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EMPATHY, EXPRESSION, AND WHAT ARTWORKS HAVE TO TEACH

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1 Introduction

A work of art such as a novel or movie can convey propositional knowledge, such as that pride comes before a fall, war is hell, or nice guys finish last. On some theories, works of art such as photographs convey perceptual knowledge: one view, for instance, has it that a photograph enables us literally to see the object of which it is a photo. I take these cases as comparatively familiar, and while they remain a source of controversy, I will only be glancing at those disputes here. Rather, I wish to argue that in addition to their capacity to convey propositional and perceptual knowledge, some works of art can also convey phenomenal knowledge and/or affective knowledge: these forms of knowledge are, respectively, knowledge of how some object or state of affairs looks, sounds, smells, etc; and knowledge of how an emotion or mood feels. I don't claim that only works of art do this; nor do I claim that the works of art that convey phenomenal or affective knowledge only do this. I do contend that their ability to convey phenomenal or affective knowledge is an important dimension of what works of art do, and it is a dimension that has not been adequately appreciated either in aesthetics or the philosophy of mind. In particular, I shall argue that an adequate appreciation of these two aspects of the epistemic value of works of art sheds light on (1) artistic expression, and (2) empathy.

2 Three Forms of Showing

I will elucidate the notion of expression, or those aspects of this notion that will be pertinent to our purposes, in terms of the commonsense notion

of showing. This latter comes, so far as I can tell, in three forms. First of all, I might show my courage by acting bravely. My brave behavior is good evidence of my courage. Or I might, by means of extensive calculations, show *that* there is a black hole in the center of the Milky Way. In these cases I don't make what I show perceptible; I certainly couldn't make the black hole perceptible, and it is not clear what it could mean to perceive courage. Rather, in these cases I provide compelling evidence for a conclusion that could be grasped even by someone with no capacity for vision or other sensation. A grammatical tag for this category is *showing-that*. Because my brave behavior (calculations, etc.) is good evidence of my courage (the existence of the black hole, etc.), an appropriately situated thinker aware of that evidence is in a position to know of my courage (of the black hole, etc.). Showing-that thus enables propositional knowledge.

Secondly, I might show something in such a way as to make it perceptible. I show my bruise, and thereby enable others to see that bruise. Although it is most natural to speak of showing in visual terms, showing is not limited to vision: one can show someone a rough texture (you would need to feel the texture) or a coyote's howl (you would have to hear it). What I show you in this sense depends on your perceptual capacities and your position in the environment. If you had electroreception like a hammerhead shark, I could show you the electrical activity in the body of a fish hiding under the sand. In that case you would not only perceive the fish, you would "electroreceive" it. Likewise, even if there are a few mice in the field, and some light bounces from them onto your retina, I don't show you them from an airplane passing 200 yards above the field. On the other hand, if you have the visual acuity of a hawk I might well do so. Let us put this perceptual-knowledge enabling form of showing under the rubric of *showing- α* , where " α " is a singular term referring to a perceptible object or affair.¹

Finally, I might also *show how* something looks, feels, sounds, etc. Apply friction to a scratch-and-sniff picture of a skunk. You won't thereby smell any skunk, but if your nose is functioning properly, you will learn how skunks smell. By accurately painting Mary's profile you will show how Mary looks in profile – what she looks like from that angle – thereby enabling me to know how Mary's profile looks. I can then manifest this knowledge by reliably discriminating the Mary-like profiles from the rest. Similarly – and in a way to be explored more fully below – the trepidation in my voice might enable you to know how my anxiety feels if you are sufficiently empathetic. If you are sufficiently empathetic, then hearing my voice may enable you to imagine feeling my anxiety. If you

can reliably do that, then you know how I feel. Showing-how can provide qualitative knowledge for those with appropriate sensory capacities. It can also enable empathy for those with the capacity for empathy.

Again, someone might show me how to imagine a chocolate mountain by describing what it would look like, and if I follow that description I might then be able to imagine it. If I do that, then I will know how a chocolate mountain would look even if I have never seen one. In a similar way the old bluegrass song about the Big Rock Candy Mountain both invites and enables us to imagine such a thing, and by means of its descriptions enables us to know what such a thing would look like, how it would feel to the touch, etc.² Oenological description of a merlot that you've never tasted can still enable you to imagine that taste, and can enable you to know how that wine would taste were you to have a mouthful of the stuff. Again, a novelist might enable me to imagine being ostracized within a small rural community. Jane Hamilton does this in her *A Map of the World*.³ In its skillful depictions of various conversations, tones of voice, facial expressions, etc., of characters, Hamilton shows us what a sense of social isolation feels like. She does this by enabling me to imagine being in that situation, and thereby enables me to know how I would feel if I were in that situation. Even if I have never felt ostracized, the excellence of the novel consists at least in part in its ability to show me how ostracism would feel. We'll return to this point later in our discussion of empathy.

One thread that unites the above cases is justification: evidence, either from the senses or from other forms of knowledge, enables those who are shown the things mentioned above, and who are in the right circumstances (being empathetic, being in the right perceptual location, possessed of the right background knowledge, etc.) to know some fact, some object of perception, or how some emotion, mood, or experience feels. This can happen whether or not any appropriate observers cotton on. I can show you my melanoma without your grasping the significance of what you see; as a result I might show it to you without your appreciating that you are seeing melanoma. Likewise I might amass evidence that taken as a whole implicates the basketball coach in the crime; the evidence might then show that the coach did it without my seeing its significance.

3 Showing How and Knowing How

So whatever shows me how to do something, or how something feels, also makes knowledge available to me. However, such knowledge

is *knowledge how* rather than *knowledge that*. I urge you to join me in rejecting Ryle's form of behaviorism, both as a positive doctrine and as an attempt to dissolve the traditional problems of mind and body. Doing so does not, however, mandate rejection of his view that knowing how is a distinctive form of knowledge not reducible to propositional knowledge. Instead that view is independently plausible and marks a valuable distinction among forms of knowledge.⁴

You teach me how to do something, and if I am doing my job as a student I will come to know how to do it. You might codify that lesson in a book or in some other artifact. A geometry book will show me how to prove a theorem. If I grasp what it teaches then I will know how to prove that theorem. A recipe book will show me how to cook a soufflé. Here too if I grasp what it teaches I will know how to cook a soufflé. In both cases, reading the book might not be enough for me to learn how; I may have to practice the theorem or soufflé a few times before I get it right. Know-how is often only possible with some practice.

