

# THE SEMANTICS OF THE AFFECTIVE LEXICON

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Emotions are psychological states, but not all psychological states are emotional; for example, neither a state of exhaustion nor a state of confusion is an emotion. Emotions are sometimes expressed facially, but not all facial expressions indicate emotions; neither a grimace of pain nor a frown of puzzlement is an emotional expression. Emotions also involve feelings, but not all feelings indicate emotions; neither hunger pangs nor a feeling of certainty is an emotional feeling. Most people would readily agree to these assertions. They involve more or less clear cases. The question posed in this paper is whether we can establish, on the basis of such clear cases, a set of criteria that will also differentiate emotions from nonemotions in less clear cases.

Developing a theory of any phenomenon requires principled decisions about what things are and are not to be explained. This is no less true in the realm of emotions than it is in, say, zoology. To give a systematic account of the emotions, we need to be able to separate the nonemotional whales from the emotional fishes. We propose to do this by analyzing the affective terms in English that do and do not refer to emotions.

Many psychologists are likely to concur with the view expressed by Panksepp (1982, p 453) that, "The semantic controversies that routinely arise in the discussion of emotion have hindered the progress of research in this area." But the problem is not so much that raising semantic issues hinders progress, as though keeping quiet would somehow help, but rather that we have not developed methods for resolving such controversies. In addition, it must be realized that the controversies have more far-reaching implications than merely what terminology we use. First, much of the psychological work on emotion has attempted to determine the structure of emotional space based on judgments about emotion terms. Russell (1980), for example, has proposed a widely accepted structure on the basis of a small sample of terms, many of which refer to states that may not be emotions. The problem is that the meaning of such structural accounts is unclear when the things being structured turn out not to be examples of the phenomenon in question. Second, other investigators have established conceptions of emotion on the basis of states they believe to be the "basic emotions" on which all others depend (e.g., Ekman, 1973; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980). These generally include "anger," "fear," "joy," and "disgust," although many systems also include such states as "surprise," "guilt," and "interest". But a case can be made that some or all of these latter states, far from being basic emotions, may not even be emotions.

Judging from the number of studies of emotion terms, many of which are quite sophisticated from a quantitative point of view, one might suppose that the issue of which words refer to emotions and which do not had been resolved long ago. But not only is the question unanswered, it in fact remains virtually unasked. Few of the many studies of emotion words have worried at all about the problem of separating emotion terms from the rest of the affective lexicon (see Averill, 1975; Shields, 1984 for notable exceptions). Most have preferred instead to proceed directly to such tasks as searching for the multidimensional structure of emotions through scaling or factor analytic studies (e.g., Bush, 1973; Plutchik, 1980; Russell, 1980) or searching for the structure of emotion terms on some other basis, such as their cognitive causes (e.g., Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner, 1982). Virtually all of the studies we have reviewed are concerned with classifying terms that are already assumed to refer to emotions. Little or no attention is paid to the logically prior question of identifying which terms from the affective lexicon as a whole refer to emotions and which to other psychological conditions.

Tiller and Campbell (1986) recently reviewed 13 studies and found that none had explicit criteria for including the words they studied. Of course, it is always possible that, despite their lack of explicitness, investigators still succeeded in generating quite adequate lists. But in the judgment of Tiller and Campbell's subjects, more than a third (37 per cent) of the words used in these studies were unrepresentative of emotion. The following are illustrative of some of the poorer candidates (pp 623-624): "healthy," "bashful" (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982); "influential", "important" (Russell, 1979); "droopy", "relaxed" (Russell, 1980, 1983); "speedy," "worthless" (Russell & Ridgeway, 1983); "faint," "efficacious" (Sjoberg, Svensson, & Persson, 1979, Study 2); "deceived," "not efficient" (McNair & Lorr, 1964); "rude," "dependable" (Hoffman & Peterson, 1970); and "steady," and "weary" (Ryman, Biersner, & LaRocco, 1974).

In the present paper we shall consider, first, the contribution of scaling studies, second, an analysis of the affective lexicon with a view to identifying emotion terms (summarizing recent work by Clore, Ortony, & Foss, 1987; and Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987), third, the question of whether emotions should be considered as prototypes, and fourth, what role natural language terms should play in theory development.

## 2. SCALING

Most published studies of emotion terms have been scaling studies in which the goal has been to discover the structure of emotion. The idea that emotions can be related by an underlying dimensional structure seems to have been proposed first by Wundt (1903). Through the years a number of investigators have employed factor analytic and multidimensional scaling techniques to describe this dimensionality (e.g., Averill, 1975; Bush, 1973; Dahl & Stengel, 1978; Davitz, 1969; Russell, 1980). Despite considerable consensus in the literature to date, a review of the studies makes it clear that the task of untangling the affective lexicon cannot be accomplished by multidimensional statistical techniques alone. While these techniques can uncover the dimensions underlying judgments of particular sets of stimuli, there are several salient limitations to their use in the study of emotion. First, the results depend critically upon the nature of the stimulus set, and, of course, nothing in the technique ensures that appropriate stimuli are chosen. Second, just as the terms used are critical to the solutions, so is the particular frame of reference that subjects adopt

when considering the terms. Third, the nature of the question to which scaling solutions are the answer has rarely been specified.

As we indicated, one almost never finds in scaling studies of emotions justifications for the item selection procedures used. For example, Russell (1980) concluded from a multidimensional scaling analysis of 28 terms that there are two dimensions of emotional space, Arousal and Pleasantness. But a look at the words used in the study suggests that many are not emotion terms at all. Moreover, the prevalence of such questionable emotion terms as "excited," "aroused," "relaxed," "droopy," and "tired" ensured that a dimension of Arousal would be found, regardless of its actual importance as a dimension of emotions.

The second difficulty with this task, in which subjects judge the similarity of emotion terms, arises from the lack of control over subjects' interpretations of the terms they judge. When given terms such as "fearful," "proud," and "hostile," for example, some subjects may think of them as enduring traits, some as momentary states, and some as descriptions of behavior, so that the meanings of the stimuli are not constant. A related difficulty stems from the fact that the linguistic context in which subjects implicitly consider the terms is usually uncontrolled and unknown. As we shall argue more fully below, even poor examples of emotion terms may seem quite emotional when considered in the context of "feeling" something as opposed to "being" it. If someone refers, for example, to "being alone" in some situation, we would not necessarily assume that they are experiencing an emotion; but if they refer to "feeling alone," we would. Hence, the failure to control the implicit linguistic context in which words are considered may be responsible for terms such as "alone" sometimes being rated by subjects as emotions.

