

Direct Reference and Implicature

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I According to some formulations of the theory of Direct Reference the semantic value, relative to a context of utterance, of rigid singular terms such as proper names and indexicals is just their referent. This position seems to preclude an accurate account of such terms as they behave in natural languages, since it is easy to construct examples of coreferential rigid singular terms embedded into sentential contexts in which it appears that those terms must be contributing different semantic values to those sentences. Yet because, among other things, of the difficulties facing Fregean alternatives to Direct Reference some authors have attempted to defuse the apparent counterexamples to that theory by arguing that these examples evince pragmatic rather than semantic phenomena. According to this view the difference between two sentences that are alike except for containing distinct but coreferential rigid singular terms is that they convey different suggestions or insinuations; two such sentences nevertheless have identical semantic content and, in particular, identical truth conditions.¹

In attempting to substantiate this point some proponents of this line of defense of Direct Reference have suggested that the pragmatic difference between the sentences in question may be accounted for in terms of Grice's notion of implicature. According to this view such sentences differ only in that assertions of one typically carry different implicata from assertions of the other. Ordinary speakers only think that such sentences differ in truth value because they confuse pragmatic implicata with the literal contents of those sentences. Following Recanati 1993 I shall refer to this line of defense of the theory of Direct Reference as the Implicature Theory.²

The aim of this essay is to assess the Implicature Theory by scrutinizing its most compelling formulation as found in Salmon 1986, 1989a and 1989c, 1990, 1995, and elaborated in Recanati 1993.³ I shall contend that on the most plausible formulation available the Implicature Theory fails to account for the resiliency of the judgments of

ordinary speakers concerning attitudinatives and sentences reporting speech acts. To account for these judgments the Implicature Theory must suppose that ordinary speakers confuse pragmatic implicata with literal content, but, as will emerge, such confusion only arises in very special cases, and we have independent evidence that the implicata postulated by the Implicature Theory are not cases of this kind. After first (sections II and III) showing how the Implicature Theory purports to accommodate the embedding phenomena mentioned above, I shall (section IV) explain why that theory does not succeed in defusing the apparent counterexamples facing the theory of Direct Reference.

II. Salmon calls his formulation of Direct Reference the Modified Naive Theory and opposes it to classical Fregean accounts of the meaning of singular terms. It is not clear from what he writes whether he intends his account to be one that holds for all natural languages, or all languages with which it would be possible to communicate, or something else. I do not know whether Salmon believes that we could communicate with a language for which, say, a descriptive theory of the semantic value of singular terms held true.⁴ I shall for this reason simply take it that Salmon is theorizing about many of the natural languages actually in use. I shall also leave untouched many of the details of the Modified Naive Theory that are not essential to its qualifying as a formulation of the theory of Direct Reference.

For Salmon each declarative sentence encodes exactly one piece of information, and the piece of information thus encoded is the information content of that sentence.⁵ The syntactic components of a sentence are correlated with components of the information content of the sentence in which they occur. Salmon calls any such component of the information content the information value of the expression with which it is correlated. The information value of an expression is what that expression contributes to the information content of the sentence in which it occurs. For the cases that will interest us, the

information content of a sentence has a structure that mirrors the syntactic structure of that sentence. Salmon uses 'proposition' as another term for the information content of a sentence.

According to the Modified Naive Theory, if sentences S_1 and S_2 consist of the n -place predications $P_1(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ and $P_2(t_1, \dots, t_n)$, respectively, where each of the t_i is a singular term, then S_1 and S_2 encode the very same proposition just in case the predicates P_1 and P_2 are semantically correlated with the same attribute, and for every singular term t_i in S_1 , t_i is coreferential with t_i in S_2 . As Salmon propounds the Modified Naive Theory it is also the case that the piece of information encoded by 'Socrates is wise' consists of Socrates and wisdom.⁶

Salmon espouses a principle of compositionality for pieces of information:

If two pieces of information p and q having the same structure and mode of composition are numerically distinct, then there must be some component of one that is not a component of the other.⁷

The difficulty is now as follows. If 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' pick out the same person, and

1. Lois Lane believes that Superman is Superman

is true, it follows, according to the Modified Naive Theory, that

2. Lois Lane believes that Superman is Clark Kent

is also true. These sentences differ only in that one of two coreferential terms occurs in the

first while the other of these terms occurs in the second. It follows according to the Modified Naive Theory that these sentences encode the very same information, and thus express the same proposition. Yet it seems that with no lapse of rationality, and in spite of being competent in the use of 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent', Lois Lane may believe that these two names referred to distinct individuals. Indeed Lois may vigorously exhibit behavior confirming 1 but disconfirming 2, for instance by sincerely assenting to the former but dissenting from the latter. Yet if 1 and 2 differ in truth value, they do not encode the same information. If so, then by Salmon's principle of compositionality it follows that there is a component of the information content of 1 that is not shared by the information content of the other. What could that difference be save a difference in the information value of the proper names not held in common between 1 and 2?

In preparing to answer to this question Salmon constructs a puzzle about belief similar to Quine's⁸ example of Ralph and Bernard J. Ortcutt, and to Kripke's⁹ example about Pierre and London. All three examples appear to be cases in which a person both believes and does not believe a proposition and so threaten to show that our ordinary concept of belief is incoherent. Salmon propounds a solution to these puzzles according to which belief is analyzed as the existential generalization of a triadic relation BEL. To justify this maneuver Salmon remarks first that pieces of information may contain material objects. Second, he observes that it is possible to know a material object under one guise but not under another: One might not recognize an acquaintance now that he has shaved off his beard, and one might take this man in his new guise to be different from the man one knows. Similarly, for those pieces of information that contain material objects, one might recognize such pieces of information under some but not all of the guises they might manifest. Thus a person might believe a piece of information but deny that she does so as a result of not recognizing that piece of information in the guise under which it is presented.

Applying these considerations to sentences containing singular terms Salmon

suggests that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' are associated with two different guises of the very same object. According to Salmon, if Lois believes

3. Superman flies

then she also believes

4. Clark Kent flies.

This is, however, consistent with Lois' not recognizing Superman under the guise associated with 'Clark Kent'. Instead she may think that 'Superman' names a thing numerically distinct from Clark Kent. In such a case Lois does believe that Clark Kent flies, even if she dissents from the sentence 'Clark Kent flies' as a result of not recognizing the proposition that this sentence expresses. Lois believes the proposition expressed by this sentence in a way analogous to that in which she could be friends with a man whom, now beardless, she does not recognize.

