Peter Troyan

Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
University of Virginia

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904
troyan@virginia.edu

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Publications

Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values, 2017, Journal of Economic Theory, 170, pp. 319-345


Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints, with Daniel Fragiadakis, 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12(2), pp. 863-908


Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas, with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo, 2015, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 4(1), Article 6
(An extended abstract also appears in the Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012).)


Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare, 2012, Games and Economic Behavior , 75(2), pp. 936-947


Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics, with Fuhito Kojima, 2011, Japanese Economic Review, 62, pp. 82-98 [refereed survey article]
Research in progress

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority (new version coming soon!), with Marek Pycia


Efficient and Essentially Stable Assignments, with Andrew Kloosterman (under review)


Obviously Strategyproof Implementation of Allocation Mechanisms (under review)


Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies, with Daniel Fragiadakis (under review)


Matching with Limited Information: A Case for Neighborhood Schools, with Andrew Kloosterman


Information Acquisition in Matching Markets