Paris.
    The third section is more miscellaneous, with contributors examining the minorities question, the Rhineland (on which Stephen Schuker gives a superb analysis of French plans and actions), Poland, and economics. On reparations, the contribution by Sally Marks, who updates her work from earlier decades, is a model of analysis. Elisabeth Glaser writes on economic questions generally, and Niall Ferguson gives a rigorous analysis of the balance of payments question. Gerald Feldman comments on this section, centering on three economic articles, do not minimize the failures of Versailles and are generally traditional in judgment. The fourth section looks at the aftermath of the Versailles Treaty and the effect it had on the U.S.S.R. and the League of Nations. William Keylor examines the effect on events that the precedents and themes of Versailles et. His concern is to explain why the prevailing assessments of Versailles remain negative. The last section is more narrowly focused on post-Versailles interpretations and attempts at revision, with a particularly interesting and subtle essay by Manfred Boemeke on Woodrow Wilson's image of Germany before, during, and after the Versailles Treaty.
    This volume is a splendid example of what a group of scholars collectively can achieve in service to scholarship. In the volume, Diane Kunz notes that "[p]erhaps not enough time has yet passed for the renunciation of Versailles myths" (p. 525). Indeed, it is possible that seventy-five years are truly not enough, but with this volume, scholarship is well on the way. No one who works in the twentieth century will fail to find articles of interest in this collection. Even the footnotes form a splendid guide to recent work on, and interpretations of, the first half of the twentieth century."
 
 
 
 

John Ikenberry writes in Foreign Affairs, April 1999:
"No peace settlement has provoked more controversy or regret than the Treaty of Versailles. This massive volume offers new archival materials and divergent national perspectives in rehashing old historical controversies, including the central question of Versailles: Was the failure of the peace and historical controversies, including the central question of Versailles and the rise of a revisionist Germany due to a flawed treaty or to wider, uncontrollable forces? The collective scholarship in this volume generally does further damage to the view, popularized by John Maynard Keynes, that the victors provoked German hostility by pursuing an unnecessary vindictive settlement. Instead, it sees the treaty in more favorable terms as a relatively flexible instrument that ultimately ended the worst of the reparations dispute and the occupation of the Rhineland in 1932. Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau come across as relatively well intentioned rational leaders who simply could not bridge Allied differences and make the commitments necessary for a lasting peace. In addition, the war's sudden and ambiguous end left the Allied governments unprepared for the negotiations. As the reader follows the account of diverging national war aims, shifting domestic coalitions, staggering dislocation, and complex negotiations, the Treaty of Versailles looks increasingly understandable -- if not inevitable. For those seeking to understand the tough realities of building a new world order, this volume will be fascinating to explore."
 
 

Further comments include:
"This volume includes excellent chapters on various aspects of the Versailles treaty of 1919 by many of the leading historians in the field of international history. It offers new perspectives on the subject by specialists on the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference, and the 1920s from the United States and Europe. These chapters show the authors' familiarity not only with available archival sources but also with both recent scholarship on and earlier interpretations of the peace treaty with Germany. This volume as a whole provides excellent analysis of peacemaking after World War I and also of historiography on the Versailles Treaty."
(Professor Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Department of History, University of Nebraska)
"The volume will comprise our knowledge about peacemaking at Versailles. Its contents make it a compendium as well as a basis for future research."
(Prof. Dr. Peter Krüger, Department of History, Marburg University, Germany)