Salmon formulates the principles behind this treatment of Lois Lane's situation by giving an analysis of belief locutions according to which belief in a proposition is always belief in that proposition under some guise or other, and according to which it is possible to believe a proposition under some guise without believing that proposition under all other guises in which it might be presented. To this end he offers an explication of belief ascriptions according to which they are analyzed with the help of a three-place relation BEL. Where 'A' names a person, 'p' names a proposition, and 'x' ranges over ways of grasping propositions, Salmon stipulates that

(i) 'A believes p' may be analyzed as $(\exists x)(A \text{ grasps } p \text{ by means of } x \ \& \ \text{BEL}(A,$

p, x));

(ii) A may stand in BEL to p and some x by means of which A grasps p, without standing in BEL to p and all x by means of which A could grasp p, and

(iii) 'A withholds belief from p' may be analyzed as $(\exists x)(A \text{ grasps } p \text{ by means of } x \ \& \ \neg \text{BEL}(A, p, x))$.

' $(\exists x)(A \text{ grasps } p \text{ by means of } x \ \& \ \text{BEL}(A, p, x))$ ' and ' $(\exists x)(A \text{ grasps } p \text{ by means of } x \ \& \ \neg \text{BEL}(A, p, x))$ ' are consistent, and so, given these postulates, a person can believe and withhold belief from the same proposition. This is supposed to resolve the puzzles about belief mentioned above. Whether it does is not an issue we will consider here. I mention it merely to show why Salmon takes the apparatus he employs for explaining the results that the Modified Naive Theory has for sentences 1 and 2 not to be ad hoc, but to be justified by its applicability to problems about belief that any comprehensive theory of language and thought should be able to solve.¹⁰

Consider again sentences 1 and 2. To make out his claim that if 1 is true then so is 2, Salmon will now maintain that for each proposition, any sentence expressing that proposition is associated with a guise under which one can grasp that proposition.¹¹ Let the function $f_t(x, S)$ take a person x, a sentence S and a time t as arguments, and give as values the way x would take the information content of S, at t, were it presented to him or her through the very sentence S. It is true that:

(B1) BEL[Lois Lane, that Superman is Superman, $f_t(\text{Lois Lane, 'Superman is Superman'})$], and

(B2) BEL[Lois Lane, that Clark Kent is Superman, $f_t(\text{Lois Lane, 'Superman is Superman'})$].

But it is not true that either:

(B3) BEL[Lois Lane, that Superman is Superman, f_t (Lois Lane, 'Superman is Clark Kent')], or

(B4) BEL[Lois Lane, that Clark Kent is Superman, f_t (Lois Lane, 'Superman is Clark Kent')].

One might stand in the BEL relation to a bit of information expressed one way, but not stand in that relation to that very bit of information expressed in a different way. This is the first step on the part of the Implicature Theory in defense of the claim that if 1 is true then so is 2, even if Lois Lane does not recognize what she believes in the guise associated with the sentence 'Superman is Clark Kent'.¹²

III. But it is only the first step. The Implicature Theory must also explain how not just philosophers but even ordinary speakers steadfastly insist that 1 and 2 differ in truth value.¹³ Implicature Theorists would explain this widespread difference in attitudes towards these two sentences by proposing that it results from a confusion of pragmatically imparted information with semantically encoded information. According to Salmon, for instance, a sentence such as 2 is true if 1 is. But, he maintains, a typical assertion of a belief ascription such as 2 pragmatically imparts the information that Lois Lane takes the proposition expressed by 'Superman is Clark Kent' in such a way that she would assent to it under the guise associated with 'Superman is Clark Kent'. That is, a typical assertion of 'Lois Lane believes that Superman is Clark Kent' pragmatically imparts the information that

BEL[Lois Lane, that Superman is Clark Kent, f_t (Lois Lane, 'Superman is Clark Kent')].

However, this pragmatically imparted bit of information is false. Thus a typical assertion of 'Lois Lane believes that Superman is Clark Kent' will pragmatically impart false information even though someone uttering that sentence would be making a true statement. One might say that a typical assertion of 2 would be true but misleading, and we are misled by this fact into taking 2 to be false.¹⁴

This is at best a schema for explaining the appearance of difference in the truth values of 1 and 2. For the contention that an utterance pragmatically imparts a certain proposition can mean any of a number of things depending upon what sort of impartation is being invoked. First of all, pragmatic implicatures divide into two major kinds, namely the conventional and the non-conventional, and our first question should be which of these two the Implicature Theorist intends to invoke in her explanation.¹⁵ Although Salmon in one place suggests the possibility of an explanation in terms of conventional implicature,¹⁶ it seems unlikely that the implicature hypothesized could be conventional. For, first, conventional implicata are generated even when the word or expression that generates that implicatum is embedded within sentential connectives such as conditionals, disjunction, negation, and modalities. For instance, the conventional implicatum carried by 'but' (roughly, that there is a contrast or conflict between the two sentences that it conjoins) is conveyed even when that word occurs in the antecedent of a conditional. Thus assertion of

If John is poor but honest, then he should be struck from the list of suspects

commits the speaker to there being some kind of contrast or conflict between poverty and honesty, and it does so in spite of the fact that the antecedent of that conditional is not asserted.¹⁷ Unlike expressions conveying conventional implicata, however, it does not appear that embedded attitude locutions convey the proposition that the agent to whom the attitude is ascribed accepts the proposition under the guise associated with the complement

of the attitude verb. Similarly for reports of speech acts. Assertion of the sentence

It is not the case that John thinks that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

does not commit the speaker to the claim that John accepts the proposition that Hesperus is Phosphorus under the guise associated with 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. Second, conventional implicata attach to particular words or expressions. Hence to defend her position the Implicature Theorist would be obliged to hold that each attitude expression and speech act verb of the form '___ V's that ...!' conventionally implicates that the referent of the filler of the first argument-place bears the relation named by the verb V towards the proposition named by the filler of the second argument-place under the guise exemplified by the words that fill that second argument-place. This appears ad hoc. Third, conventional implicata are not in general cancelable, whereas part of the case for the Implicature Theory is the very cancelability of the putative implicata carried by attitude locutions and speech act verbs.¹⁸ For instance Barwise and Perry write,

Some arguments for referential opacity seem based on a confusion between conversational implicatures and semantic entailments. 'Smith believes that Cicero was an orator' does not imply, but at most suggests, that Smith would check 'Cicero was an orator' true. The suggestion is clearly cancelable: "Smith believes that Cicero was an orator, but only knows to call him "Tully".¹⁹

It appears, then, that the Implicature Theorist should invoke non-conventional implicature in her explanation of the fact that speakers typically take 1 not to imply 2.