In addition to these methodological aspects of scaling studies, there are larger issues concerning the meaning of the findings. When emotion terms are rated for similarity, the usual finding is that the words can be mapped into a space of two or three basic dimensions. But exactly what is the question to which such a structure provides an answer? As Scherer (1984) has pointed out, multidimensional scaling is most useful for analyzing the dimensions of experience or phenomenology of emotion, but perhaps less useful for uncovering other kinds of structures based on, for example, the causal conditions that differentiate the emotions. Such techniques can be used to describe the dimensions of taste that differentiate among wines, the dimensions underlying consumer preferences for automobiles, or the dimensions of any structure that can sensibly be thought of as existing at a single level. But such techniques are perhaps not well suited for uncovering hierarchical, multilevel, or other complex structures that emotions may display.

Even within the phenomenological domain, scaling studies often yield very general dimensions that do not provide distinctive information about emotion. Two dimensions (often interpreted as Valence and Arousal) are most frequently discovered, one of which can be seen as Osgood's Evaluation dimension, and the other of which may be seen as a combination of his Potency and Activity dimensions (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). But these are universal dimensions that apply to almost any concept, suggesting that the research tells us nothing unique about emotions at all.

In this connection, the history of the work on emotion terms has a parallel in the search for the structure of personality trait terms (for a summary see Mischel, 1968; Wiggins, 1973). In both

cases the dimensions uncovered were initially interpreted as discoveries about personality traits themselves or about emotions themselves, but some interpreters see the results as reflecting facts about language rather than about the attributes of persons. To the extent that we, as investigators, have confused the general structure of the language with the structure of the substantive domains to which it refers, we are rather like beginning biology students who use microscopes for the first time. Invariably their drawings of the paramecia they see look suspiciously like drawings of their own eyelashes.

### 3. WHY WORDS?

Readers may still find themselves asking why, if we are interested in emotions, are we worrying about words at all? Indeed, of all human experiences, emotions seem to be among the least susceptible to verbal description. It is true, of course, that emotional experience cannot itself be captured adequately in words, but this is true of experience in general and is not really peculiar to emotional as opposed to other kinds of experience. Natural language offers a large vocabulary of emotion terms, and, other than the experiences themselves, these terms offer the most satisfactory access we have to the variety of emotions that exist. Natural language terms allow us to make many more distinctions between different emotions and between different intensities of the same emotion than can be captured in facial expressions, physiological indicators, or any combination of these. Some might argue that we should not make distinctions that cannot also be shown in physiology and in behavior as well as in language, but the fact of the matter is that behavior during emotions is often optional and quite malleable; moreover, evidence of psycho-physiological differentiation among the emotions is still crude, despite some recent progress (e.g., Ekman, Levenson, & Friedman, 1983). To attempt to specify the domain of the study of emotion, therefore, we have little alternative but to turn to natural language words that refer to emotions.

At the same time, as a map of the domain of emotion, language can be seriously misleading. Any particular language may lack lexical items for some emotions, so that a system based on a single language may miss those emotions altogether. No less troublesome is the fact that different emotion words do not necessarily refer to different types of emotions; many are simply alternative paths to the same emotion. "Terrified," "apprehensive," "worried," and "cowering," for example, all presumably refer to forms of fear, varying primarily in terms of whether the fear is strong or weak, and is manifested cognitively or behaviorally. It would be difficult, therefore, to estimate the number of distinct emotions recognized in a language from the number of emotion words in that language. Thus, emotion words are clearly not isomorphic with the states to which they refer, and a system that assumed that they were would be as complex as the language of emotion itself. But such imperfect indicators of emotion can be useful when they are viewed, not as direct indications of so many distinct emotions, but as individual tokens of a smaller number of emotion types. As such, they can help us to delineate the emotion types around which a comprehensive theory of emotion may be built. An example of a theory that proceeds in this way is the one that we have proposed in Ortony, Clore, and Collins (in press), and which is briefly outlined in Ortony's chapter (this volume).

Ordinary language terms are useful (and essential) in the development of emotion theory in the same way that other flawed criteria are useful in the development of psychometric instruments. "Bootstrapping" refers to a set of psychometric procedures in which a measurement concept can be

elevated into a highly reliable and valid instrument through the use of partially valid but highly fallible criteria (Wiggins, 1973). The classic example of this process is Binet's use of teacher's impressions of their student's intelligence as a criterion for selecting intelligence test items. Fallible though they are, teacher's impressions of the intelligence of their children clearly contain some validity, and no one would have paid any attention to Binet's test if it had been unrelated to them. Today, however, after further refinement, scores on his test are more likely to be used as the criterion for judging teacher's impressions than vice versa. In a somewhat analogous way, natural language words, even though they do not have a one-to-one relationship to emotions, may serve as tools for arriving at the kinds of principled distinctions that we seek about emotions themselves.

Before we can use natural language terms in this way, however, we must have some way of determining the boundary between emotions and nonemotions. The first question that arises in considering such a distinction is, what sorts of features or combination of features are likely to be present in all emotions and not in any nonemotions. Fehr and Russell (1984) had subjects list the attributes of emotion that came to mind and found that the most frequently-mentioned features fell into the following categories: "heart-rate increases," "perspiration/sweat," "obsessive concern with situation," "tears/crying," and "eyes open wider." The problem with such an analysis is that emotions are more complex than these surface features would suggest. It is most unlikely that a feature like sweat or tears or even heart-rate increases would be constituents of all emotions in the same way that all birds necessarily have feathers. We doubt that any physical manifestation, not even a particular facial expression, would be a defining feature of any psychological condition. Observations such as these lead us to conclude that the necessary and sufficient conditions of emotion, if there are such, are psychological in nature, not behavioral, expressive, or physiological.

#### 4. THE AFFECTIVE LEXICON

A number of people over the past 25 years have compiled lists of emotional and affective terms. Prominent among these are Averill (1975), Bush (1973), Davitz (1969), and Plutchik (1962). We refer to the terms collected together by these and other emotion researchers as the "affective lexicon." The affective lexicon contains not only emotion terms but terms for other kinds of affective conditions as well. The terms "affect" and "emotion" are sometimes used interchangeably, but we distinguish them, using the term "affective" to refer to anything that is valenced or is positive or negative in value. For example, many of the people who frequent pubs in England have a strong preference for what they call "real ale" as opposed to more commercial ales with less character. This preference is affective, but it is not an emotion, even when it is the cause of a heated emotional interchange. Affect is a very general category of which emotion is a relatively small part. Emotions are particular kinds of affective conditions; so that all emotions are affective conditions, but not all affective conditions are emotions.