Consistent with our pattern thus far, a painting might show me how a certain man's hair is colored, and if I have appropriate perceptual apparatus I will thereby learn how it is colored. That is only possible if the sitter's hair is so colored, and only if the painter and other aspects of the transmission of information are reliable. If all these conditions are in place, then I can learn how that man's hair is colored. If I retain this knowledge I will be able to discriminate this color from others. That is a skill that I might retain for a while and then lose, and when I lose that skill it will no longer be true that I know the color of the man's hair except, at best, propositionally ("It's russet"). Further, if I learn what his hair looks like, then I might be able to visualize that color in the absence both of him and of his picture. However, this ability to visualize is not a necessary condition of my knowing that color. (I know what sulfur smells like without at this moment being able "olfactorily" to image that smell; the same goes for my current inability to form an image of chartreuse.) We will see below that just as empathizing is something that we do rather than something that befalls us, to empathize with another it is not enough that we have had some experience of what they are going through. In addition to knowing what they are going through, we must "feel with them." The hard work comes in knowing how to elucidate the expression with which I've just shuddered.

If a painting does not accurately and reliably portray the color of a man's hair, then it might not convey knowledge of what his hair looks like. However, even if it does not do so, it may still provide me with

qualitative knowledge, and thereby a skill, because it exemplifies the qualitative information that it also represents. It enables me to know what russet looks like because in looking at it I perceive that color, and because, in general, that perceptual experience will in turn enable me later on to discriminate that color from others. As a result, if I've never seen russet before, I learn something new. Further, even if I know what russet looks like, this painting can activate that knowledge in such a way as to provide me with the ability to visualize that color in its absence. So a painting can both provide knowledge-how and enable me to bring what I know into consciousness.

Can a work of literature, in spite of being fictional, convey know-how? I shall argue that it can, but let us first take a moment to note how literary works can convey propositional knowledge. Compare them with the case of bumper stickers: a Jesus-fish-eating-a-Darwin-lizard is not going to convince anyone not already converted to creationism. It conveys opinion, not knowledge. The same is true of the biblical story of Lot and his wife. If you are not already convinced that gloating over someone else's downfall will turn you either literally or metaphorically into a pillar of salt, then that story is not going to give you a reason for thinking that such behavior will do so. By contrast, consider a Zen koan, a very short story, that goes like this:

Tanzan and Ekido were once traveling together down a muddy road. A heavy rain was still falling. Coming around a bend, they met a lovely girl in a silk kimono and sash, unable to cross the intersection. "Come on, girl," said Tanzan at once. Lifting her in his arms, he carried her over the mud. Ekido did not speak again until that night when they reached a lodging temple. Then he no longer could restrain himself. "We monks don't go near females," he told Tanzan, "especially not young and lovely ones. It is dangerous. Why did you do that?" "I left the girl there," said Tanzan. "Are you still carrying her?"⁵

This koan, known as Muddy Road, not only contains an implicit claim (roughly: sometimes it's better to break a rule and get on with it than it is to get hung up on a strict adherence to that rule), but also gives some basis for that claim. One sees the obvious reasonableness of the monk who carried the woman in contrast to that of the monk who challenges him. That is not to say that the story conveys an *a priori* truth. You have to have some background practical rationality, and some basic world knowledge (of things like puddles, and the human tendency to get hung up on the letter rather than the spirit of a rule). But if you have that rationality and that knowledge then the koan can teach you something

new in the sense of drawing out a consequence that is implicit in that capacity and that knowledge.

The setting of a literary work is thus like a supposition entered in a Fitch-style natural deduction system.⁶ We could, in fact, reconstrue Muddy Road, with little loss of content, in the form, “Suppose two monks were walking down a muddy path after a heavy rain . . .” Within the scope of that supposition the narrator argues down to the conclusion that the monk who carries the woman across the puddle better respects the spirit of the monastic prohibition against touching women than the monk who does not touch her. On that basis we may infer a conclusion no longer within the scope of the supposition, namely that there can be situations in which breaking a rule is a better way of adhering to its spirit than is adhering to the rule’s letter. At this point, of course, we are not far removed from the structure of some counterexamples to certain species of rule-utilitarianism.

One might indeed be tempted to puzzle over how it is possible to get knowledge out of fiction. It may, after all, seem mysterious how an epistemic rabbit can be pulled from a make-believe hat. But supposing something for argument’s sake is, in relevant respects, a form of fiction, too. Hence if one is puzzled how knowledge can be got out of fiction, one ought to be no less puzzled how knowledge can be got out of supposition for the sake of argument. Obviously, though, we know perfectly well how the latter is possible; if there is a problem about how knowledge can be got out of fiction, it does not arise merely from the *fictionality* of the work in question.

This is not to suggest that suppositions of the sort we use with formal systems are exactly the same as the suppositions I am suggesting we entertain in engagement with fiction. Any proposition already established can be reiterated into a subproof in a natural deduction system. By contrast, how much background knowledge we are expected to leave at the door of the fictional work is often signaled by the genre, and often by basic elements of the narrative structure. New Journalist fiction invites us to reiterate pretty much any of our background knowledge into the fiction; Magical Realism, by contrast, asks us to leave most of human psychology fixed but leaves us unsure how much physics we can presuppose. Perhaps most Western fiction of the last two centuries falls somewhere in between these two extremes.

A work of literature can show that something is the case beyond the fictional world it creates. Can a literary work also show how in a way that enables us to acquire a skill? Consider this series of examples.

1 Because of my sheltered life I might never have felt disgust toward anything. A movie might portray things that are disgusting to normal human

observers and thereby invoke disgust in me if I am normal. Disgust has a pretty well-established autonomic pattern of response that can be elicited in the absence of any belief that the disgusting object is real. (Just imagine an animated close-up of an open, deep, and infected wound, where the animation is not so realistic as to cause us to believe that we are seeing a real wound.) So the movie might be a fictional film and yet show me how disgust feels simply by eliciting that emotion in me. Simply by looking at the disgusting film I can acquire a skill, even if the film is overtly a work of fiction.

2 Most people who see gross movies have known disgust before. However, a further consequence of our example is that even if I am acquainted with disgust, the movie will activate that knowledge in me by reminding me of how it feels. By reminding me how disgust feels the movie enables me to image that feeling, for at least a little while after the filmic experience. (Presumably I'll have some inclination to suppress that knowledge as well.) It thereby reawakens a skill that had been dormant. As we'll see presently, that will in turn make me better able to "feel with" someone else who is going through the same thing.

3 When we read literature we are to imagine the scenes portrayed, a claim made plausible by J. O. Urmson.⁷ To do this we are to visualize the things described, imagine hearing them, imagine touching them, and so on. Now suppose the novel we are reading incites us to imagine something quite disgusting. So long as our imaginative powers are sufficiently acute we can come to know disgust for the first time, or have that knowledge activated when it was merely dormant before.

