PLCP 853: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM IN JAPAN (Spring 2005)
Tuesday 1:00-3:30 in Cabell 318

Prof. Len Schoppa
Office: Cabell 148 (tel: 924-3211)
Hrs: Mon and Thurs 3:30 - 4:30 (or appt)
e-mail: schoppa@virginia.edu

This course examines the interactions between politics, political institutions, and public policy during periods of institutional reform, with a particular focus on how these dynamics are playing out in contemporary Japan.  We will look at how postwar political institutions (e.g., the structure of the bureaucracy; the old electoral system) shaped politics and public policy; how discontent with the style of politics and with public policy outcomes led to reforms in political institutions during the 1990s; and how politics and public policy have been influenced by these changes.  Most weeks, we will read at least one book focusing on the political economy of Japan, but many of the books selected are comparative in orientation (examining how developments in Japan compare to those in places like Britain, Italy, and the United States), and in other weeks I have paired Japan-focused readings with comparative/theoretical selections that are designed to bring out the ways in which studies of Japan's political economy are linked to broader debates in the literature on comparative politics.  The seminar is designed for graduate students with some background in Japanese or comparative politics and will require heavy reading and a long research paper.

Requirements:

The grade in this seminar will be based on participation in weekly discussions (50%) and a research paper (50%). Each week through the first part of the course, one or more students will be assigned to lead the discussion by presenting short oral presentations reacting to assigned readings. Each student should expect to make several of these presentations. Each students' participation grade will be based on these presentations as well as on his or her contributions to the subsequent discussion. Attendance at all seminar sessions is mandatory.

The final two weeks of the course are set aside for oral presentations by students. Students should use these presentations to refine their papers, with final drafts due Monday, May 9, at 9 am. Papers should be 25-35 pages in length and should explore some issue in Japanese politics (or another country going through a period of institutional reform) with relevance to themes explored in the seminar.

Readings:

Readings marked with an * are available on the toolkit materials page for this class, accessible with the password “schoppa”. I hope to make most of these available in a loose-leaf folder which you can borrow from me for easy (and cheaper) copying than will be required if you have to print out the toolkit articles using university printers. Because of the small numbers of students enrolled in the class, I did not order books through the bookstore.  I suggest instead that you decide which of the books below you want to own, and order these via Amazon.com or an alternative channel.  You may also check out these books at Clemons, where I have placed them on three-day reserve.

Background Reading Assumed of Students Coming Into the Class:

Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

I. Introduction: The Challenge of Achieving Economic Reform (1/25)

*Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (January 1996): 143-79.

*Stephen Haggard, “Interests, Institutions and Policy Reform,” in Anne O. Krueger, ed., Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000): 21-60.

II. The Constraints Imposed by Bureaucratic Structures on Economic Reform (2/1)

Mark Tilton, Restrained Trade: Cartels in Japan's Basic Materials Industries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Steve Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

III. The Constraints Imposed by Political Structures on Economic Reform (2/8)

*Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, “The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes,” in Stephan Haggard and Matthew McCubbins, eds, Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 21-63.

*John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas," Electoral Studies 14:4 (1994), pp. 417-439.

*Brian Woodall, Japan Under Construction: Corruption, Politics, and Public Works (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 1-50, 81-123.

IV. The Constraints Imposed by Interest Group Structures on Economic Reform (2/15)

Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

*Frank K. Upham, “Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in Comparative Perspective.” Fordham International Law Journal 20:2 (December 1996): 396-511.

Additional Reading: Robert M. Uriu, Troubled Industries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

V. Embedded Varieties of Capitalism: Mutually-Reinforcing Social Structures in the Japanese Political Economy (2/22)

*W. Carl Kester, “American and Japanese Corporate Governance: Convergence to Best Practice?," In Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds. National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 107-137.

*Leonard Schoppa, Race for the Exits: Women, Firms, and the Unraveling of Japan’s System of Social Protection (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 3.

Additional Reading: Ronald Dore, Flexible Rigidities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986).

VI. Take One: Institutional Change and Economic Reform Swept Along by Globalization (3/1)

Three chapters by Frieden and Rogowski; Garrett and Lange; and Rosenbluth, in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 25-75, 137-156.

T.J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 113-219.

VII. A Closer Look at the Process of Political Reform: Britain in the 17^th Century and Japan in 1994 (3/15)

*Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” in Alston, Eggertsson, and North, eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 134-165.

*Ray Christensen, Ending the LDP Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), pp. 9-35.

*Steven Reed and Michael Thies, “The Causes of Electoral Reform,” in Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, eds., Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 152-172.

Additional Reading: Gerald Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

VIII. A Closer Look at the Effects of Political Reforms on Politics and Policy: Britain in the 19^th Century and Japan Post-1994 (3/22)

Gary Cox, The Efficient Secret (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

*Gary Cox, Michael Thies, and Frances Rosenbluth, “Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” British Journal of Political Science 29:1 (1999): 33-56.

*Ellis S.Krauss and Robert Pekkanen, "Explaining Party Adaptation to Electoral Reform: The Discreet Charm of the LDP?" Journal of Japanese Studies 30:1 (Winter 2004): 1-34.

*Steven Vogel, “Can Japan Disengage? Winners and Losers in Japan’s Political Economy, and the Ties that Bind Them,” Social Science Japan Journal 2:1 (April 1999): 3-21.

IX. Case Studies of Economic Reform in Japan: Financial Reform (3/29)

Jennifer A. Amyx, Japan's Financial Crisis: Institutional Rigidity and Reluctant Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Additional Reading: Henry Laurence, Money Rules: The New Politics of Finance in Britain and Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

X. Case Studies of Economic Reform in Japan: Labor Market Reform (4/5)

Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

*Mari Miura, From Welfare Through Work to Lean Work: The Politics of Labor Market Reform in Japan (Ph.D dissertation: Dept of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 2002), pp. xx-xx.

XI Case Studies of Economic Reform in Japan: Social Welfare Reform (4/12)

*Leonard Schoppa, Race for the Exits: Women, Firms, and the Unraveling of Japan’s System of Social Protection (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), Chapters 1, 4-5, and 7.

XII. Change Agents (4/19)

Richard Samuels, Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

XIII. Student Topic I: David Moore and One Other (4/26)

*Andrew Dewit and Sven Steinmo, "The Political Economy of Taxes and Redistribution in Japan," Social Science Japan Journal 5:1 (2002): 159-178.

XIII. Student Topics II (5/3)

Paper Due: Monday, May 9, at 10 am