

against the slave trade; and "Observations on the Slaves, and the Indented Servants enlisted in the Army, and in the Navy of the United States" (1777).

All of the art work of this period with black images is here, and some of the dark paintings in the first edition have been made lighter and clearer in the new book. All of the African-American personalities (free and slave) of the American Revolution era are here, with all the known paintings and engravings. Some of these early figures are not well known and they are all together here for the first time. The documents and rare pamphlets for this early period are very good, and they are really hard to find elsewhere. The running text which includes many biographies, long and short, is very full and explanatory. The Sources section shows the exhaustiveness of the Kaplans' research into books, historical state magazines and scholarly college and university publications.

The 1973 edition of *Black Presence* was a catalog of an exhibition during the bicentennial celebration of the Declaration of Independence. The new 1989 edition is tied in with the State of Massachusetts' memorializing in 1988 the 350th anniversary of the first landing of Africans on its soil in 1638.

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Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, by Alice H. Amsden. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. \$29.95. Pp. 379.

Most analysts of East Asian industrialization in general, and of South Korean industrialization in particular, typically focus on one facet of South Korean industrialization — its reliance on external finance, its export orientation, the highly exploited workers in its export processing zones, the various state bureaucracies guiding investment — and proclaim this as the only reason for success. If Amsden had simply organized the information generated in hundreds of narrow studies into a coherent picture of the state's disciplining of industry, the managerial strategies of large enterprises, and workers' shop floor struggles — and how these combined to produce average annual rates of GNP growth of more than six percent — that would already justify careful reading. But Amsden

also provides a theory of late development informed by thinking about the significance of "learning by doing."

Classic thinking about late development has two flaws. First, it rests on the latecomer's need for innovative institutional mechanisms to discipline labor, concentrate capital and protect markets. But the emphasis on "need" tends to make these analyses functionalist. Second, and consequently, most writing about late development tends to concentrate too much on state institutions and activity and not enough at the level of the firm and shop floor.

Amsden departs from this state-oriented functionalism to look at the organizational and shop floor behaviors underpinning South Korean growth. Like everyone else, she shows how the state deliberately promoted investment in export industries. If this investment was irrational from the point of view of static comparative advantage, it yielded industrial competence and enormous export revenue in the long run. But every late developer tries this. Why was South Korea able to avoid the debt traps, deteriorating terms of trade, and relegation to technological backwaters typical even of many newly industrializing countries? Again like most analysts, Amsden points to the high level of state autonomy: the Korean state was able to force firms to invest rather than consume subsidies, and to impose performance standards on subsidy recipients. But, and here is her major contribution, Amsden also argues that managerial and shop floor processes significantly and positively affected investment behavior and productivity growth.

Amsden asks how South Korean firms managed to assimilate other countries' technology and become competitive. The state of course helped firms license technology selectively. But how did firms master it? Arguing, as Amsden has done in prior articles, that rising output allowed greater familiarity and thence mastery partly begs the question, for mastery obviously is important for the sales that make possible rising output. What Amsden adds here is that the state targeted certain industries for growth, and created enormous conglomerates through constant diversification and merger; this, in turn, subordinated traditional familial entrepreneurs with short time horizons and limited capacities and desires to invest, and enhanced the role of long-term investment-oriented professional managers and engineers. Amsden shows how Korea's educational system, like that of the United States, turned out the latter in large numbers. She argues that this technically minded management valued excellence over financial and sales concerns, concentrating on adapting and improving imported technologies. This reinforced the ultimate goal of indigenously developed technology. In turn, large firms forced technical excellence on their subcontractors, thus encouraging what is usually a

family owned sector to resort to professional management as well. Shop floor pressures also reinforced the need to master imported technology.

Amsden provides a particularly textured analysis of the consequences of shop floor strategies, transcending the usually mystifying verities of neoclassical economists observing South Korea's unregulated labor markets. On the one hand, why hasn't that country fallen into a low wage-low productivity trap like other late industrializers, and why, on the other, has it been able to sustain productivity growth far in excess of its rapidly rising real wages? Clearly the early stages of South Korean industrialization rested on the hyper-exploitation of a repressed work force, and in particular on poorly paid female workers. Amsden deemphasizes this aspect. After all, this is neither new nor unique to late developers. The question is: how has South Korea managed to move from the extraction of absolute surplus value to the extraction of relative surplus value (or in Amsden's terms from a situation characterized by capital widening to one characterized by capital deepening)?

Using studies of the shipbuilding and steel making industries, Amsden argues that despite active state repression of workers and labor unions, (primarily male) workers in emerging heavy industries secured a measure of shop floor power because of the process of learning through apprenticeship. South Korean managers correctly perceived that much of the "know-how" their firms accumulated took the form of human capital possessed by skilled line workers. As Amsden says: "Korean managers could never hope to manage in a tight, 'Taylorist,' top-down fashion . . . *because no one at the top knew enough about the [production] process to do so*" (209, emphasis in original). Thus despite the presence of an oversupply of labor in the general economy, managers acquiesced in rising real wages in order to retain skilled workers, much as Japanese employers instituted lifetime employment in the 1920s. Retaining skilled male workers was the only way to maintain their current ability to export. In turn, fear of future real wage growth spurred managers to innovate and increase productivity. Real wages tripled in South Korea 1970-1984, but productivity usually grew even faster. Shop floor dynamics in South Korea thus generated the rising wages-rising productivity-rising investment pool dynamic typical of developed economies.

Amsden glosses over many of the consequences of Korea's highly segmented labor force, which is sharply divided between "core" workers and subcontractors, heavy and light industry and — reinforcing the other divisions — between men and women. But her analysis shows why South Korean workers and firms were able to produce such rapid and successful industrialization. The need to exclude or control transnational firms brings us back full circle to the state's role in preserving the domestic

market and then disciplining the local firms operating in that market. It also returns us to Amsden's original contribution, namely, a non-functional analysis of the second most successful case of late development in this century. The first, of course, is Japan.

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People's Nicaragua, by Harry R. Targ. New York: International Publishers, 1989. Paper, \$5.95. Pp. 128.

Dr. Harry Targ, who teaches Political Science at Purdue University, traveled to Nicaragua in 1987. He had previously become involved in Central American solidarity activities and this trip represented the logical outcome of that work. This short book is a personal testimony to his experiences as an observer of the Sandinista Revolution in that war-torn land and to his renewed commitment, upon his return, to the international struggle.

The text divides roughly into three parts. The first is a brief historical discussion of U.S. imperialism, with specific references to Nicaragua. This is followed by a travelogue, covering his group's adventures in Nicaragua; this mixes anecdotal material and analysis, always with an emphasis on the former. Finally, there is an account of what happened upon his return, focusing on distortion of the news by the mainstream media and on Professor Targ's efforts to publicize his views about the Sandinista Revolution. The last chapter also briefly summarizes subsequent events in Nicaragua and efforts by the Central American countries to bring peace to that land.

The book is written for people who are relatively unacquainted with Nicaragua and is clearly meant to convince them of the Sandinista Revolution's merits and accomplishments. It is highly critical of U.S. efforts to block social change, thus denying the people's legitimate aspirations. Written in an informal and personal style, the text makes easy reading, although some may be repelled by its constant moralizing and self-indulgent guilt trips.

Perhaps the most interesting chapters for those who know something about the country are the concluding ones, which analyze media bias in