To compile his "semantic atlas of emotion terms," Averill (1975) asked subjects to rate how emotional each of 600 terms was. Among other words, they rated the words "angry," "weeping," "blushing," "tearful," "grieving," "suicidal," "fearful," and "violent" as very "emotional." It is surely the case that these terms implicate emotions in some way, though only some of them actually refer to emotions. The others may have been rated as emotional because they refer to behavior or experiences that are likely either to cause emotions, be caused by emotions, or in some other way be associated with emotions. To distinguish such nonexamples of emotion terms from

terms that refer directly to emotions, we conducted a detailed analysis of the meanings of nearly 600 affective terms (Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987). In the process, it became clear that one reason why some nonemotion terms might end up on lists of emotion terms is that no attempt has ever been made to control whether subjects thought of the terms in the context of "feeling something" or "being something." Let us turn, therefore, to a more detailed consideration of the effect of linguistic context on emotional meaning.

One of the characteristics of good examples of emotion terms is that they seem equally emotional when considered in the contexts of being or feeling. "Being angry," for example, sounds just as emotional as "feeling angry." This is not true of many other terms in the affective lexicon. Consider "neglected" in these two contexts. "Feeling neglected" clearly conveys emotion, but "being neglected" does not; it simply refers to a fact about an individual's situation. Indeed, "being neglected" is not even a psychological state, let alone an emotional one. One may be neglected without even being aware of it, or alternatively, one may be aware of it and not care. Despite the appearance of the word "neglected" on lists of putative emotion terms, "being neglected" does not satisfy the requirements of an emotion on any count; it does not necessarily involve a mental state, and it does not even necessarily involve affect or evaluation. By contrast, "feeling neglected" does communicate an emotional reaction; it indicates that one believes one has been neglected and that one cares about that fact. The emotional part of "feeling neglected," therefore, derives from the "feeling" part, not the "neglected" part. The "neglected" part simply tells what the cause or occasion of the feeling is. "Neglected," therefore, seems no more appropriate to include as an emotion than "kicked in the shin" or some other potential cause of emotion would be. The emotions that one does feel when one feels neglected might include anger, resentment, fear, and hurt feelings or some unique combination of them.

The same logic can be used to understand why there is no difference in the emotionality communicated by "feeling angry" and "being angry." "Being angry" already communicates both believing something and caring about it. It would be anomalous, for example, to say, "John neither believed nor cared that his rent had been raised, but he was angry about it." In other words, the believing and caring conveyed by the word "feeling" is redundant when used with emotion terms such as "angry."

## 5. A TAXONOMY OF AFFECTIVE CONDITIONS

In examining the affective lexicon, we initially took an analytic rather than an empirical approach. We considered, in a theory-neutral way, how the conditions referred to by good examples of emotion terms are similar to each other and different from nonemotional conditions. A general taxonomy of the kinds of emotional and nonemotional conditions represented in the affective lexicon resulted, which allowed us to make a provisional classification of a large sample of English terms and a characterization of the attributes that appear to be necessary to classify a condition as an emotion (Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987). This scheme was then tested empirically in a scaling study (Clore, Ortony, & Foss, 1987). Both the taxonomy and the empirical test will be discussed in this paper.

The analytic part of the project can be seen as an example of componential analysis (e.g., Goodenough, 1956; Lounsbury, 1956). It involved considering each of a sample of nearly 600

terms. The terms were chosen, with an eye to being as inclusive as was practical, from all of the lists published by previous investigators. The meaning of each term was considered with respect to whether or not it referred to an emotion. When a term was judged not to refer to an emotion, an effort was made to be explicit about why it was not an emotion term and what category of psychological condition it did exemplify. The development of the taxonomy was in this sense a bottom-up approach, with a variety of categories and schemes being considered. At the practical level, decisions were made after lengthy discussion as well as occasional consultation with linguistic colleagues, dictionaries, and passing strangers. Months turned into years before the a priori stage was completed. Eventually, however, once the categories were established and a large number of words had been categorized, the groups of terms took on clear, and in most cases, homogeneous identities that allowed relatively uncomplicated and reliable classifications to be made. The resulting taxonomy is depicted in Figure 1, and a categorized list of the nearly 600 terms considered is shown in the Appendix. Let us turn now to a description of the taxonomy, beginning with some of the categories of nonemotion terms.

### 5.1. External Conditions

The first distinction that emerged from our analysis of the affective lexicon was between External and Internal Conditions. As discussed earlier, "neglected" is an example of a term that would seem to refer to an emotion when considered as "feeling neglected," but when considered as "being neglected" would more properly be classified as an External Condition. The main kinds of terms that ended up in the External category were terms that refer to factual matters about a person's behavior (e.g., quiet, ineffective), the person's situation in the world (e.g., safe, vulnerable), or the actions of others toward the person (e.g., neglected, abandoned). These we refer to as Objective Descriptions, as can be seen in the right hand part of Figure 1.




FIGURE 1. Taxonomy of psychological conditions proposed by Ortony, Clore, and Foss (1987). The psychological conditions of interest appear in rectangles and the features that differentiate them in ellipses.

One feature that differentiates emotions from some (but not all) of the Objective Descriptions is that emotions can vary in degree. With respect to the emotion term "anger," for example, one can say that a person is "very angry" or only "somewhat angry," but this variation in intensity is not possible with some Objective Descriptions. With respect to the nonemotion terms, "abandoned" and "alone," for example, one cannot say that a person is "somewhat abandoned" or "somewhat alone." One either is or is not abandoned or alone.

The other subcategory of External Conditions, Subjective Evaluations, includes such terms as "wonderful," "awful," "sexy," and "peculiar." These are external in that their use tends to communicate more about the orientation of another person toward the individual than they do about the individual himself. A similar category has been found necessary by investigators studying the language of personality (e.g., Allport & Odbert, 1937; Norman, 1967).