By the time we have reached Case 3 above we have, I contend, found a case in which a literary work gives us knowledge of how disgust feels. More complex emotions are elicited by more sophisticated fictions. If I were that Zen monk who challenged the other for carrying the woman over the puddle, I would feel *embarrassed* by the answer given in the story. Further, if I identify with that monk in the following sense, then I might feel embarrassed as well: the sense in which I might identify with him is simply finding his question reasonable under those circumstances.⁸ If I do that, then I will feel genuinely embarrassed by the other monk's answer so long as I am acute enough to discern the propriety of that answer. At one point I feel it reasonable to ask the other why he touched this woman, given a monastic proscription against doing so. After hearing his reply, I see the error in my adherence to rules in situations in which adherence does not serve the ends those rules were constructed to serve. Not only that, but I will feel embarrassed for not having realized that before. This is not quasi- or make-believe embarrassment. I, the student of the

koan, will feel true embarrassment for having not foreseen the second monk's answer. That of course will show me how embarrassment feels. Not only that, but it activates my knowledge of how embarrassment feels so that even if I have been embarrassed in the past, my knowledge of that feeling is now brought to consciousness. As a result, if the first monk, the one who challenged the other, is embarrassed by his question (the koan does not say), I am in a position to identify with him.

In the film *The Rapture* (1991) the main character Sharon's husband is murdered by a disgruntled employee, and she sacrifices her own daughter after waiting in the desert for what she was sure would be a sign from God. Now the Apocalypse really does come and she ends up with the option of entering Heaven if only she will say, either aloud or in her heart, that she loves God. Sharon refuses to do so, however, and will remain in Purgatory for an unspecified amount of time. After witnessing what she has been through, some viewers feel they can understand why she feels the way she does. How could God have allowed these things to happen? This is to say that one can imagine being in Sharon's situation and feeling justified in refusing to accept God's love. This is in turn to say that on the basis of this fictional work one can identify with her. In this case, and in contrast to the case of the embarrassed monk, one need not feel resentment toward God in order to feel with the character. One can understand how she feels while feeling no resentment toward God, either because one is not a theist or because one takes a different attitude toward the problem of evil from hers.

Some forms of engagement with works of art, then, either convey or activate a skill, which itself has two dimensions. The first is simply a discriminatory capacity, such as the ability to identify russet or disgust or embarrassment when one sees or feels it. The second is the capacity to image that experience or feeling. This second ability can then, as we shall now see, be used to help feel with others. Showing how, then, enables the acquisition of cognitive, experiential, and affective skills, where the last of these consists in the ability to imagine having an emotion or mood of a certain kind. Showing how thus puts us in a position to know how, and, in the area of emotions and moods, thereby enables us to know how an emotion or mood feels.

4 Perceiving Aspects and Affects

We mentioned above that a painting or drawing shows some aspect of what it represents. It does not thereby enable us to perceive the thing

represented, even when the thing represented is a perceptible object. Nevertheless a painting or drawing shows us, and thereby enables us to perceive, aspects of what it represents – the color of the sitter’s hair, the pattern of his tie, the slope of his forehead, the strain in his face. So, too, when we look at a painting we can learn how certain things look – the color, the pattern, the slope, the strain.

This ability of works of art to teach us things no doubt depends upon there being a reliable causal connection between the thing represented and the pictorial representation itself. Again, if the painting or drawing is not of anything that is real, it is not clear that we learn from it any fact about what a particular thing looks like. The most that can be said is that from such a picture we can learn what a *kind* of thing looks like – a winged horse, an underwater city. Likewise, to the extent that the artist’s depiction is influenced by her imaginative construction, the depiction does not convey knowledge of its subject matter (as opposed to knowledge about the artist). Thus if the painting is a conjectural reconstruction of the emperor Justinian being felled by a barbarian’s arrow, then insofar as it is imaginative it will not convey knowledge of, for instance, how Justinian looked when he got hit, and in what way he fell.

Research in aesthetics often explains the expressive qualities of artifacts in terms of expressive behavior among human beings. The latter is then frequently left as an unexplained explainer; yet the notion of literal human expression hides some subtleties of its own. Consider the difference between my scowling and my coolly saying, “I’m angry.” The scowl, at least if it is caused in the right way by a felt anger, shows my anger. It also expresses that anger. By contrast, the cool assertion, “I’m angry,” reports my anger, but it is not plausible to describe it as either showing or expressing anger. Showing and expressing can be jointly instantiated, and some speech acts might exemplify neither. However, I wish here to argue for a stronger claim, namely that all cases of expression are also cases of showing.

As the example of scowling suggests, expression differs from representation at least in that the former involves making a state of the self palpable. This is reinforced by the term’s origin in the Latin *exprimere*, meaning “to press out.”⁹ It is also reinforced by some paradigm usages. Consider a remark by Frederick Douglass as he recalls the songs he and his fellow slaves would sing while not working for their masters: “The mere recurrence to those songs, even now, afflicts me; and while I am writing these lines, an expression of feeling has already found its way down my cheek. To those songs I trace my first glimmering conception of the dehumanizing character of slavery.”¹⁰ The tear to which Douglass refers

is an expression of feeling at least in part because it is a direct manifestation thereof. Likewise, in his *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*, Charles Darwin speaks of expressive movements as revealing our thoughts and impressions more reliably and directly than do our words.¹¹ This comports with the fact that an expression of emotion or thought is more than an indication of that thought or emotion. Assuming indication is an evidential relation such that if A indicates B, A's presence increases the probability of B's occurrence, a construal of expression as indication would not be accurate. When I am angry my respiration increases, as a result of which I emit more CO₂ than is usual. An increase in CO₂ around my body is thus evidence – an indication in the present sense – of my anger. It is not, however, an expression of anger because its presence is compatible, even under normal circumstances, with many other etiologies. By contrast, in the absence of reasons to think that onions were being sliced near where Douglass was writing his memoirs, etc., the tear running down his cheek provides a good deal more evidence than mere indication.¹²

Again, to express my love I need to put the strength and depth of my feelings on the table – if at all possible in the form of a self-sacrificing act or pricey artifact. This, however, is just to say that to express a psychological state I must make that state knowable to an appropriate observer. Although the relation between expression and what is expressed is not always so straightforward as the relation between tears and grief, I suggest that one theme binding together different forms of expression is the ability of the expressive behavior or artifact to enable in an appropriate observer knowledge of what it expresses. We have seen that this is in contrast to indication. It is also in contrast to representation. Although some representations are produced by sufficiently reliable causal chains to enable knowledge of what they represent, a representation of a state of affairs is not, *per se*, enough to enable knowledge of that state of affairs. An expression is.

Expression makes something knowable to appropriate observers; making something knowable to appropriate observers is, in turn, to show it; hence expression is a species of showing. As we saw in Section 2, showing can occur whether or not anyone cottons on. Since expression is a species of showing, the same goes for it: although I express my love, trepidation, regret, you might be too distracted, obtuse, or self-absorbed to get my drift.