Non-conventional implicatures divide into the conversational and the non-conversational. The latter category includes instances in which a person conveys an

implicatum but not by virtue of an exploitation of, or any genuine or apparent violation of conversational maxims. An example would be a case in which a person conveys an implicatum but does so without saying anything in the sense of 'says' favored by Grice.²⁰ Suppose John asks, "Who ate the last piece of cake?" and Mary, whom John knows would know the answer, replies by overtly staring at Sam. Mary has implicated that Sam ate the cake but she does so without having said anything. Because the Implicature Theory is concerned primarily with what is implicated when a person says something, I shall not construe that theory as appealing to non-conventional, non-conversational implicature. Instead I shall construe the theory as appealing to conversational implicature in accounting for the apparent difference between utterances of 1 and utterances of 2.²¹

When it is claimed that an utterance of a sentence S in a particular instance conversationally implicates a proposition P, we must be able to calculate that implicature by adverting to features of the speech situation together with conversational maxims and the Cooperative Principle.²² In the case at hand this calculation could aim to show that conversational maxims together with the injunction to be a cooperative interlocutor would lead a speaker ascribing an attitude to an agent to use words that the agent would herself use in expressing that attitude. In setting the stage for such a calculation Recanati suggests what he terms a

Maxim of Faithfulness:

In reporting a belief about an object, and especially in referring to that object, use an expression which the believer himself would use (insofar as differences of language or context permit), or at least try to be faithful to the believer's own point of view, unless there are reasons for not doing so.²³

Evidently the reasons referred to here must be good reasons, since otherwise the Maxim will

be lacking in normative force. Yet such good reasons are legion. The Maxim of Faithfulness can be overruled in situations in which we are ascribing attitudes or reporting speech acts of those who do not speak our language. It can also be overruled in situations in which we are ascribing attitudes or reporting speech acts of those who lack our conceptual resources. In addition, Faithfulness can be overruled in situations in which we are using indirect discourse to ascribe attitudes or report speech acts whose verbal expression contain indexicals. For instance if John were to report in indirect discourse Mary's remark, "John is an excellent pianist," he would normally be expected to use

Mary said that I am an excellent pianist

rather than

Mary said that John is an excellent pianist.

On the supposition that the Maxim of Faithfulness is a conversational norm, albeit a defeasible one, Recanati 1993 suggests a pattern of reasoning that in a given instance of communication could underlie the generation of the postulated implicatum:

The speaker has said, "John believes that Cicero was poor"; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the Maxim of Faithfulness; he could not be doing this unless he thought that John would accept the sentence, 'Cicero was poor', or something very similar; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that the supposition that he thinks that John would accept the sentence, 'Cicero was poor' is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that John would accept 'Cicero was poor'; he intends me to think, or

is at least willing to allow me to think, that John would accept, 'Cicero was poor'; and so he has implicated that John would accept 'Cicero was poor'.
(1993, p. 346)

The proponent of the Implicature Theory will contend that the fact that the Maxim of Faithfulness is a crucial part of an explanation of a range of linguistic data (which includes such facts as that sentences 1 and 2 seem to convey different information) is evidence for that Maxim. It would strengthen the case for this Maxim if it were plausible independently of considerations concerning Direct Reference. Recanati considers such an argument in suggesting that a speaker following the Maxim of Faithfulness conveys more information than one who does not do so, and that therefore this Maxim is a corollary of the Maxim of Quantity ("Make your contribution as informative as is required for present purposes of the exchange.")²⁴

This suggestion is mistaken on two grounds. First of all, it depends upon a misconstrual of the Maxim of Quantity. An injunction to be as informative as required does not imply an injunction to be informative as possible (even within the constraints of relevance), just as an injunction to give a plant as much water as necessary does not require one to give that plant as much water as possible (even within the constraints of what is healthy for the plant). Failure to recognize this amounts to a construal of the Maxim of Quantity as an injunction to volubility.²⁵ But it is only if the Maxim of Quantity is construed as an injunction to be as informative as possible (within the constraints of relevance) that it will have as a corollary the injunction that all else being equal, one should be more informative rather than less so in ascribing attitudes and speech acts. Thus the present suggestion does not provide an independent reason for supposing that cooperative speakers follow the Maxim of Faithfulness.

Second, it is not true that a speaker following the Maxim of Faithfulness conveys

more information than one who does not do so. Consider a maxim suggested by Urmson:

Maxim of Apt Reference

Other things being equal, it is best to use the referring expression most likely to secure successful identification by the person(s) to whom the communication is expressed.²⁶

As an example Urmson offers the suggestion that in speaking to a non-gardener one should always refer to a pelargonium as a geranium. Apt Reference applies to attitude ascriptions as a special case, and explains the above-mentioned cases in which Faithfulness is overruled (cases involving indexicals, ascriptions to speakers of other languages, and ascriptions to those lacking our conceptual resources). Further, if John only knows Cicero by the name 'Cicero' but a speaker's interlocutor only knows the Roman orator by the name 'Tully', the maxims of Faithfulness and Apt Reference will yield conflicting injunctions for the speaker. Following the Maxim of Apt of Reference will lead the speaker to ascribe to John the belief that Tully was a great orator. Following the Maxim of Faithfulness will lead the speaker to ascribe to John the belief that Cicero was a great orator. Yet if--to follow a natural construal of informativeness--the informativeness of a speech act depends in part upon the background beliefs of the auditor, it will not be true that in the case we have imagined the ascription

John believes that Cicero was a great orator

is more informative than

John believes that Tully was a great orator.

For the auditor will be able to identify the object of John's belief on the basis of the latter ascription but not on the basis of the former. As a result, in the situation we have imagined it is not true that any information conveyed by the former sentence is conveyed by the latter but not vice versa.

