Work in Progress


 

gPath Dependence in the Evolution of Japanfs Party System Since 1993,h a paper I presented at the International Political Science Association Meeting in Fukuoka in July 2006.  Ifm continuing to modify the paper and expect to include it in a volume I am co-editing with Prof. Aiji Tanaka of Waseda University.

 

Abstract: The argument that party systems take shape at critical junctures, and that the subsequent evolution of these systems is constrained by what took place in the past, was made way back in 1967 by Lipset and Rokkan. More recently, Paul Pierson, in his book Politics in Time, has pointed to the stability of party systems as a leading example of the workings of gpath dependence.h  But party systems do change, as seen in the way the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) replaced the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) as the leading alternative to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) during the 1990s.  In this paper, I identify the positive feedback loops that make party systems difficult to disrupt (processes that help explain the stability of the g1955 Party Systemh in Japan up until 1993).  I then focus on conditions that can disrupt, overwhelm, or make dysfunctional these mechanisms of party system reproduction.  The elimination of the JSP as a significant party and the emergence of the DPJ as the leading alternative to the LDP after 1996 can be explained, I argue, by a particular confluence of sudden changes in the structure of Japanfs policy space.  Change at this critical juncture did not completely remake the system, however, since strategic incentives arising from the prior configuration of the old party system has led the DPJ and the LDP to market themselves as supporters of neoliberal economic reform—leaving Japan without a viable party of the Left.

 


gExit, Voice, and Womenfs Movements in an Era of Low Fertilityh, a paper I presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in the fall of 2005, has been submitted to a journal.

Abstract: When the womenfs movements of Sweden and the United States began seeking increased labor market opportunities and greater equality in the sharing of informal work in the 1960s, both had high fertility rates. Most women married young and had several children before they began struggling to balance work and family and fighting for improvements in their conditions that would make this struggle easier. In contrast, women in contemporary Japan and Italy, who are relative latecomers to the gender role revolution, have been struggling for equality in an era of low fertility.  Most women put off marriage until their late twenties (if they marry at all), and many work for over a decade or more before they face decisions about how (and whether) to balance work with family. This paper argues that we are seeing different patterns of behavior in the advanced industrialized nations that are confronting gender role issues in an era of low fertility than in those that pioneered the womenfs movement in an era of high fertility—shaping womenfs movements in distinct ways and producing different degrees of social norm and policy change.


gGaiatsu, Learning, and Japanfs Emerging Economic Liberalism,h a paper being revised for submission to an IR journal.

Abstract: This paper examines how earlier periods of American pressure led Japanese elites to adopt a defensive strategy of embracing WTO and OECD multilateralism which has, over time, led to an internalization of liberal economic norms among Japanese economic elites.


International Cooperation Despite Domestic Conflict: Japanese Politics and the San Francisco Treaties, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in New Orleans, March 24-27, 2002.

Abstract: Alliance theory based on unitary rational actor assumptions predicts that states worried about entrapment or abandonment are likely to hesitate before committing to an alliance.  Moreover, two-level game theory predicts that states with divided domestic politics are likely to find it difficult to strike international bargains.  If these theories are correct, polities torn between factions worried, between them, about both abandonment and entrapment should have particular difficulty sustaining support for a security alliance.  This paper challenges these arguments by presenting a two-level model of alliance politics that shows how cooperation can be sustained under these adverse conditions.  The model is then illustrated through an analysis of how Japanese domestic politics shaped the terms of U.S.-Japan security cooperation in the 1950s.

 


 


This page maintained by Leonard Schoppa. Last updated on: June 30, 2006