Our discussion of showing in Section 2 and our current account of expression tie together in another way. The reason is that our emotional

expressions sometimes take the showing- α form, that is, sometimes make those emotions quite literally perceptible. To see why, consider that at least the so-called basic emotions (anger, fear, surprise, disgust, sadness, happiness) are syndromes, in that they tend to manifest themselves, in relatively consistent pan-cultural ways in (1) a neurophysiological pattern, (2) a pattern of facial behavior, (3) a range of action, (4) a distinctive phenomenological dimension. Consistent with these pan-cultural patterns is the existence of optional “display rules” that can affect the ways in which those emotions are displayed in one society or another, and relative to one social situation rather than another. Further, some emotions may constitutively require that the subject judge true or at least accept as true certain contents. Thus for instance it seems impossible to be proud in the absence of certain beliefs about oneself. On the other hand, fear is possible in the absence of any judgment or acceptance of a proposition that, say, a certain stimulus is dangerous.

At the same time, we often, perhaps even usually, perceive objects by perceiving certain characteristic components thereof. I see the apple without seeing all of its parts, but only by seeing its facing surface. (I have to see a substantial part of that facing surface to count as seeing the apple; seeing a square micron of that facing surface under a microscope does not suffice to make it the case that I see either the apple or the facing surface, for a square micron is not a characteristic component for a perceiver like me in my normal ecological environment.) Similarly I see your anger by seeing the scowl in your face, and I hear your exuberance by hearing your exuberant voice. I might also feel your anxiety by feeling your hand as you shake mine. In these cases we perceive the emotions of others because we perceive characteristic components of those emotions. That is not to say that we perceive all of the parts of the emotion by virtue of perceiving the emotion. We see the apple without seeing its core, and we see Paris from above without seeing each newspaper stand in that city. So it is with emotions.¹³

We can, then, perceive emotions. Further, I shall assume that Kendall Walton is correct in his view that a photograph enables us to see what it is a photograph of.¹⁴ We quite literally see Abe Lincoln in a photo of Lincoln, in spite of the fact that Lincoln does not now exist. Accepting this assumption, together with my earlier claim that we can perceive emotions, we may infer that a photograph can enable us literally to perceive someone’s emotion. So if we had a photo of Lincoln looking enraged, that photo would not only enable us to see Lincoln, it would also enable us to see his rage.

What of a drawing or painting of that same man that also shows his anger? I contend that just as a drawing or painting can show us how a man's hair looks, it can also show us how his anger looks. Further, just as the drawing or painting of his hair might not enable us to perceive that hair, so too a drawing or painting of his angry face might not enable us to perceive his anger. The reason is that we can learn what something looks like without seeing that thing. Moreover, if the drawing or painting is not accurate, or the chain of transmission from man to representation is not reliable, then it will not show us how the man's anger looks, but might nevertheless show us how *anger* looks. A drawing of an enraged face, such as one finds for didactic purposes in Gary Faigin's *The Artist's Complete Guide to Facial Expression*,¹⁵ shows what human anger looks like; a drawing of a disgusted face shows what human disgust looks like. This is so even if there is no actual person whom the drawing is a drawing of; and it is so even if, if there be such a person, she never made a face quite like that.

We can learn from works of art other than photographs how emotions look, at least for the basic emotions. In addition, aside from these basic emotions which have pan-cultural facial signatures, people often have idiosyncratic ways of manifesting their emotions that can nevertheless form characteristic patterns. Those patterns can become conventionalized but need not do so. Whether or not a given pattern becomes thus conventionalized, a given manifestation of emotion might still be a characteristic component of that emotion for a certain group, or even for an individual. If that happens it might still be possible for a manifestation of emotion to enable others to perceive that emotion. Rosie Vincy in *Middlemarch* has a characteristic way of displaying her determination: she twists her neck. Eliot describes her thus in at least four places in that novel, and it seems plausible that one who sees that neck-twist while aware of this regularity has also seen a characteristic component of that determination. This is so in spite of its not being the case that a neck-twist is a pan-cultural manifestation of determination.

While our dominant sense is vision, which for this reason is our best means of detecting characteristic components of emotions, nothing in principle prevents the perception of emotions through other sensory modalities. Fear has a characteristic sound in the human voice; that is why we can literally hear someone's fear. Fear sometimes also has a tactile manifestation in clammy hands, and is thus something that others can perceive tactually. One also hears talk of the "smell" of fear, but it's an open question whether this piece of common parlance has any objective basis.

5 Expressiveness and Showing How

No doubt this ability of art to show how emotions manifest themselves is one way in which art is expressive. Music that shows how fear sounds will also sound fearful; a picture that shows how anger looks will also look angry, at least in one place. (Whether the entire picture is also angry is a further question, and depends on what else is in the picture.) The question is whether showing an emotion's appearance (visual, aural, or otherwise) is the heart of expressiveness.

One influential theory of musical expressiveness, the "contour and convention" theory of Peter Kivy,¹⁶ offers an affirmative answer in contending that music's expressive qualities are due to its bearing a perceptible resemblance to expressive human behavior. Kivy's "contour theory," holds that music's "sonic 'shape', bears a structural analogy to the heard and seen manifestations of human emotional expression."¹⁷ Kivy does not require that the discernment of resemblance between the structural features of the music and the structural features of human emotional expression be a conscious process. For this reason he can account for the fact that our discernment of an object's expressiveness can be instantaneous rather than the result of a conscious calculation. In addition, Kivy is aware of the fact that a piece of music can bear a structural analogy to many other things besides expressive behavior (exploding geysers, cascading waterfalls, stampeding bison) and while on occasion program music might represent such things, music does not express them. Kivy proposes an evolutionary hypothesis to the effect that human beings are simply prone to see analogies with expressive behavior in favor of the many other analogies that they might discern, just as we are prone to see a face in an electrical plug in a wall instead of the many other things that we could see there.¹⁸

According to this "contour and convention theory," then, music might have a sad sound by virtue of containing structural features isomorphic to the heard or seen structural features of a person's behavior when she is displaying her sadness. However, the sadness of a bit of music might also be due its ability to show how sadness *feels*. As Kivy acknowledges, the sadness of music might be due either to structural features of the music, such as the development of a melody over a few measures, or because of the peculiarly melancholy sound of a chord. Kivy's account applies in a fairly straightforward way to the former sort of case, but not to the latter. He is candid about this, writing,

we have yet to work one further element into the contour theory: that is the expressive chords, major, minor and diminished. These chords are generally

perceived as cheerful, melancholy, and anguished, respectively . . . The problem is that these individual chords, not having a contour, being experienced as simple qualities, do not seem to bear any analogy at all to human behavior – hence must be expressive of cheerfulness, melancholy and anguish in some other way than that allowed by the contour theory of musical expressiveness.¹⁹

Kivy goes on to observe that there is no generally accepted explanation for the expressive features of these chords, and infers that the contour theory is no worse off than any other theory in this regard.²⁰ He also essays an account of the expressive qualities of chords, observing that the major triad C–E–G sounds stable; for instance a movement could easily end on it. By contrast it would not sound at all natural to end a movement on the diminished triad C–E-flat–G-flat. The same is true, if to a lesser extent, of the minor triad C–E-flat–G. Kivy suggests that this may be why the major triad sounds cheerful, the minor triad melancholy, and the diminished triad anguished.