Faithfulness, then, does not appear to be a corollary of the Gricean maxims. Further, we have seen that it can clash with and be overruled by the Maxim of Apt Reference. It can also clash with and be overruled by a norm that enjoins us to be charitable in our ascriptions to others (call this Charity). For instance speakers will typically understand an ascription such as 'John believes that the wealthy Cicero was poor' as violating the Maxim of Faithfulness, since otherwise the utterer would be ascribing incoherence to John.²⁷

Faithfulness can also be overruled in conversational situations in which the niceties of ascribers' points of view are irrelevant to the aim or aims of that conversation. The familiarity and frequency of such cases is due simply to the fact that predicting and explaining the behavior, particularly the verbal behavior, of others is only one of the many aims with which we ascribe attitudes and report speech acts. Another aim is to take stock of people's opinions on questions whose answers concern us. Very often in this latter enterprise the "what" of others' opinions matters more than does the "how", that is, we often abstract from niceties concerning the way in which the ascriber would express herself in conveying her opinion to us. Mary might only know Mark Twain by the name 'Sam Clemens', but having read many of his book manuscripts before publication she is familiar with his literary work and thinks it is marvelous. She also has mentioned to us that she thinks that Theodore Dreiser and Stephen Crane are execrable writers. If we are conducting a poll to determine who of Mark Twain, Theodore Dreiser, and Stephen Crane is the most popular, we can with complete propriety construe Mary as casting her vote for the first of these three.²⁸

It seems plain then that even supposing that it is a norm that cooperative

interlocutors follow, the Maxim of Faithfulness will vie with other maxims and considerations in determining how a speaker is to conduct her ascriptions of attitudes and reports of speech acts. What is more, the cases we have adduced in which Faithfulness is violated in favor of other maxims and considerations are neither difficult to imagine nor unusual. And yet ordinary speakers apprised of the Superman story steadfastly accept 1 and deny 2. I shall now argue that on its fullest extant formulation the Implicature Theory has no account to give of the resiliency of such attitudes as this. As will emerge, to account for these data the Maxim of Faithfulness would have nearly always to be the dominant norm governing our use of attitude ascriptions and indirect speech. We have just seen that this necessary condition appears not to be met.

IV. Conversational implicata are not in general heard as falling within the scope of logical operators and other sentential connectives. For instance, even if a typical utterance of

Mary lives somewhere in the south of France

conversationally implicates the speaker's ignorance of where in the south of France Mary resides, that implicatum is not heard as contributing to the contexts in which this sentence embeds. For if it did we would find prima facie plausible a conditional such as

If Mary lives somewhere in the south of France, then I do not know where.

While it is easy to imagine situations in which this conditional is plausibly uttered, we do not take this conditional as prima facie plausible.²⁹ The Implicature Theory, however, requires that the implicata it supposes to be generated by attitudinatives and sentences reporting speech acts are heard as embedding. Otherwise that theory will have no explanation of the

apparent truth of

It is not the case that Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman

But then the implicature postulated by the Implicature Theory must be of an unusual kind. We may begin to see what kind of implicature must be postulated by scrutinizing a criticism of the Implicature Theory that misses its mark.

Recanati 1993 attacks the Implicature Theory on the very ground that it yields incorrect results in cases in which attitude sentences are embedded in larger sentential contexts. He asks us to consider the sentences,

5. Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman.
6. Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent is Superman.

5 is false and 6 is true according to the Superman story. Yet Recanati holds that the Implicature Theory is committed to treating 5 as true and 6 as false. For the Implicature Theory is committed to the truth of

7. Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Clark Kent

and to the view that 7 is logically equivalent to 5. On pain of inconsistency, Recanati reasons, the Implicature Theory must therefore treat 6 as false.

As an account of Salmon's formulation of the Implicature Theory this is slightly inaccurate. For Salmon need not treat 6 as a simple truth-functional negation of an atomic attitude sentence. Recall that according to Salmon, 'A withholds belief from p,' may be analyzed as, ' $(\exists x)(A \text{ grasps } p \text{ by means of } x \ \& \ \neg \text{BEL}(A, p, x))$ '. Yet if we read 6 as stating

that

8. Lois Lane withholds belief from the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman,

then it is possible to see 6 and 5 as consistent, since as we have seen it is possible to believe a proposition under one guise but withhold belief from that proposition under another guise. As a result the truth of 5 does not imply the falsity of 6. Nevertheless Recanati is entitled to consider instead of 6,

6'. It is not the case that Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman,

and it seems clear that the Implicature Theorist is required to treat 6' as false. Recanati does not take the Implicature Theory's commitment to the truth of 5 and the falsity of 6' as a decisive objection to that theory. Rather he raises a challenge for the Implicature Theory's ability to explain our tendency to think that 6' is true. Perhaps we tend to think that 6' is true because what is heard as being negated in 6' is what according to the Implicature Theory is communicated by a typical utterance of 'Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman'. Two views about what is heard as being negated in sentences such as 6' present themselves. One is that what is heard as being negated in 6' is a conjunction, one conjunct of which is what is strictly expressed by the sentence 'Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman', and the other conjunct is what is typically conversationally implicated by utterance of this sentence. Another view is that what is heard as being negated in 6' is only what is typically conversationally implicated by utterance of 'Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman'.³⁰ Since Schiffer 1987 has shown the latter strategy to be untenable, we need consider only the former.³¹

Recanati observes that taking the first option requires the Implicature Theorist to

explain why an implicatum of a simple sentence is heard as part of the semantic content that is negated in the more complex sentence 6'. He considers an explanation in terms of metalinguistic negation.³² Perhaps the negation in 6' is like the negation in

9. He's not tall--he's very tall,

where what is heard as being negated is the entirety of what is conveyed (both semantic content and conversational implicature) in typical assertions of 'He is tall'. (Assume with Recanati that typical assertions of 'He is tall' conversationally implicate that the referent of 'he' is tall but not extremely tall.) Recanati rejects this hypothesis on the ground that the standard reading of 'He's not tall' is simply the negation of the semantic content of 'He is tall'. A speaker needs to use stress to indicate that something more than the semantic content is being negated; otherwise the natural reading is that the negation is merely of the semantic content. In contrast, Recanati observes, the Implicature Theorist must hold that the standard or default interpretation of 6' is that what is negated is the semantic content together with the standard implicatum of 'Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman'.³³

Recanati is correct in pointing out a contrast. However, this contrast may be due to the choice of example. 'He is tall' generates a species of generalized conversational implicature known as scalar implicature,³⁴ and these implicata may not arise with enough frequency for the Implicature Theorist wisely to choose them as her paradigm. Rather the Implicature Theorist may wish to appeal for analogies to expressions or sentences that nearly always generate conversational implicata.³⁵ Consider for instance some sentences containing the expression, 'a contact lens'. Perhaps assertion of 'I nearly lost a contact lens today' will almost always implicate that the speaker is referring to one of his own contact lenses rather than to someone else's.³⁶ After all, on those occasions in which we refer to the contact lenses of people other than ourselves we can use genitives rather than indefinite descriptions

with little loss in brevity or clarity. Yet consider how 'a contact lens' is heard to behave under negation:

10. I didn't lose a contact lens in the accident, but Mary did.

The natural reading of 10 is

11. I didn't lose one of my own contact lenses in the accident, but Mary did lose one of her own contact lenses.

It seems, that is, that the natural reading of negation is as having scope over both semantic content and the typical implicatum thereof when what is negated is an expression that nearly always carries a certain conversational implicatum. We may make analogous points for other logical operators. For instance,

