Peter Troyan

Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
University of Virginia

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904
troyan@virginia.edu

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Publications

Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles, International Economic Review, forthcoming


Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values, Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 170:319-345


Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12(2):863-908


Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2015, 4(1), Article 6


Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare, Games and Economic Behavior , 2012, 75(2):936-947


Strategyproof Mechanisms for Two-Sided Matching with Minimum and Maximum Quotas, with Suguru Ueda, Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo, Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), 2012, pp. 1327-1328 [extended abstract]


Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics, with Fuhito Kojima, Japanese Economic Review, 2011, 62:82-98 [refereed survey article]
Research in progress

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority, with Marek Pycia (revise and resubmit, Econometrica)


Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies, with Daniel Fragiadakis (revise and resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior)


School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance, with Andrew Kloosterman (under review)


Essentially Stable Matchings, with David Delacrétaz and Andrew Kloosterman (under review)


Obvious Manipulations, with Thayer Morrill (under review)