These remarks are suggestive but cannot stand on their own as a solution to the problem that Kivy has raised for himself. Kivy does not tell us why cheerfulness, melancholy, and anguish should be considered in increasing order of instability. Nor is it clear why, if that were established, it would fall under the “contour” theory: in what way is instability an aspect of the contour of anguish, and is that way anything like the way in which sad behavior tends to have a drooping character that can be mapped onto a temporal progression of sounds?

I shall try to answer such questions while explaining the extent to which Kivy’s and related theories approach the truth. When I express an emotion or experience I either show it objectually or show how it feels; that way of showing must also be the product of design. One way to show my emotion or experience objectually is to make that emotion or experience perceptible rather than merely representing it. I don’t express pain by saying coolly, “I’m in pain.” I need to yell, recoil, cringe, grimace, or something of the kind.²¹ Another way to express my pain is to show how it feels. From our discussion thus far, we know that this means: I make available to others knowledge of what my pain feels like.

This suggests a larger pattern. An artifact or bit of behavior expresses emotion or experience either by objectually showing that emotion or experience, or by showing how that emotion or experience feels. Similarly, an artifact or bit of behavior is expressive of emotion or experience (instead of expressing emotion or experience) either by showing how that emotion or experience appears (visually, aurally, etc.), or by showing how it

feels. If Kivy's account at least gives us a sufficient condition for the expressiveness of music, then that is because in his showcase examples the music shows how an emotion either *sounds* or *looks*. It shows how an emotion sounds if it perceptibly resembles the sound of the human voice manifesting that emotion. It shows how an emotion looks if it perceptibly resembles the look of a human being manifesting that emotion. (In this latter case structural features of the music bear an isomorphism to structural features of human action.) This point in turn suggests the following generalization: where α is a perceptible object, ϕ is an emotion or experience, and γ a sensory modality or feeling:

α is expressive of ϕ just in case α shows how ϕ γ 's.

This generalization would also predict that a painting has an expressive dimension when it shows how an emotion looks – that is, how its visual features are displayed on the human face and elsewhere on the body. Likewise for other artifacts and affective qualities. However, emotions have more than looks and sounds; many of them have characteristic ways that they feel. So, of course, do experiences. In addition, many of our richer emotions lack characteristic ways of exhibiting themselves in behavior. I doubt that there is a characteristic way people act, sound, or look when they are experiencing a sense of crisis, isolation, loneliness, or regret. Yet surely it is possible for an artifact to be expressive of a sense of crisis, isolation, loneliness, or regret, and the above pattern enables us to see how that can be.

Take the example of a sense of crisis. An artifact might show us what a sense of crisis *feels like*. Flo Liebowitz suggests that this is precisely what happens in the final scene of *Bonnie and Clyde*.²² The two protagonists are finally caught in a trap and the Feds open fire on them with an overwhelming amount of artillery. The entire scene occurs in slow motion, giving us a sense of time stopping while we take in the carnage. In so doing, that scene not only shows us what the demise of Bonnie and Clyde might have looked like; it also shows us what a sense of crisis feels like. Again, here is a passage from Peter Taylor's story "Rain in the Heart." In it a sergeant returns to his new wife for a brief leave from his army duties.

The sergeant stood up. The room was very still and close. There was not even the sound of a clock. A light was still burning on her dressing table, and through the open doorway he could see the table lamp that was still burning in the living room. The table there was a regular part of the

furnishings of the apartment. But it was a piece of furniture they might have chosen themselves. He went to the door and stood a moment studying the effect she had achieved in her arrangement of the objects on the table. On the dark octagonal top was the white lamp with the urn-shaped base. The light the lamp shed contrasted the sharp of the urn with the global shape of a crystal vase from which sprigs of ivy mixed with periwinkle sprang in their individual wildness. And a square, crystal ashtray reflecting its exotic lights was placed at an angle to a small round silver dish.

He went to the living room to put out the light. Yet with his hand on the switch he hesitated because it was such a pleasing isolated arrangement of objects.²³

This passage conveys a sense of isolation, and indeed dislocation. The husband is seeing his new wife for the first time in a while and yet he is preoccupied with an arrangement of objects on a table. His fascination with their individual separateness seems to reflect his feeling of dislocation, of being out of synch with his environment. In this way it exemplifies T. S. Eliot's notion of an "objective correlative" of emotion.²⁴ I suggest also that by representing the arrangement of objects on the table as he does, Peter Taylor enables us to know what isolation feels like.

6 Congruence of Sensation and Affect

Representation of a state of affairs is not the only way to show how an emotion or experience feels. We can also do this by exploiting what we might call congruence between experiences of one sensory modality and another, and between experiences of one sensory modality and an emotion. Experimental psychology has established a large body of data showing robust interpersonal consistency in judgments across sensory modalities: some sounds, like that of the piccolo, are bright, while others, like that of the oboe, are dim. This is so in spite of the fact that brightness and dimness are strictly speaking only properties of light sources rather than sounds.²⁵ Again, some smells, like vanilla, are smooth, while others, for instance musk, are rough. Not only can we find congruence between elements of one set of experiences for a given sensory modality and another set for another modality; we can also find congruence between elements of a given set of experiences for one sensory modality and various emotions. Yellow is a happy color. That, however, is not because it looks the way happiness looks; happy people are not in the habit of turning yellow, and there is no obvious affinity between this color and the way

happy people are wont to behave. Rather, yellow is happy because it *shows how happiness feels*. Brown on the other hand shows how sadness feels.

Let me now clarify these claims. For each sensory modality we can construct the set of possible experiences available through that sense modality. For vision there is a class of possible visual experiences, for sound a set of possible sonic experiences, and so on. In addition, for any of these classes one can map its members onto multiple dimensions such as

pleasantness/unpleasantness
intensity/mildness
agitation/calm.

Let us suppose that there are three dimensions of assessment, and that they are these.²⁶ Then we have an experiential 3-space onto which experiences of each sensory modality may be mapped. Further, elements of the set of emotions and moods can be mapped onto this space as well. In some cases, two emotions will be mapped onto the same point in this 3-space, just as there will likely be cases in which two experiential elements from a single sensory modality, or two experiential elements from distinct sensory modalities, that will be mapped onto the same point in this 3-space.