12. If John nearly lost a contact lens today, he had better be more careful in the future,

will normally be read as

13. If John nearly lost one of his own contact lenses today, he had better be more careful in the future.

One holding that the great preponderance of uses of the antecedent of 12 implicate that the lens referred to belongs to the agent under discussion may make sense of these near equivalences on the hypothesis that the typical implicatum carried by utterances of 'John

nearly lost a contact lens' is (usually if not always) heard as part of what is embedded in the antecedent of the conditional. An analogous explanation would make sense of the fact that

14. Either Mary lost a contact lens in the accident or Bob did

will normally be read as

15. Either Mary lost one of her contact lenses in the accident or Bob lost one of his contact lenses in the accident.

A postulate for explaining these phenomena would be an

Embedded Implicature Hypothesis:

If assertion of a sentence S conveys the implicatum that p with nearly universal regularity, then when S is embedded the content that is usually understood to be embedded for semantic purposes is the proposition (S & p).^{37,38}

(This Hypothesis is silent about the calculation of the truth values of compound sentences, and pronounces only upon the judgments that speakers make about such truth values.) This Hypothesis may be used in defense of a Gricean approach to cases such as 10, 12, and 14. It is far from clear, however, whether it can be used to account for the behavior of attitudinatives and sentences reporting speech acts. We have seen that the Maxim of Faithfulness, if construed as a conversational maxim rather than as a condition on the literal truth of attitude ascriptions, vies with other maxims and conversational considerations in governing our ascriptions of attitudes and speech acts. What is more, cases in which maxims

such as Apt Reference and Charity, or other conversational considerations, overrule Faithfulness are neither unusual nor difficult to imagine. This, in turn, strongly suggests that the implicature postulated by the Implicature Theory is at best a species of generalized conversational implicature rather than one that nearly always arises. If so, however, then the Implicature Theorist cannot appeal to the Embedded Implicature Hypothesis in defense of her account of sentences such as 6'. Consequently, on the fullest formulations presently available the Implicature Theory does not succeed in defusing a standard example that appears to undermine Direct Reference.

Are there other hypotheses in the vicinity of the Embedded Implicature Hypothesis to which the Implicature Theorist might appeal? We know from cases such as 9 that a stronger Hypothesis than the Embedded Implicature Hypothesis -- namely, that if assertion of a sentence S conveys the implicatum that p as a generalized conversational implicature, then when S is embedded the content that is usually understood to be embedded for semantic purposes is the proposition (S & p) -- is not true. Nevertheless there may be cases of conversational implicature that do not arise with near-universal regularity but that nevertheless are heard as falling within the scope of logical operators. For instance, according to many proponents of the Gricean apparatus a typical utterance of 'James took the medicine and got better' only pragmatically implies that the first conjunct reports an event that occurred prior to the event reported by the second conjunct.³⁹ One holding that this sentence has identical truth conditions to 'James got better and took the medicine' can nevertheless explain the fact that speakers might assent to one sentence but not to the other, for it can be maintained that speakers mistakenly take the pragmatically imparted information concerning temporal order to be part of the semantic content of each sentence. This is suggested by the fact that dialogues such as the following are readily intelligible:

16. Did James take the medicine and get better?

No. He got better and took the medicine.

The putative implicata of sentences conjoining expressions reporting events are also heard as embedding into larger sentential contexts, as is made clear by a case offered by L.J. Cohen:

17. If the old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been declared,
then Tom will be quite content,

18. If a republic has been declared and the old king has died of a heart attack,
then Tom will be quite content⁴⁰,

Cohen argues that 17 could well be true and 18 false in light of Tom's preference for how political change is effected in his country. A defender of Grice's apparatus may reply that 17 and 18 only appear to be different in truth value, but it is difficult to tell whether she can advert in defense of her reply to the Embedded Implicature Hypothesis. The reason is that these conjunctive sentences may not generate an implicatum of temporal order with near-universal regularity. For instance, even though Grice's Maxim of Manner (which enjoins speakers to be perspicuous and in particular to be orderly in their description of events) directs us to report events in the order, if there is one, in which they occurred, other potentially conflicting considerations govern the order in which we report such events as well, such as that we should list events in their order of importance. ("At the meeting, Mary was given a raise and Bob was commended for his solid performance in the last quarter.")

For these reasons it may be premature to insist that the only way in which to account for a putative implicatum's being heard as falling within the scope of logical operators is if that implicatum arises with near universal regularity. Perhaps another hypothesis can accommodate cases such as those involving conjunctions while also applying to sentences reporting speech acts or attitudes. If so, the Implicature Theorist owes us a formulation of

such an hypothesis, without which she cannot claim to have explained the behavior of such sentences in a manner that defuses counterexamples to Direct Reference.

The Implicature Theorist is also without an account of why ordinary speakers demur from 2. It may well be that someone who hears 'I nearly lost a contact lens today' asserted and who believes that the speaker's contact lenses were in no danger whatever of being lost would naturally say that what the speaker has said is false. Further, as we have seen, the dialogue in 16 is quite natural. But we do not in general say such things as 'That's false' in reply to assertions of sentences that merely generate generalized conversational implicata to indicate our disagreement with the implicatum. To take a stock example, a speaker who asserts, "Joe is either in the garden or the kitchen," may conversationally implicate that he does not know in which of these two places Joe is to be found. But in the dialogue,

Joe is either in the garden or the kitchen.

That's false. You know that he is in the garden

The respondent's reply is odd. A more natural reply would be

You're dissimulating. You know perfectly well that he is in the garden.

This is evidence that in cases in which a sentence carries an implicatum in a way that is less than nearly universal it is unnatural for one to take issue with that implicatum by saying that what the speaker has said is false.⁴¹ But our considerations have shown that the implicature postulated by the Implicature Theorist is at best a species of generalized conversational implicature. This leaves unexplained why speakers fervently disagree with 2. Since it is not the case that the great majority of uses of attitude ascriptions and indirect speech are ones in which the Maxim of Faithfulness dominates other maxims and conversational

considerations, the implicata hypothesized by the Implicature Theorist will not arise with the kind of regularity that is to be found in cases like 10, 12, 14 and 16-18. But then we should not accept the claim that speakers confuse the putative pragmatic implicata of attitude and speech act ascriptions with their semantic content, just as we should not accept that speakers confuse the pragmatic implicata of assertions of disjunctive sentences with their semantic content.