## 5.2. Internal Conditions

A second and more common class of terms in the sample studied refers generally to Internal Conditions, some of which are Mental and some of which are Nonmental conditions. Words such as "sleepy," "exhausted," "aroused," and "nauseous" refer to Physical and Bodily conditions that are internal as opposed to external and nonmental as opposed to mental. In saying they are nonmental we do not, of course, mean to imply that mental processes do not influence whether one becomes aroused, faint, or fatigued, but simply that these terms refer not to mental processes but to bodily ones.

The terms referring to internal conditions that are mental rather than physical and bodily introduce a new complexity. Until this point, the structure was relatively simple and consisted of a series of binary branchings in which terms were seen to refer either to external or internal conditions and mental or nonmental conditions. The mental conditions, however, resisted all attempts at such neat distinctions. To account for the more subtle differences among these terms, we called upon the classical categories of cognition, conation, and affection. The conation category, traditionally interpreted as "will," was interpreted for our purposes simply as "behavior."

As a group, the terms denoting mental conditions appeared to vary with respect to which of these was their dominant referential focus. Some, the largest group, were judged to be more or less pure Affective States. This category included the traditional emotion terms such as "happy," "sad," "angry," "afraid," "disgusted," "proud," "ashamed," and "in-love." It also included the many terms that mark specific intensities of these and other emotions, varying from "pleased" to "euphoric," "melancholy" to "despondent," "irked" to "irate," "uneasy" to "terrified," "embarrassed" to "mortified," and so on. It also included emotion terms marked by content specificity, such as "homesick," "heartbroken," and "self-pity."



In saying that a word such as "proud" has a predominant affective focus rather than a cognitive or a behavioral focus, we are not saying that pride has no implications for how one acts or thinks or that its elicitation does not often involve action or cognition. Rather we are asserting that the term itself does not refer directly to acting or being inclined to act, on the one hand, or to knowing, thinking, or believing on the other. By contrast, a second group of Internal Conditions (shown at the right hand side of the figure at the same level) called Cognitive Conditions, include such terms as "amazed," "convinced," "baffled," "startled," "bored," "interested," and "surprised." In this group are some terms that have been listed by others as being basic emotions, but which did not appear to us to have a predominant or significant focus of affect, including "interest" and "surprise." There were no terms in our sample that showed a pure behavioral focus, although some terms showed a combined focus on behavior and one of the other two possibilities.

It was apparent that any attempt to force all of the mental state terms into one or the other of these pure categories would require ignoring some significant components of meaning. Therefore, unlike the higher branches of the taxonomy, these focus branches involve mixtures. Affective-Behavioral Conditions, for example, are terms that have a strong behavioral focus but that also have a strong affective focus. Often they refer to expressive styles, such as "cheerful," "apologetic," "mournful," "bitchy," "crabby," and "jubilant." We also encountered Affective-Cognitive Conditions. These include emotionally-toned ways of thinking, such as "encouraged" and "pessimistic," emotionally-toned ways of conceptualizing self or others, such as "admiration" and "contempt," or emotionally-affected thought, such as "worried" and "dismayed." Many of these might be classed as emotions, though in general they are poorer examples. Finally, we also encountered examples that seemed best characterized as Behavioral-Cognitive Conditions. These are not focused on affect, but refer both to how one is thinking about a situation and how one is acting or inclined to act. When we say they are not "focused on affect," we mean that although they may be evaluatively positive or negative from some perspective, the term does not refer primarily to the experience of positiveness or negativeness of the person described by, or who is, the subject of the term. Examples include, "careful," "cooperative," "adventurous," and "purposeful."

We did not encounter terms that required a joint focus on all three of these mental categories, although this is a logical possibility. We should also mention that we initially included desire as a fourth, motivational focus. It was deleted because it was very rarely used, although at least one of our terms, "lust," would have been happier there than anywhere else. One could also presumably find terms that did not appear in our sample that would illustrate such a category.

Words are sometimes ambiguous in their referents. One of the most critical ambiguities concerned terms like "hostile," "friendly," "aggressive," or "proud." These can refer either to a momentary current state or to a trait or other enduring disposition. Since we are primarily interested in detecting emotions, which appear to be states, we always took the state reading in preference to the trait reading of such terms. In addition, terms are sometimes ambiguous in other ways. The terms "touched" and "uncomfortable," for example, have both a physical and a psychological, often metaphorical, reading. We always considered the psychological reading rather than the physical. In fact, when we collected ratings of these terms, we indicated "psychological" in parentheses to disambiguate them for our subjects.

### 5.3. States and Conditions

Many of the terms in the affective lexicon refer to states -- some are mental states and some are bodily states. But some are not states at all in the requisite sense. Since the best examples of emotion terms refer to states, we also made some attempt to classify the words with respect to stateness, although an in-depth treatment of the concept of states versus traits and other enduring dispositions was beyond the scope of this project. Terms that refer to short-term, internal conditions, such as "amazed," "relaxed," "overwhelmed," "humiliated," and "glum," are relatively clear cases of states. Because it is a short-lived mental condition, "amazed" is a good example of a state. One cannot be amazed for long, despite the common English expression, "I never cease to be amazed." By contrast, "prejudiced," "self-centered," "indifferent," "funny," and "faithful" are clearly non-states, a category that we refer to as "frames of mind." Many of these are non-states because they refer to traits, attitudes or other long-term dispositions. Since some terms have two meanings, one a trait meaning and one a state meaning (as in the case of "proud"), classification as a state term means that a term can have a state reading, not that it must. There are cases that do not clearly fit either into the state or the frame of mind category. These are referred to (in the Appendix) as "statelike conditions" and include such terms as "hostile," "secure," and "fond," which appear to have some attributes of states but lack others. There are very few of these, less than five per cent of the total.

#### 5.4. Implications

The taxonomy is not a theory of emotion and is not based on any particular theory of emotion. Indeed, it is not even a taxonomy of emotion. Rather it represents a kind of pre-theoretical brush clearing effort to establish the domain to be explained by any theory of emotion. Our claim is not that we have classified any particular term correctly, since a number of assignments are admittedly arguable. But out of the process of categorizing the words, a set of principled distinctions emerged that afford a simple, direct, and useful characterization of emotion.

