Peter Troyan

Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
University of Virginia

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904

CVGoogle Scholar


Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles, International Economic Review, 2019, 60(3)

Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 114:232-252

Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values, Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 170:319-345

Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12(2):863-908

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2015, 4(1), Article 6

Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare, Games and Economic Behavior , 2012, 75(2):936-947

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Two-Sided Matching with Minimum and Maximum Quotas, with Suguru Ueda, Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo, Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), 2012, pp. 1327-1328 [extended abstract]

Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics, with Fuhito Kojima, Japanese Economic Review, 2011, 62:82-98 [refereed survey article]
Research in progress

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority, with Marek Pycia (revise and resubmit, Econometrica)

Obvious Manipulations, with Thayer Morrill (revise and resubmit, Journal of Economic Theory)

School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance, with Andrew Kloosterman (revise and resubmit, Theoretical Economics)

Essentially Stable Matchings, with David Delacrétaz and Andrew Kloosterman (under review)