Cases like 10, 12, 14, and 16-18 are pretty uncommon. In other instances, notably those involving particular or generalized implicature, ordinary speakers are adept at distinguishing implicated contents from what is said. We have seen evidence that the Implicature Theorist is unable to maintain that the implicature she postulates in defense of Direct Reference is one that arises with near-universal regularity. This inability in turn forces her either to underestimate the capacity of ordinary speakers to distinguish what is said from what is implicated, or to give up her explanation of cases that seem to be counterexamples to Direct Reference. Its proponents have harped on the fact that the Implicature Theory is coherent, and the point cannot be gainsaid. They have nevertheless failed to account for the data that appear to undercut Direct Reference.⁴²

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1. It was apparently Urmson 1968 who first laid a foundation for this style of approach without defending it explicitly. Something like this position has also been propounded in one form or another by Peacocke 1975, Hornsby 1977, Tye 1978, McKay 1981 and Bealer 1982, Sainsbury 1983, as well as by the authors cited in the next note.
2. Barwise and Perry 1981, 1983, and Salmon 1986, 1989a and 1989b, 1990, 1995 suggest defenses along these lines. Berg 1988 formulates a version of the Implicature Theory while refraining from propounding it. Richard 1983, 1987, defends Direct Reference along pragmatic lines but does not make use of the notion of implicature. (Richard 1990 defends an alternative position.)
3. In spite of elaborating the Implicature Theory Recanati does not endorse that view.
4. His comments at 1986, p. 54 seem, however, to show that he thinks it unlikely that this could happen.
5. Ibid, p. 13.
6. Salmon modifies the Modified Naive Theory to prevent it from implying that 'Plato' and 'the author of The Republic' have the very same information value. According to this modification definite descriptions of the form 'the F' have two aspects to their semantic value: On the one hand there is the referent if there is one, and on the other hand there is the information value of the description, a complex made up in part of the information value of the predicate F (1986, p. 21). On this basis Salmon denies that complex singular terms such as definite descriptions are to be treated as directly referential, and suggests that only lexically simple singular terms are to be counted as having objects as their semantic value. Salmon also qualifies his account to deal with quotational contexts, so that the fact that two coreferential singular terms are not interchangeable within quotes will not impugn his theory. Further, Salmon adapts the Modified Naive Theory to accommodate tense and indexicality. These further modifications are not relevant to our purposes, and I will say nothing about them.
7. 1986, p. 54.
8. See Quine 1956.
9. See Kripke 1979.
10. See Salmon 1995 for further elaboration of the present proposal and for clarification of its dialectical status. Observe also that the Implicature Theorist would need to formulate an analogous set of postulates for all other attitudinatives and verbs that name speech acts.
11. See 1986, p. 117. Salmon does not assume that sentences are the only entities that can serve as guises.
12. See 1986, 114-118.
13. Salmon devotes Chapter 8.4 of his 1986 to relieving this burden. Later he writes, "Why is it that substitution of 'Phosphorus' for 'Hesperus'... feels invalid in propositional attitude attributions? Some explanation of our speech patterns and intuitions of invalidity in these

sorts of cases is called for." (1990, p. 233) Richard (1990, p. 125) overstates the case in characterizing the datum that needs to be explained in writing,

...other than using bribery, threats, hypnosis, or the like, there is simply nothing you can do to get most people to say that Jones believes that Tully was an orator, once they know that Jones sincerely denies 'Tully was an orator', understands it, and acts on his denial in ways appropriate thereto.

This is incorrect, however, as will become evident in Section III below, and as shown by Berg 1988, who gives the example of the sentence,

Look, there's Superman in his Clark Kent outfit; he's incredibly convincing!
Everyone thinks he's a reporter--Jimmy Olson, Mr. White--why, even that clever Lois Lane believes Superman is a reporter. (p. 355)

The insistence mentioned in the text is steadfast but not insuperable.

14. See Salmon 1986, pp. 114-118, and Salmon 1990, p. 233-4. Salmon 1990 offers two other postulates to help explain why ordinary speakers refuse to infer 2 from 1, but neither of those postulates can help to account for an analogous refusal concerning ascriptions (such as those to Thales concerning the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus) to speakers of languages other than our own. Salmon's first postulate is that lay speakers tend to confuse direct with indirect discourse. For instance, according to this postulate lay speakers confuse the truth conditions of

Lois Lane believes that Superman is Clark Kent

with the truth conditions of

Lois Lane believes that 'Superman is Clark Kent' is true in English.

Since the latter of these sentences is false, according to Salmon's postulate speakers mistakenly infer that the former is false as well. It should be clear, however, that this postulate will not account for the refusal of lay speakers to infer 'Thales believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus' from 'Thales believes that Hesperus is Hesperus'. For it is not plausible that a member of either group will confuse the truth conditions of

Thales believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus

with the truth conditions of its direct discourse analogue, namely

Thales believes that the translation from English into Greek of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is true in Greek.

Even treating the description 'the translation from English into Greek of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'' in the latter sentence as having wide scope, the trouble is that lay speakers will not in general have the resources to confuse the truth conditions of the two sentences; for they may not even know which language Thales spoke. Further, since Thales may have been a polyglot it will not do to circumvent this problem by replacing the latter of the above two sentences with 'Thales believes that the translation from English into his own language of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is true in his own language'.

Salmon's second postulate is that ordinary speakers are prone to infer, from the fact

that a person demurs from a proposition under one guise, that they demur from that proposition in all guises under which it may be presented. For instance speakers infer from the premise that Lois demurs from the proposition that Superman is Superman, when presented with it under the guise, 'Superman is Clark Kent', to the conclusion that Lois demurs from the proposition that Superman is Superman in all guises under which that proposition might be presented. Again, however, this explanation will not help account for the attitudes of ordinary speakers towards speakers of languages other than their own. For even if ordinary speakers accept the premise that Thales demurs from the proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus when presented with it under the guise, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', it would be outrageous to suppose that ordinary speakers infer from this that Thales demurs from the proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus in all guises under which it might be presented. Such a supposition would make a mystery of how an ordinary speaker could take anyone who does not speak her own language to have any beliefs at all. On the other hand if Salmon wishes for purposes of his explanation to ascribe to ordinary speakers acceptance of the premise that Thales demurs from the proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus when presented with it under the guise that is the translation into Greek of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', the difficulty again is that ordinary speakers may not know which language Thales speaks. As before, replacing 'translation into Greek' with 'translation into his own language' is foreclosed by the possibility of Thales being a polyglot.