First, emotions refer to internal, mental conditions, as opposed to external or physical conditions. Second, they are good examples of states, as opposed to dispositions and other nonstates or borderline examples of states. Third, they have affect as their predominant referential focus, as opposed to behavior, cognition, or some combination of these. The claim that emotion words are focused on affect is not circular, because while all words in the affective lexicon concern affect in some way, emotions are a subset of these with a predominant rather than a peripheral focus on the experience of affect. In addition, the dispositional readings of many terms, (e.g., "fearful," "hostile," "proud"), although they also would have a focus on affect, would not qualify as emotions because in their dispositional reading they do not refer to states.

It should be clear that we have not eliminated all sources of ambiguity about which terms refer to emotions. Still, we did find that once we were successful in explicating the criteria that seemed to underlie judgments about clear cases, we could apply them reasonably reliably. Independent categorizations of ten per cent of the words by the two authors produced 89 per cent agreement.

#### 6. TESTING THE TAXONOMY

In a study (Clore, Ortony, and Foss, 1987) designed to test the validity of the classification scheme, the same sample of words on which the taxonomy was developed was studied empirically. The study was based on the previously discussed effects of linguistic context on emotional meaning. Subjects rated the words once in the context of feeling and once in the context of being. For example, subjects were asked, how confident they were that "feeling neglected" is an emotion, and then how confident they were that "being neglected" is an emotion? There were two purposes for doing this. First, the two contexts ("feeling something" vs. "being something") were intended to maximize sensitivity to the difference between genuine emotions and nonemotional states. Feeling something is much more likely to seem like an emotion than is being it. Thus, if one were to present the word "neglected" in isolation, as is usually done, some subjects would interpret it in terms of the nonemotional fact of "being neglected," while others would probably interpret it in terms of the emotional feelings implicit in the expression "feeling neglected." The result would then be an apparent lack of agreement about whether or not "neglected" referred to an emotion. This problem is particularly acute with Objective Descriptions like "neglected," "ignored," and "abused," which we have elsewhere (Ortony & Clore, 1981) referred to as "other-action" words. To reduce the likelihood of such interpretational ambiguity, subjects first considered the "feeling" form, which was more likely to be judged emotional, and then judged the "being" form, in which we were primarily interested.

The second purpose for collecting both feeling and being ratings was to test the hypothesis that words referring to genuine emotions should be judged as similarly emotional in both the context of "being" and "feeling," while words not referring to genuine emotions were expected to show other patterns. To the extent that the major categories represented in the taxonomy were discriminable in terms of the patterns of ratings they received, then the data would provide an independent assessment of the proposed categories. Some of the specific predictions were as follows:

1. **Affective Terms:** Subjects should give high ratings in both "being" and "feeling" contexts to words in the three Affect-focal mental conditions, such as, "angry" (Affective), "encouraged" (Affective-Cognitive), "glum" (Affective-Behavioral). Terms in the Affect-focal group (at least the state terms) contain all of the features of the emotions, therefore, subjects should be relatively certain, for example, that "feeling glum" and "being glum" both refer to emotions.
2. **Cognitive Terms:** Subjects should give moderate ratings in both "being" and "feeling" contexts to words in the two Cognitive-focal mental conditions, such as "amazed" (Cognitive) and "playful" (Behavioral-Cognitive). These should be least discriminable from the affective conditions because cognitive conditions share all of the features of emotions except the focus on affect.
3. **Bodily Terms:** Subjects should give low ratings in both "being" and "feeling" contexts to physical and bodily state words, such as "sleepy" and "tired," because they share few features of emotion terms.
4. **External Terms:** Subjects should give high ratings to external conditions in the "feeling" form because, as discussed earlier, the context "feeling" supplies the important believing and caring features that are required for an emotion term. But they should give low ratings to external conditions in the "being" form because, in that form, they share none of the features of emotion terms.

Because the predictions involved the "feel/be" distinction and because adjectives fit readily into the "feeling" and "being" contexts, adjectives and verbs in adjectival (past participle) form were generally chosen as stimuli in preference to other possible syntactic forms when the meaning was judged to be comparable. As already indicated, we sought to prevent subjects from reinterpreting items in the "being" context as though they had been presented in the "feeling" context. For this reason, the two contexts were always presented together, with the "feeling" form immediately preceding the "being" form. We believed that having subjects make their judgments about an item in its different contexts successively would keep them from reinterpreting the "being" form as "feeling." So, for example, we thought that if subjects considered "being neglected" in conjunction with "feeling neglected" they would be unlikely to confuse them. They were instructed to indicate their confidence that what was referred to by each of the phrases (e.g., "feeling alone") was an emotion. Ratings were made on scales with four alternative choices, which were, "Certain it isn't," "Suspect it isn't," "Suspect it is," and "Certain it is."

A discriminant analysis showed that the major categories of terms were all significantly different from each other, and that the differences were in every case consistent with predictions. In fact, all but three of the 28 possible pairs of the eight categories were significantly different from each other, and no predictions had been made about the groups that were not different. Specifically, Affective-Behavioral words could not be discriminated reliably either from Affective or from Affective-Cognitive words, and among the External Conditions, the Objective Description and Subjective Evaluation categories could not be discriminated.

A cluster analysis was also conducted on the distances between the centroids. The results can be seen in Figure 2. Four clusters were clearly formed. The first to form consisted of the Objective Descriptions and the Subjective Evaluations, which is consistent with the fact that they were not significantly different. The second to form consisted of the Cognitive Conditions and the Behavioral-Cognitive Conditions. The third included the Affective, Affective-Behavioral, and Affective-Cognitive Conditions. Beyond these, the groupings were quite distinct, with the most discriminable from the others being the Physical and Bodily States cluster.

FIGURE 2. Complete link cluster analysis computed on the Mahalanobis distances between the centroids of eight categories of psychological conditions (Clare, Ortony, and Foss, 1987).

The rest of the data analyses were conducted on these four large clusters, namely, the Bodily, Cognitive, Affective, and External Clusters. The discriminability and relative locations of these groups can be seen in Figure 3 which shows four isodensity contours, one for each group. Each contour represents a region within which 68 per cent of the distribution falls, which is approximately one standard deviation around the centroid. The hypotheses predicted that Affect-focal terms should be rated as clearly referring to emotions in both linguistic contexts, the Cognitive terms as possibly referring to emotions in both, the Physical and Bodily terms as not referring to emotions in either, and the External Condition terms as clearly referring to emotions in the "feeling" form but as not referring to emotions at all in the "being" form. It can readily be seen by looking at the figure that all four hypotheses were confirmed. The differences among the groups shown in the figure were all highly significant. It can also be seen that the terms generally seemed much more like emotions in the context of "feeling" than in the context of "being."




