Peter Troyan

Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
University of Virginia

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904



Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints (with Daniel Fragiadakis), Theoretical Economics, forthcoming
Supplementary Appendix

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas (with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo), ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (2015), Vol. 4, No. 1, Article 6
(An extended abstract also appears in the Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012).)

• Media coverage: "Economist Seeks to Make Med School 'Match Day' More Efficient, Fair'' (June 5th, 2015)

Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare, Games and Economic Behavior (2012), Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 936-947

Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics (with Fuhito Kojima), Japanese Economic Review (2011), vol. 62, pp. 82-98 [refereed survey article]
Research in progress

Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values (revisions requested at Journal of Economic Theory)

Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies, with Daniel Fragiadakis (under review)

Efficient and Essentially Stable Assignments, with Andrew Kloosterman (under review)

Obviously Strategyproof Implementation of Allocation Mechanisms (under review)

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority, with Marek Pycia

Matching with Limited Information: A Case for Neighborhood Schools, with Andrew Kloosterman

Information Acquisition in Matching Markets