15. Authors such as Carston 1987, Recanati 1989, and Bach 1994, have isolated a distinct pragmatic mechanism that helps to determine the literal content of what is said. (Bach 1994 calls the determination of what the speaker is saying in such cases the construction of an implicature, and argues that this determination is not a species of Grice's notion of implicature.) But because this approach can provide little succor for the Implicature Theory I shall not consider it here.

16. Salmon 1989a, pp. 275-6.

17. I have argued for this claim at length in my ms. 'Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content'.

18. I do not identify the non-cancelability of implicata with the fact that such implicata survive under embedding. An implicature that an assertion of a free-standing sentence would normally carry may be canceled by features other than syntactic context such as shared knowledge of the speaker and auditor or the fact that the sentence is put forth with non-assertoric force. While it may in fact be true that an implicatum is non-cancelable just in case it survives under all forms of syntactic embedding, I know of no argument that this is so.

19. Barwise and Perry, 1981, p. 394. See also Salmon 1986, p. 118. Observe that it is more difficult to see how to cancel the putative implicata of attitudinatives in which distinct but coreferential singular terms occur within the complement. The only case I know of in which this can be done felicitously is that of Berg 1988, mentioned in an earlier note. Salmon would of course urge that the cancellation could be effected by saying,

Lois believes that Superman is Clark Kent, although she does not accept that proposition when she takes this information the way she does when it is presented to her through the very sentence 'Superman is Clark Kent'. (See 1986, p. 118, for a similar case.)

This sentence is, however, hardly evidence for the Implicature Theory since it is not

something an ordinary speaker would accept.

It may be observed here also that as Grice pointed out in his 1975, p. 44, the cancelability of part of what is communicated is not a sufficient condition for that element's being an implicatum. This point seems to have been missed by Crimmins 1992 (Chapter 1.3), who argues at length against the Implicature Theory on the ground that the cancelability of the "how" of attitude reports is not a sufficient condition of that element's being merely implicated. As we shall see below, any serious defense of the Implicature Theory would have to invoke not just the putative cancelability as evidence but also the possibility of calculating such implicata by appeal to Grice's Cooperative Principle, conversational maxims and aspects of the relevant speech situation.

20. See Grice 1975, p. 25, and pp. 87-88, for his account of the notion of saying.

21. Salmon 1986, p. 115, tentatively suggests an account in terms of conversational implicature. In later work, such as his 1989a, the suggestion is put forth with greater confidence.

22. See Grice, 1975, p. 31, and Schiffer, 1987, p. 467, for elaboration of this point.

23. Recanati 1993, p. 333. For an example of an appeal to a maxim of this sort see Soames 1987, p. 117 and p. 119. Salmon 1990, p. 234 postulates an established practice of using sentences such as 'Jones believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus' to convey the proposition that BEL[Jones, that Hesperus is Phosphorus, f (Jones, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus')]. I read Salmon as taking it that this practice is something of a norm, and not just a behavioral regularity.

24. Recanati 1993, p. 333.

25. Injunction I implies injunction J just in case any way of satisfying I is a way of satisfying J as well. See Green 1995 for further discussion of this misconstrual of the Maxim of Quantity.

26. Urmson 1968, p. 116. Urmson in fact contends that this maxim is the supreme principle of those that he considers (including his version of Faithfulness). Apt Reference may well be a corollary of Grice's maxim to be perspicuous, although the latter is so loosely formulated that I shall not try to decide this issue here.

27. For further discussion see Barwise and Perry 1983, p. 258.

28. This example is inspired by one offered in Soames 1988, pp. 218-9.

29. Contrast this example with 'If John took the medicine and got better, then he took the medicine before getting better.'

30. Recanati also considers the possibility of holding that what is negated in 6' is the proposition strictly and literally expressed by the sentence 'Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman'. Recanati rejects this option on the ground that taking it would require the implausible hypothesis that we are inclined to take 6' as true because it is obviously false and we construe those who utter 6' as speaking ironically.

31. As the Postscript to Schiffer 1987 makes clear, and as Salmon 1989a (pp. 252-3) confirms, Salmon is able to take the untenableness of the latter strategy in stride.

32. See Horn 1989 for a thorough account of this notion.

33. Perhaps it will be suggested that the very embedding of a singular term within an attitude or speech act locution achieves what the stressing of locutions that generate scalar implicata achieves. In 9 stress placed on 'tall' served as part of a metalinguistic negation, so that what is negated in 'He's not tall' is the conjunction of 'He is tall' and the typical implicatum of assertions of that sentence, namely 'He is not extremely tall.' Similarly for

The cake wasn't good; it was excellent.

It might be wondered why a sentence such as this is not anomalous, since a thing can be good and excellent at the same time. Yet the speaker's meaning will be sufficiently clear. In the sentence before the semicolon one denies the conjunctive proposition that the cake is good and the cake is not excellent, the latter conjunct being what is generally implicated by assertion of the first conjunct. Such a denial is, by itself, not very informative, leaving the auditor unclear whether one is denying that the cake is no more than good, or denying that the cake is so much as good. With the sentence following the semicolon one goes on to say more precisely which conjunct one is denying. (In using just the sentence after the semicolon in response to another speaker's assertion that the cake was good we often suggest the impropriety of her making the weaker claim, particularly if we stress 'excellent'; prefacing such a remark with 'The cake wasn't good' serves to make explicit a disagreement that is merely suggested in saying only 'The cake was excellent.')

Similar phenomena may be found in embedding within other logical operators, such as conditionals:

If the soup is warm, we'd better heat it up before serving it.

Here one supposes the conjunctive proposition that the soup is warm and not hot, and goes on on the basis of that supposition to suggest that it be made hot before serving. Perhaps the Implicature Theorist will suggest that attitude and speech act verbs raise to salience the clothing, or the "how", of the propositional content of complement clauses, thereby achieving what stress achieves in cases of scalar implicature. According to this approach attitude and speech act verbs perform a pragmatic function of indicating that what follows them is associated with a mode of presentation for the ascriber; but that indication is no part of the semantic content (even relative to a context of utterance) of any words found in attitudinatives and speech act ascriptions, just as what is conveyed by stress in the cases involving scalar implicature just considered does not redound to the semantic credit of any words to be found in those sentences. We have then a two-component hypothesis:

1. Assertions of attitude or speech-act ascriptions convey implicata by means, *inter alia*, of the Maxim of Faithfulness.
2. Use of attitude or speech act verbs in ascriptions (both asserted and unasserted) of attitudes and speech acts serves to indicate that the typical implicatum is part of what is communicated, but this indication is a pragmatic rather than a semantic relation. (See Green (1997) and Green (ms.) for development of this notion of indication.)