FIGURE 3. Isodensity contours representing 68 per cent of the distribution (one standard deviation) for each of the four major classes (Clore, Ortony, and Foss, 1987).

A classificatory discriminant analysis was conducted which determines for each word the nearest group centroid, and thereby classifies the words empirically into one of the four groups. The percentage of words associated with their own class was: 76% for the Affective Condition words, 81% for the Body State words, 71% for the External Condition words, and 49% for the Cognitive Condition words. These figures can be seen in the diagonal of Table 1 which shows that the majority of items were assigned to their a priori classes. Notice that the most common misclassifications were of noncognitive terms appearing in the Cognitive class. This was also evident in the overlap of the cognitive group and the others shown in Figure 3.

Inspection of the results suggests that occasionally subjects appear to have considered terms in unintended ways or to have been overly influenced by one feature of a term. For example, we had classified the terms "astonished," "bewildered," "flabbergasted," and "amazed" as Cognitive

TABLE 1. Frequencies (and row percentages) of "correct" and "incorrect" classifications in the four classes.

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Empirically-derived classification:

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Rationally-derived classification:	Affective	Cognitive	Body	External	Totals
Affective	234 (76%)	37 (12%)	6 (2%)	30 (10%)	307

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Cognitive	19 (14%)	66 (49%)	23 (17%)	26 (19%)	134
Body	2 (5%)	5 (14%)	30 (81%)	0 (0%)	37
External	6 (7%)	17 (20%)	2 (2%)	61 (71%)	86
Totals	261	125	61	117	564

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Note. "Correct" classifications are defined as those empirically derived classifications that match the rationally derived ones (diagonal). "Incorrect" classifications are those empirically-derived classifications that do not match (off-diagonal).

Conditions, but ratings given by subjects placed them among the Affective Conditions. It appears that nonemotional (e.g., Cognitive or Body) states that are marked as intense seemed more emotional to subjects, perhaps because such intense states are likely to cause emotions. "Being bewildered", for example, refers to a cognitive state of confusion, which is not an emotion, but such bewilderment is also likely to cause frustration and distress, which are emotions.

Before leaving this study, we should note that the data allow us to determine how words used in previous investigations fared when assessed against the same criteria. For example, at the beginning of this paper, we argued that some multidimensional scaling studies of emotion paid insufficient attention to the selection of stimuli. It is worth asking, therefore, how the terms from these studies were classified in the present experiment. Two of the most frequently cited multidimensional scaling studies are those by Plutchik (1980) and Russell (1980). Of the forty words used in Plutchik's study, 34 appear also in our list. Of these, 11 were not classed as emotions in our data. Moreover, it seems unlikely that any of the six terms that were not in our sample would have been classed as affect-focal mental states either. These include, "agreeable," "distrustful," "inquisitive," "intolerant," "puzzled," and "receptive". Hence, 17 (or nearly half) of Plutchik's 40 terms appear not to be examples of emotion words at all. In addition, five (nearly 20%) of the 28 words used by Russell in a number of studies (e.g., Russell, 1980) were also classified in one of the nonaffective categories.

Although a number of investigators have discussed the importance of the problem studied here (e.g., Mees, 1985; Tiller & Campbell, 1986; Shields, 1984), we know of no other attempts to derive systematically a set of criteria for what is to count as an emotion. Most research on emotion words has either been concerned with characterizing the dimensional structure of emotions (e.g., Russell, 1980) or with providing the basis for a particular theory of emotion (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1986; Mees, 1985; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Neither of these were goals of the present research, which was aimed at differentiating the major kinds of psychological states and conditions referred to by terms in the affective lexicon, including not only emotional states but also cognitive states, bodily states, and others. The discriminability of the categories of the taxonomy on the predicted bases provide support for the general hypothesis that the best examples of emotion terms are terms

referring to conditions that are states, that are internal as opposed to external, that are mental as opposed to physical, and that have a significant focus on affect.

## CROSS-CULTURAL GENERALITY

Based as it is on an analysis of English words, one cannot be sure that our conclusion (that emotion terms refer to internal, mental states focused on affect) would also hold for other languages and cultures. Carl Heider (1987), for example, indicates that the Indonesians and the Japanese are somewhat less concerned with moral good and evil as a basis for affective reactions than are Westerners, and that their positive and negative evaluations are more likely to reflect a preoccupation with the dimensions of order versus disorder. Such observations tell us that, like individuals, cultures may differ in their dominant concerns and consequently in their affective reactions to specific events. Despite differences in the criteria they invoke to make evaluations, however, we have no reason to suppose that Indonesians or Japanese or any other groups are unconcerned with making evaluations. Any group, we assume, forms affective reactions and therefore has terms in their language that refer to such reactions.

One might also suspect this characterization to be inadequate for other cultures on the basis of Lutz's observations about the Ifaluk of Micronesia (see, e.g., Lutz, this volume). Lutz suggests that our understanding of emotion could benefit from a greater emphasis on the pragmatic or rhetorical functions of emotion terminology rather than focusing exclusively on their referential aspect. She points out that among the Ifaluk the applicability of an emotion term to a situation would be a matter for negotiation among the persons involved. She suggests that the widespread Western assumption that words are primarily labels for things, and that they can be said to have a single or determinate meaning, is challenged by such observations. Despite the variability in meaning of particular emotion terms, however, and the disagreements among participants about their applicability to any particular situation, the emotion terms in question presumably still tend to be terms that concern internal, mental states that are focused on affect or evaluation. What is being negotiated in these situations may not be whether one or another term refers to an emotion, but rather whether a particular emotion term is applicable in a particular situation.

In our view, the locus of cultural (and indeed individual) differences lies not in the kind of distinctions we have characterized as underlying the structure of words in the affective lexicon, but rather in the kinds of perceptions of the world that contribute to emotional differentiation. Thus, we might expect such differences to be relevant to cognitive theories of emotions, or even to taxonomies of emotion words, but much less so, if at all, to a taxonomy of the affective lexicon of the kind we have outlined.

