Peter Troyan

Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
University of Virginia

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904

CVGoogle Scholar


Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values, 2017, Journal of Economic Theory, 170, pp. 319-345

Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints, with Daniel Fragiadakis, 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12(2), pp. 863-908

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo, 2015, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 4(1), Article 6
(An extended abstract also appears in the Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012).)

Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare, 2012, Games and Economic Behavior , 75(2), pp. 936-947

Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics, with Fuhito Kojima, 2011, Japanese Economic Review, 62, pp. 82-98 [refereed survey article]
Research in progress

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority, with Marek Pycia (revise and resubmit, Econometrica)

School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance, with Andrew Kloosterman (under review)

Essentially Stable Matchings, with David Delacrétaz and Andrew Kloosterman (under review)

Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles (revise and resubmit, International Economic Review)

Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies, with Daniel Fragiadakis (revise and resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior)

Obvious Manipulations, with Thayer Morrill (under review)