Suppose now that an experience E1 and emotion E2 map onto the same co-ordinate, (x, y, z), in that three-space. In that case, E1 may be used to show how E2 feels. E1 might be pleasant, intense, and agitated, say as a result of being a visual expanse of yellow with lines arranged in such a way that it appears to be scintillating; as a result it shows how exuberance feels. Or E1 might be unpleasant, intense, and calm; as a result it shows how sadness feels. (Were it more agitated it would become closer to grief.) This is not at all to say that we are consciously aware of these congruences when we discern the happiness of E1. We might well become conscious of these congruences but need not do so.²⁷

The foregoing also does not imply that if E1 and E2 are mapped onto the same point in the 3-space, E1 will show every aspect of E2. For instance, if E2 is anger, then it will probably have a content component, that is, what its owner is angry about. However, knowing how an emotion feels does not normally require sharing the content of that emotion, if only because content is not in general part of the phenomenology of emotion. Again, any tokening of an emotion will carry with it a distinctive phenomenology: my exuberance will often be suffused with a variety of visual, auditory, and other experiences. These experiences are not, however, part of what it is to feel exuberant, so if those features are not

captured by congruences with other sensations, that will not upset the approach being mooted here. Finally, many of our emotions lack a distinctive phenomenology, so that if we are to express them it won't be by showing how they feel. If we are to express them, it will instead have to be by showing how they appear (if there be any such way), or portraying a situation apt to evoke such an emotion in me.

I have argued that a work's expressiveness is due either to its showing how an emotion, mood, or experience appears, or to its showing how an emotion, mood, or experience feels. The former is the natural home of a "contour" theory of expressiveness such as that of Kivy; I would say the same of Stephen Davies.²⁸ Yet that is not the only way in which expressiveness is achieved. Indeed, Kivy, as we have seen, worries whether he can account for the expressiveness of elements of music that bear no clear isomorphism to aspects of expressive behavior, either visually or sonically. I have suggested that the expressive quality of these elements is due to their being "congruent" with the emotion of which they are expressive in the way I have outlined above.

7 Empathy and Epistemology

Expressiveness is a matter of either showing an emotion, mood, or experience, or showing how an emotion, mood, or experience feels. The latter is particularly important for explaining how we can learn from things that are expressive and why that species of learning is important. In particular, one would expect that knowing how an emotion or experience feels enables me to "feel with" someone who is actually in the grip of that emotion or experience. This is to say that artworks that are expressive by virtue of showing how an emotion or experience feels enable me to empathize with others. However, to get a handle on this thought we will peer deeper into empathy.

Many writers both in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind distinguish between sympathy and empathy. Sympathy seems to involve taking a concern for the well being of another (not necessarily another person), and taking steps to provide them succor. It does not involve sharing any of what they are feeling. Thus I can sympathize with your grief by providing a shoulder on which to cry, and in other ways taking an active interest in aiding you. To sympathize with you, however, I need not share your grief. By contrast, many writers hold, for A to empathize with B, or more precisely for A to empathize with B's ϕ , where ϕ is an emotion,

experience, or perhaps even a thought, A must feel ϕ .²⁹ On this view, to empathize with your terror I must feel terror myself, and to empathize with your resentment of God I must resent God too. Of course this is not a sufficient condition; I don't empathize with your aching just-stubbed toe by stubbing mine. In addition to sharing your emotion (or experience), on this account I must use my own replication of your situation to imagine my way into what you are feeling.

This view of empathy is, however, intuitively implausible. It is of course *not* enough for me to empathize with your feeling of being ostracized that I have been ostracized in the past. Nor is it enough that I have been ostracized in the past and am now capable of calling up that memory into consciousness. One is not empathetic simply by virtue of having dormant skills. Instead I have to do something that makes me count as feeling with you. But it is a mistake to infer that feeling with others requires actually duplicating their feelings in myself. After all, to get myself to feel ostracized I'd have to induce certain beliefs in myself, such as that I am being excluded from a group on the basis of inappropriate considerations.³⁰ But suppose I don't happen to feel that way at this point; as it happens, I feel more or less accepted by the groups I care about. Writers like Berys Gaut, Alex Neill, and Ute Frith would infer that I am incapable of empathizing with your feeling of ostracism, but surely that is untrue. It would be awfully nice of me to follow a Pascal-style routine to get myself to believe that I am being excluded, but by the time I carry this off it will probably be too late for my empathy to be worth anything to you anyway. Instead, I could save a lot of time and effort simply by calling up into conscious awareness my *memory* of how I felt when I was ostracized in the past. On the basis of that conscious awareness, I now know how you feel, not dispositionally but occurrently. If I then go on to use this conscious awareness as a prop in which I imagine that you are feeling *this*, then I have empathized with you.

Gaut didn't claim that for me to empathize with your anguish it is sufficient that I feel anguish. He takes this as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Following Neill,³¹ Gaut also holds that, "empathy requires one imaginatively to enter into a character's mind and feel with him because of one's imagining of his situation".³² So on this view, to empathize with another's feeling of ϕ , I not only have to feel ϕ , I must also use that feeling of ϕ as a kind of prop on the basis of which to imagine being in your situation. This further condition of imaginative identification seems eminently plausible. What it does not do is mandate any requirement that I actually feel what I imagine you to be feeling.

Rather, it is enough that I be able to call into consciousness my experience of that feeling without actually reliving it, and then on that basis to imagine my way into your situation. That seems to be sufficient to enable me to feel with you.

Again, I've had some bad ankle sprains in my time, and I can still vividly recall how it felt when I went off that curb in Pittsburgh one beautiful spring day while running. Now I watch you sprain an ankle and there you are writhing on the pavement. I don't need to injure myself to empathize with you. Rather I need only recall feeling what you are suffering right now, and use that recalled feeling as a prop in which I imagine myself feeling as you do.

For a less experiential and more cognitive case, note that I can understand Sharon's position in *The Rapture* when she decides not to say she loves God. After all, look at what God has allowed happen to her. I can grasp the reasonableness of her position: Sharon resents God, and I can understand why. I used to feel the way she does at that point in the movie. As it happens, after thinking about some aspects of the problem of evil, I don't feel that way any more. Even if I were a theist, I'd now be inclined to reject the commonly held assumption that God is obliged to create the best possible world that it is in His power to create. Because of that I don't resent God. But for all that I can empathize with the character's feeling of resentment.

We can, then, empathize with the emotions, thoughts and experiences of others without duplicating those things in ourselves. Instead, it is enough that we be consciously aware of those feelings, thoughts, or experiences, if only by virtue of our memory of having gone through those things ourselves.

Is memory of an earlier experience or emotion the only alternative to actually feeling that experience or emotion for the purpose of empathy? I will now argue that it is not, and more precisely that imaginative engagement with various works of art is another way of achieving empathetic competence.