## 8. EMOTIONS AS PROTOTYPES

In reaction to the difficulty of articulating the distinguishing features of emotions, some suggest that the problem can be resolved only by getting rid of the idea that the concept "emotion" has defining features and adopting instead the view of emotion as a prototype. This, for example, is the position taken by Fehr and Russell (1984). Following the proposals made by Rosch (1973) and others, they argue that psychological events are judged to be emotions or not on the basis of the degree to which they resemble certain prototypical emotional events. In support of their argument,

they make two observations about the classification of events as emotions. First, they point out that some emotions are generally recognized as better examples of the category "emotion" than are others, that is, that membership is graded. This is thought to be important because, according to the classical view, if a putative emotion shares the necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership, then it is an emotion. If it lacks one or more features, it is not an emotion, and that is the end of it. Second, they observe that people disagree about which psychological conditions are and are not emotions. This fact is seen as important because, according to the classical view, people can only use the concept "emotion" if they know the necessary and sufficient conditions that define it, and of course if everyone knows the necessary and sufficient conditions, there should be no disagreement. On the basis of these two arguments, Fehr and Russell maintain that we should view emotions as fuzzy sets rather than as real (classically definable) sets. These two arguments can be referred to as the gradedness argument, that emotions vary in goodness of category membership, and the adjudication argument, that people disagree about category membership.

That emotions can be graded with respect to how good they are as examples of the category has been demonstrated by Fehr and Russell (1984) and Tiller and Harris (1984). But as evidence for the necessity of viewing emotion as a fuzzy set, the fact that terms can be so graded loses its force when we note that the same can be shown for such classically defined concepts as "even number" (Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983). Subjects rate numbers such as 2, 4, and 8 as better examples of even numbers than such numbers as 34, 106, and 806. A more compelling demonstration is to note that the energetic, sexy rock singer, Tina Turner, happens to be a member of the classically-definable set, "grandmother." Since there are better-seeming and worse-seeming examples, even of these classically-definable concepts, then such gradedness is not a criterion for distinguishing categories that can and cannot be classically defined.

There remains, however, the adjudication argument, that subjects do not show a high level of agreement about whether peripheral examples of emotions are or are not members of the emotion category. Of course, disagreement in itself is not diagnostic, because subjects may be differentially sophisticated either about the concept or about the properties of particular examples. To resolve this issue, however, requires that we distinguish between people's concepts about emotion and the categories of emotional events themselves. Many prototype theorists who focus on emotion (e.g., Fehr & Russell, 1984; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987) are careful to point out that they are speaking of mental representations of emotions rather than of actual emotions, and of properties of concepts rather than properties of events. As Shaver, et al, (1987, p. 3) note, "Studies of ordinary people's cognitive representation of emotion episodes, and of the emotion domain as a whole, cannot resolve scientific debates about the nature of emotion." Of course, we expect a close correspondence between certain aspects of events and our concepts about those events. That is a fundamental assumption underlying what we have to say. But it does not follow from the observation that laymen disagree about the boundaries of their concepts, that the events they are conceptualizing have nothing specific and essential in common. Laymen may well classify events, including emotional events, by comparing them to abstract prototypes or to specific good examples. This would not, however, preclude the possibility that there are fixed and knowable conditions for something to be an emotion.

A question that should be asked at this point is what the status of the taxonomy that we have proposed is with respect to the concerns raised by prototype theory. If the criteria we have



proposed are interpreted as individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for emotion terms, would one expect that emotion concepts would no longer show gradedness and problems of adjudication? It seems likely that gradedness would still characterize emotion terms. Terms such as "angry," "happy," and "jealous" are better examples than "apathetic," "ill-at-ease," and "soothed," but, as discussed earlier, this may be true of all concepts. It also seems likely that we would still have some problems of adjudication or disagreement about the boundary between emotions and nonemotions. However, there are many reasons why one might expect to observe such disagreements, but, as far as we can tell, none that are incompatible with the taxonomy we have described.

We would argue, then, that the fact that whether or not a term refers to an emotion is sometimes a matter of degree does not require one to view emotional events themselves as fuzzy. Emotion is a matter of degree primarily because one of the necessary features of emotion terms, "focus on affect," is itself a matter of degree. Judgments about whether a term is primarily focused on affect, behavior, or cognition are irreducibly fuzzy. This is probably true any time one makes qualitative (either/or) distinctions about events that differ only quantitatively. A degree of indeterminacy must exist when one breaks a continuum into two categories, in this case into terms that do and do not have a primary focus on affect. But this feature is only one of the several that are required. Affective terms are not necessarily ambiguous with respect to the others, such as whether a term refers to internal versus external conditions, mental versus physical and bodily conditions, or states versus dispositions. There may, of course, be disagreement with respect to the classification of any particular term into these categories, but the point is that such indeterminacy is not irreducible; it is not an inherent aspect of the process as it is when one attempts to divide a single continuum into two discrete categories.

The same point has been made clearly by Wierzbicka (1987), who argues that the existence of necessary and sufficient conditions does not imply the absence of gradedness and indeterminacy. She points out that, "Components such as 'similar to the colour of blood' (in 'red') or 'thought of as someone who could marry' (in 'bachelor') are vague, and this vagueness is mirrored in the referential indeterminacy of the corresponding words. . . . It is not the Aristotelian notion of necessary and sufficient features which causes troubles in semantic analysis; it is the tacit behaviourist assumption that the necessary and sufficient features should correspond to measurable, objectively ascertainable aspects of external reality." In agreement, we would argue that even if one isolates conditions that are necessary and sufficient for emotion, there will still be more or less pure cases of emotion and disagreement about the status of borderline cases. With respect to the present analysis, we would expect disagreement to be greatly diminished by applying the criteria specified here, and they should assist in finding the locus of disagreement when it occurs.

## 9. TECHNICAL VERSUS EVERYDAY TERMS

Fehr and Russell (1984) have made the point that investigators have to choose whether to use everyday terms and concepts that are fuzzy or new terms and concepts devised for systematic scientific analysis. They caution that adopting new terms inevitably involves also adopting new concepts, and argue that once that is done, one is unable to address the traditional questions about emotions that have been raised in terms of everyday concepts. Since these are the questions of interest, they argue, we must ultimately contend with the fuzzy concepts of everyday terms.

We are inclined to take a less drastic view and to see old and new concepts as potentially reconcilable. The project described in this paper was aimed at discovering what conditions emotions have in common by considering the nature of the conditions referred to by a large number of everyday emotion and nonemotion terms. One result was a characterization of what appear to be the essential features of the emotion category. The criteria extracted from our analysis not only fit all of the good examples of emotions but also explain why some nonexamples are often confused with emotions. Ours is not in any sense a new concept of emotion, but an explication of what is assumed to be inherent in the existing meanings of emotion terms. This attempt to articulate what is common among emotion terms, however, is merely a tool for selecting emotion terms for use in theory development. It is in this theoretical endeavor that the new-old distinction becomes especially important.