In spite of its virtues this version of the Implicature Theory does not appear tenable. The difficulty is that this version of the theory predicts that the implicata imputed to sentences reporting attitudes and speech acts cannot be canceled. While an unembedded assertion of 'The cake was not bad' in reply to 'How was the cake?' seems to implicate that the speaker is not in a position to make a stronger claim, an attempt to cancel this implicatum creates a puzzling conjunction, as in

The cake was not bad; indeed it was good.

It is difficult to read this as anything but an expression of a mid-utterance change of mind, and our hypothesis about the role of stress on 'not bad' predicts this result since it predicts that utterance of the two conjuncts together commits the speaker to a contradiction. By contrast, it does not seem that the Implicature Theorist would wish to maintain that in sentences such as Barwise and Perry's "Smith believes that Cicero was an orator, but only knows to call him 'Tully'", the speaker is either changing her mind in mid-utterance or committing herself to a contradiction. The reason is not that we are unable to convey useful information by contradicting ourselves ("Bob is not himself today") or by changing our minds in mid-utterance ("I have two--no, three points to make"). The reason is that in adopting this position the Implicature Theorist will have foregone one important piece of (what she would consider) evidence for the Implicature Theory, namely the cancelability of the putative implicata of attitude ascriptions. Indeed, the cancelability of these implicata is, from the point of view of the explanans now being mooted, evidence against this version of the Implicature Theory.

34. See Levinson 1983, Chapter Three for a definition of this concept, and Hirschberg 1985 and Horn 1989 for detailed discussion.

35. To help the reader keep track of the types of communicated content within the Gricean apparatus, the following tree, adapted from Levinson 1983, p. 131, may be helpful:



I have modified Levinson's taxonomy by adding a branch and a node for those implicata that arise with near universal regularity. Most writers would take this kind of implicature to fall within the category of generalized

conversational implicature, that is, its sister node to the left, but it is convenient for present purposes to distinguish the two.

36. The implicatum is nevertheless surely cancelable, either by explicit disavowal or by virtue of the context of utterance. As L. DeRossett has pointed out, in the context of a contact lens factory the implicatum would not be generated.

37. Grice may have had something like the Embedded Implicature Hypothesis in mind in writing, in his 'Retrospective Epilogue', "It certainly does not seem reasonable to subscribe to an absolute ban on the possibility that an embedding locution may govern the standard nonconventional implicatum rather than the conventional import of the embedded sentence..." (Grice 1989, p. 375).

38. One counterexample to this Hypothesis may be found in the case of first person attitudinatives. Martinich 1980 has argued that those who assert 'I believe that p' conversationally implicate that p with near-universal regularity, and that this helps to explain the oddity of 'I believe that p but it is not the case that p'. However, the standard reading of

If I believe that p, then someone believes that p,

is not

If I believe that p and p, then someone believes that p.

If this is correct then 'I believe that p' is an example of a locution that gives rise to an implicature with near-universal regularity but that does not conform to the Embedded Implicature Hypothesis. Martinich's analysis is dubious, however, since we may easily muster evidence that avowals do not conversationally implicate the complement avowed. Such putative implicata are never felicitously cancelable (precisely as Moore's paradox shows), while even such implicata as that conveyed by 'She lost a contact lens' are.

39. See Salmon 1989a, pp. 252-3 for appeal to this example. Richard (1990, pp. 119-120) develops the point. I shall not discuss the objection, which would arise from authors such as Recanati 1993 and Bach 1994, that what Salmon would construe as pragmatically imparted information in conjunctions such as this is instead a pragmatically determined component of what is said.

40. Cohen 1971. In spite of Grice's just-quoted suggestion of the possibility of some such principle as the Embedded Implicature Hypothesis, some recent authors, assuming that conversational implicatures are pragmatic consequences only of a complete speech act, and that subordinate clauses are not the vehicles of complete speech acts, have inferred that it is impossible for an unasserted clause to generate an implicatum. For instance Recanati and Carston have held that if a putative implicatum can embed then the generation of that content cannot have been a case of implicature. Indeed Recanati 1989, 1993 suggests a

Scope Principle: A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said (and, therefore, not a conversational implicature) if--and, perhaps, only if--it falls within the scope of logical operators such as negation and conditionals.

Recanati's suggestion is to use the Scope Principle to help adjudicate those cases in which it is otherwise difficult to tell whether a pragmatically determined aspect of meaning should be accounted for in terms of implicature or in terms of what Carston 1988 calls explicature (and what Bach 1994 has called implicature). Observe that the Scope Principle does not strictly conflict with the Embedded Implicature Hypothesis, since the latter only refers to how sentences are normally understood without committing itself to whether these readings are

correct. Nevertheless the two theses are in tension with one another since if ordinary speakers hear a sentence as having a certain content then the presumption is that they are correct. Of course, if this tension is to be resolved in favor of the Scope Principle then that removes one means of defense of the Implicature Theory. Even so, we should be skeptical of the Scope Principle.

In partial support of this principle Recanati claims that conversational implicata are pragmatic consequences only of acts of saying something (1993, p. 271), and I take him to mean by this that such implicata are pragmatic consequences only of complete speech acts, such as the putting forth of an indicative sentence with assertoric force, or the putting forth of an interrogative sentence with interrogative force. But this claim is dubious. Nothing in the Gricean apparatus precludes calculation of what a speaker could have intended to convey in uttering a clause that is not put forth with any illocutionary force, say by virtue of that clause occurring in the consequent of a conditional or under the scope of negation. What is thus implicated would, of course, not itself be being put forth with assertoric force, but there is no bar to an interlocutor using Gricean norms, for example the Cooperative Principle and the Maxim of Manner, in calculating what a speaker is assuming for the sake of argument, or denying, or for that matter asserting to be possible. (Grice's Quality Maxim clearly would not guide such calculations, since that Maxim is directed towards assertions, but it appears that all other maxims could do so.)

41. Richard 1990, p. 123, in an attempt to give the Implicature Theory its due, remarks, "We do not come equipped with a meter that reliably distinguishes between semantic and pragmatic implications." I agree that we do not come equipped with a meter that cannot be fooled, but our examples suggest that we are equipped with a meter that distinguishes semantic from pragmatic implications in the majority of cases in which there is a distinction to be drawn.

42. I am grateful to N. Belnap, J. Berg, L. DeRossett, G. DiMuzio, W. Edelberg, A.P. Martinich, R. Neta, M. Pelczar, J. Rainsbury, N. Salmon, S. Schiffer and an anonymous referee for this journal for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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