8 Art and Skill

It is not controversial that empathy involves exercise of a skill. Those suffering from some forms of autism have great difficulty empathizing with others, quite possibly for reasons having to do with dysfunction of the so-called Mirror Neuron System.³³ Others of us are simply too boorish

to empathize with others, at least with regard to particular issues. Bob might simply never have taken the time to put himself in the shoes of an unwed teenage mother; that's why he has no patience with her inability to find work elsewhere than on lower rungs of the service economy. Yet others might have too narrow a range of experience to draw on to empathize with others: much as I'd like to, I simply don't know how to empathize with a woman living under the Taliban because my own experience is too removed from hers.

Imagination is often distinguished from other mental acts and processes on the dimension of direction of fit. While belief purports to fit the world (and thus has mind-to-world direction of fit), and desire purports to mold the world (and thus has world-to-mind direction of fit), imagination falls naturally into neither of these categories. When I imagine a neutron bomb going off in Denver, I am not beholden to represent how things are, nor (one hopes) am I trying to get the world to be one way or another. Yet even here I am beholden to some norm of accuracy. If I visualize a daffodil swaying in the breeze, I'm simply not imagining a neutron bomb going off in Denver.

Imagination of the sort required for empathy is also beholden to a norm of accuracy. I'm not empathizing with your sense of isolation by imagining any old thing. I need to put myself in your shoes in the correct way, or else my imagination misses its target. If I call up to consciousness a feeling of *amae* (the Japanese emotion of satisfaction in the knowledge of having submerged one's identity in a group), I'm simply not imagining your sense of isolation. From what we have said thus far, we know that to empathize with your sense of isolation I need to do two things correctly: (1) activate my possibly latent or dormant knowledge of how that sense of isolation feels; and (2) use that as a prop to imagine how I would feel were I in your situation. Each of (1) and (2) might be done better or worse, and a failure of either one might cause me to be under the illusion of having empathized with you when I have not in fact done so. Further, we now know that one can achieve condition (1) not just by having experienced the emotion in question before; one can also achieve this condition by having learned how it feels from exposure to a novel, painting, sonata, or other work of art. The artwork might show how that emotion feels by exploiting congruences between sensation and affect.

Such an artwork can show how an emotion feels without being representational. A non-representational painting might be congruent, in ways discussed in Section 6 above, with central aspects of exuberance. By

possessing this congruence, the painting might show me how exuberance feels without representing anyone or anything being exuberant, and without making me exuberant. Likewise for many other sensory modalities, and many other emotions and moods. A work of art might also exploit the power of representation to show how an emotion feels. I'll close with an illustration of this possibility.

We tend to think of ourselves as being called upon to empathize with those suffering rather than those experiencing some pleasant or enjoyable emotion. That is presumably because sufferers tend to solicit our empathy more often than do others. Nevertheless it makes perfectly good sense to empathize with someone feeling a "positive" emotion or mood. So consider a photograph from Rodchenko entitled *Pioneer Girl* (see Plate 4.1). Notice the point of light in each of her eyes; that from her hair and the bit of her clothes you see, she's not overdressed for plowing a field or hammering railroad ties. Too, you're looking at her from below, and so it is natural to see her as large and strong. Yet the classical cut of her nose and upper lip suggest nobility. I can't but *admire* the Pioneer Girl. Correlatively, I can now empathize with the admiration that Rodchenko felt for her, or at least the admiration felt by the persona that his work embodies.

This photo shows me a lot of things, then. It shows me the girl, her scarf, and tousled hair. It also shows me *what admiration feels like*. Of course it has a polemical dimension as well, since it aims to convince me that the girl's face is representative of the coming workers' revolution. I can remain neutral on that issue, though, while still admiring the girl's combination of earthy strength and nobility. I would, furthermore, still admire these characteristics if I were gazing at what I know to be a painting, even a hyper-realist painting in the style of Chuck Close, of the same subject. Here it is doubtful that I would feel any admiration of the painting's subject, since to do that I would have to believe that subject to exemplify properties of a certain kind – and I am not likely to do that with an entity I don't believe to exist. Nevertheless, such a painting might show me how admiration feels by enabling me to imagine admiring its sitter.

A work of art can show me how an emotion or mood feels, then, without that being its primary aim. Also, a work of art can show me how an emotion or mood feels even if I am no stranger to that emotion or mood. I might be acquainted with a certain emotion or mood although I am not able to access it consciously, through disuse, as it were. A work of art can reacquaint me with an emotion or mood by bringing it to consciousness. Further, a work of art can show me how an emotion or



Plate 4.1: *Pioneer Girl* (Alexander Rodchenko, 1930)

Source: Copyright Estate of Alexander Rodchenko/RAO, Moscow/VAGA, New York.

mood feels without causing me to feel that emotion. It might do that either by engaging the imagination, or by exploiting our sensitivity to congruences between experiences, on the one hand, and emotions and moods on the other.

Expressiveness and empathy are, then, closely linked. Something that is expressive of an emotion, mood, or experience shows how that emotion, mood, or experience appears or feels. In so doing, that thing makes know-how available to appropriately constituted and situated observers. When what has been made available is how an emotion or mood feels, such observers are then in a position to employ their imagination in such a way as to empathize with others. While expressiveness in the

service of empathy is not the exclusive domain of art, and while a great deal of art aims at nothing of the kind, it nevertheless appears that *one* central function of art forms as disparate as painting, music, literature, film, and photography is that they show how emotions and moods feel in such a way as to equip us to achieve a greater rapport with others.

Notes

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- 1 This usage is to be distinguished from that in A. Miklósi et al., "Intentional Behaviour in Dog-Human Communication," *Animal Cognition* 3 (2000): 159–66. The authors define showing as a communicative action comprising both a directional component related to an external target and an attention-getting component directing the attention of the perceiver to the informer or sender. Although I make no use of this notion here, we might call it overt showing to distinguish it from that used in the text. Also, this paper shares with Tim Wharton ("Natural Pragmatics and Natural Codes," *Mind and Language* 18 (2003): 447–77) a conviction of the importance of the notion of showing for certain aspects of communication; insofar, it shares with that work the conviction that much of so-called natural meaning deserves the attention of students of communication.
- 2 Here is one verse:

In the Big Rock Candy Mountain
 You never change your socks
 And little streams of alkyhol
 Come trickling down the rocks
 O the shacks all have to tip their hats
 And the railway bulls are blind
 There's a lake of stew
 And ginger ale too
 And you can paddle
 All around it in a big canoe
 In the Big Rock Candy Mountain.