Our everyday language richly provides for the description of emotional reactions, including different nuances, forms, and intensities of emotion, but for this very reason, we think it impossible to build a systematic theory of the emotions based directly on the meanings of individual emotion words. In the development of a theory of emotion, language can be both a tool and a source of evidence. The goal, however, must not be to define emotion words, but to discover the structure of the psychological conditions to which such words apply. For example, using words chosen on the basis of the taxonomy discussed here, we have recently proposed a theory of emotion in which emotions are structured in terms of their cognitive eliciting conditions (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, in press). Rather than work at the level of natural language terms, we have conceptualized the entities to be structured as emotion types, which are specified only in terms of the cognitive causes that differentiate them from other emotion types. An emotion type is the psychological state that is elicited by a particular set of cognitive conditions. Each type may be marked by multiple everyday emotion terms, which are considered specific tokens of that emotion type. For example, the natural language term "pride" is a token of the emotion type for which the formal specification is, "Approving of one's own praiseworthy action," and the term "fear" is a token of the emotion type for which the formal specification is, "Being displeased about the prospect of an undesirable event." These formal specifications are new emotion terms, but not necessarily new concepts. Rather, they are intended to capture an essential aspect of underlying emotion types of which the everyday terms are tokens. Indeed, one of the goals is to ensure that these new bottles do indeed contain old wine.

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## APPENDIX

### EXTERNAL CONDITIONS

#### SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS:

attractive awful bad contemptible despicable disagreeable dreadful dreary dull fine glorious good hateful hopeless horrible inadequate inferior lousy lovable marvelous odd pathetic peculiar phony pitiful pleasant ridiculous rotten self-destructive sexy strange strong (psychologically) superior terrible terrific trustworthy unattractive unlovable unpleasant untrustworthy useless weak (psychologically) weird wonderful

#### OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTIONS

abandoned abused alone beaten beloved bereft cheated competent defeated degraded dependent (physically) deprived disgraced dominated guiltless guilty helpless ignored impotent ineffective insulted isolated lucky mistreated neglected oppressed persecuted powerful quiet safe slighted successful thwarted uncared-for unfaithful unimportant uninterested unprotected untroubled unworried welcome vulnerable

### INTERNAL CONDITIONS - NONMENTAL

#### PHYSICAL AND BODILY STATES

aroused breathless comfortable (physically) dazed dizzy droopy drowsy exhausted faint fatigued feverish hungry ill itchy jittery nauseous numb pain refreshed relaxed (physically) rested revived sick (physically) sleepy sluggish thirsty tingly tired uncomfortable (physically) weary well

### INTERNAL CONDITIONS - MENTAL

#### AFFECT NON-FOCAL

#### COGNITIVE CONDITIONS

Frames of Mind: aware conceited conscientious cynical earnest hung-up indifferent patient prejudiced rigid self-centered serious sincere tolerant trust vain

States: accept alert amazed astonished baffled bewildered bored certain complacent confident confused convinced curious determined disillusioned doubtful expectant fascinated flabbergasted hazy hopeful impressed incredulous inspired interested lost (befuddled) mixed-up overconfident perplexed resigned self-confident skeptical startled stunned (psychologically) sure surprised suspicious uncertain

#### COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL CONDITIONS

Frames of Mind: adventurous aggressive aloof antagonistic argumentative arrogant bold brave careful careless cautious charitable competitive cooperative courageous crazy critical cruel daring defensive defiant dependent (psychologically) energetic faithful foolish friendly funny generous gentle greedy hesitant inhibited lazy lively meek mischievous modest nonchalant obstinate petty playful protective purposeful rebellious reckless restless sarcastic selfish sensitive (considerate) silly stubborn stupid submissive uncooperative unfriendly vigorous violent virtuous willful

## AFFECT FOCAL

### AFFECTIVE STATES

State-like Conditions: affection aversion carefree despise detest dislike fond lighthearted like on-edge soothed vengeful

States: adore afraid aggravated agitated agony angry anguished annoyed anxious apprehensive ashamed at-ease attracted awestruck bitter blue brokenhearted calm charmed cheered cheerless comfortable (psychologically) contented crushed deflated dejected delighted depressed despondent disappointed discontented disgusted displeased dissatisfied distressed downhearted dread ecstatic elated embarrassed enjoyment envious euphoric exasperated excited (psychologically) fear fed-up frightened frustrated furious glad gratified grief grief-stricken guilt happy hate heart-stricken heartbroken heartsick heartsore heavy-hearted high homesick horrified hurt (psychologically) ill-at-ease in-love incensed intimidated irate irked irritated jealous joyful joyless livid loathe lonely lonesome longing love lovesick low mad melancholy miserable mortified moved nervous outraged overjoyed overwhelmed pained panic peeved petrified pining pissed-off pleased pleasure proud rage regret relaxed (psychologically) relieved remorse resentful sad satisfied scared self-pity serene shaken shame shook-up sick-at-heart sickened sore sorrow sorry suffering tense terrified threatened thrilled tormented touched (psychological) uncomfortable (psychological) uneasy unhappy upset uptight woe-stricken yearning

### AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE CONDITIONS

Frames of Mind: devoted fulfilled intimate sensitive (easily hurt) unfulfilled warmhearted

State-like Conditions: appreciation approve-of disapprove-of forgive hostile insecure malicious nostalgic reassured repentant respect reverence secure sentimental spiteful

States: admiration aggrieved alarmed amused apathetic at-peace awe burdened compassionate concerned consoled contempt contrite desire despair desperate discouraged disenchanting disheartened dismayed disturbed eager empathy encouraged enthusiastic grateful heartened hope hopelessness humble humiliated impatient indignant infatuated lust offended optimistic peaceful pessimistic pity self-conscious self-satisfied shocked smug suspense sympathetic thankful troubled want wonder worried

### AFFECTIVE-BEHAVIORAL CONDITIONS

Frames of Mind: affectionate apologetic benevolent bitchy cowardly crabby grouchy irritable kind loving placid scornful shy solemn tender timid warm

States: cheerful emotional gaiety gleeful gloomy glum joyous jubilant merry mournful passionate triumphant