- 3 Jane Hamilton, *A Map of the World* (New York: Doubleday, 1994).
- 4 Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson argue that all alleged cases of knowledge-how are analyzable as cases of knowledge-that, while the converse relation of analyzability does not hold (Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, "Knowing How," *Journal of Philosophy* 98 (2001): 411–44). However, their "analysis" appeals to what they call "practical modes of presentation," and as Tobias Rosefeldt points out, in the absence of an elucidation of this notion we cannot tell whether the putative analysis succeeds without remainder (Tobias Rosefeldt, "Is Knowing-How Simply a Case of Knowing-That?" *Philosophical Investigations* 27 (2004): 370–79).
- 5 This and other famous koans may be found at www.ashidakim.com.
- 6 A fuller account of supposition and its norms is given in Mitchell Green, "The Status of Supposition," *Nous* 34 (2000): 376–99.
- 7 J. O. Urmson, "Literature as a Performing Art," in George Dickie and Richard Sclafani, eds., *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology* (New York: St Martin's, 1977), pp. 334–41.
- 8 Berys Gaut argues persuasively that in spite of skeptical challenges by some aestheticians, the everyday notion of identification at play in cases such as this is innocuous (Berys Gaut, "Identification and Emotion in Narrative Film," in Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith, eds., *Passionate Views: Film, Cognition and Emotion* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999): 200–16).
- 9 Oxford Compact English Dictionary, p. 934.
- 10 Frederick Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave* (1845), p. 14.
- 11 Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, 3rd edn., ed. Paul Ekman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 359.
- 12 I offer more detailed arguments against a conception of expression as indication in Mitchell Green, "Expression, Indication, and Showing What's Within," *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming. David Owens also highlights the inadequacies of such a conception (David Owens, "Testimony and Assertion," *Philosophical Studies* 130/1 (July 2006): 105–29).
- 13 Paul Griffiths develops the case for the pan-cultural nature of the so-called basic emotions (Paul Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997). Mitchell Green, *Self-Expression* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), chapters 4–5, defends in further detail the claim that some emotions can be perceived.
- 14 Kendall Walton, "On Pictures and Photographs: Objections Answered," in Richard Allen and Murray Smith, eds., *Film Theory and Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 60–75.
- 15 Gary Faigin, *The Artist's Complete Guide to Facial Expression* (New York: Watson-Guptill, 1990).
- 16 This theory is updated and defended in Peter Kivy, *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 40.

18 Ibid., p. 41. Jerrold Levinson offers a general objection to all views of musical expression (and perhaps artistic expression generally) that depend upon a perceived resemblance between the work and an agent who is literally expressing her emotion (Jerrold Levinson, “Musical Expressiveness as Hearability-as-Expression,” in Matthew Kieran, ed., *Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). Levinson holds that seeing or otherwise perceiving a resemblance between A and B is never on its own a sufficient condition for seeing (hearing, etc.) A as B. He gives the example of seeing the resemblance of a leafy tree and a bushy head. In seeing such a resemblance, Levinson contends, we do not thereby see the tree as a bushy head. Perceiving a resemblance is thus not a sufficient condition for seeing- (hearing-, etc.) as.

Levinson is right to point out that perceiving a resemblance is not a sufficient condition for seeing- (or otherwise perceiving-) as. The point does not, however, undermine resemblance-based views of musical (or other forms of non-sentient) expression, for it is not clear that in order to perceive the expressiveness of an object one must see it as anything other than what it is. I see the Newfoundland’s face, and I see the sadness in that face, for I perceive that the face has a sad look. In order to do this, must I also see it as sad? That evidently depends upon how we construe the truth conditions of this locution. Does seeing α as Φ require that I imagine α to be Φ , or to be the vehicle of some agent’s expression of Φ ? In that case the seeing-as requirement is too strong: surely I can perceive the sad look in the Newfoundland’s face, or the contemptuous look in the face of a man whose face has been disfigured by an accident, without imagining anything at all? On the other hand if the seeing-as condition does not require use of the imagination, then for all Levinson has said, perception of a resemblance will be enough to satisfy it.

19 Kivy, *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music*, p. 43.

20 Kivy infers that the fact that the contour theory cannot provide an explanation here is, as he says, “no great deficit.” This is of course a fallacy. If no theory in a class C can account for a datum that is in the domain of C-type theories, it is equally possible that all theories in that class are incorrect, not that any one of them is off the hook.

21 If I only coolly say, “I’m in pain,” I express my belief that I’m in pain but not my pain, for this cool utterance does not show my pain.

22 Flo Leibowitz, “Personal Agency Theories of Expressiveness and the Movies,” in Allen and Smith, eds., *Film Theory and Philosophy*, pp. 329–42.

23 Peter Taylor, “Rain in the Heart,” in *The Old Forest and Other Stories* (New York: Doubleday, 1941).

24 Eliot writes,

The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an “objective correlative;” in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events

which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. If you examine any of Shakespeare's more successful tragedies, you will find this exact equivalence; you will find that the state of mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep has been communicated to you by a skilful accumulation of imagined sensory impressions; the words of Macbeth on hearing of his wife's death strike us as if, given the sequence of events, these words were automatically released by the last event in the series. The artistic "inevitability" lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is deficient in Hamlet. (T. S. Eliot, "Hamlet and His Problems," in *The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism*, London: Methuen, 1921)

- 25 See Lawrence E. Marks, *The Unity of the Senses* (New York: Academic Press, 1979); and "Intermodal Similarity and Cross-Modality Matching: Coding Perceptual Dimensions," in R. Duncan Luce et al., eds., *Geometrical Representations of Perceptual Phenomena* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995), pp. 207–33.
- 26 We don't have to be certain of either of these suppositions for the following elucidation to help clarify the thesis I am suggesting.
- 27 If some version of the present hypothesis is correct, it would provide another case of unconscious cognitive processes along with others currently being collected together under the rubric of the *adaptive unconscious* as characterized and elucidated in Timothy Wilson, *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
- 28 See Stephen Davies, "Philosophical Perspectives on Music's Expressiveness," in *Themes in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003).
- 29 See for instance Gaut, "Identification and Emotion in Narrative Film;" and Carl Plantinga, "The Scene of Empathy and the Human Face on Film," in Plantinga and Smith, eds., *Passionate Views*. Ute Frith also takes empathy to require an actual sharing of emotions, writing, "Empathy presupposes, amongst other things, a recognition of different mental states. It also presupposes that one goes beyond the recognition of difference to adopt the other person's frame of mind with all the consequences of emotional reactions" (Ute Frith, *Autism: Explaining the Enigma*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 144–5.
- 30 I am not presupposing that emotions are a species of judgment; I am assuming something much weaker, namely that certain emotions require judgments or beliefs as necessary conditions.
- 31 Alex Neill, "Empathy and (Film) Fiction," in David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, eds., *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), pp. 175–94.
- 32 Gaut, "Identification and Emotion in Narrative Film," p. 206.

- 33 Jeanette Kennett, "Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency," *Philosophical Quarterly* 52 (2002): 340–57, reviews some of the basic studies of autism. Dapretto and colleagues report striking neurological evidence in support of the relation between autism and dysfunction in the Mirror Neuron System (Mirella Dapretto et al., "Understanding Emotions in Others: Mirror Neuron Dysfunction in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders," *Nature Neuroscience* 9/1 (2006): 28–30).