Is the dramatic economic
growth in modern China good news or bad news?
That question lies at the heart of William Overholt’s latest book,
“Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics.” Overholt’s credentials
for this subject are impressive. Ivy
league educated, Dr. Overholt has spent his career in Asia, mostly in Hong
Kong, observing the economic and political activity in Asia and advising
numerous governments and international agencies along the way. He is currently the head of the RAND Center
for Asia Pacific Policy and is the author of five earlier books on Asia.
Overholt’s main thesis is
that China is a much more accommodating partner to the rest of the world as
well as to its Asian neighbors since Deng Xiaoping seized the reins of power in
the early 1980s. Under Deng, China broke
decisively and permanently with the aggressive and expansionary foreign policy
associated with Mao’s China and the disastrous domestic policies of the
infamous Cultural Revolution. The most compelling statistic that captures much
of the significance of this shift is that of life expectancy: “The average Chinese lived only to age 41 in
1953, but in 2005 could expect to live 72.7 years.”
But, American foreign policy
still sees Chinas as the main threat in the region as if the Cold War was still
moving merrily along. There has been
little recognition of the substantial changes in China in the way the US
conducts its Asian policy. Japan remains
the center piece of the American Asia strategy, leaving other Asian nations
puzzled since most of them view Japan as more of a military threat to the
region than China. In earlier years,
American policy was one of economic help and cooperation with little emphasis
upon military ties. Since the Iraq war,
the Bush Administration has refocused the Asian alliances more along military
lines. This leaves China in the awkward
position of being the target of the American-Japanese alliance to the chagrin
of most of Asia.
Overholt argues that China
has been much more willing than Japan to settle international disputes,
including territorial disputes, by making concessions and to negotiate
cooperative trade agreements. Japan, on
the other hand, has rattled the sabers on more than one occasion sometimes in
connection with Taiwan, sometimes in the ill-conceived visits by senior Japanese
political figures to the Yakusuni Shrine.
Nevertheless. Overholt is
optimistic about the future of Asia. He
sees continued economic progress in China and India, although he sees China as
the real leader in this competition. Democracy
may be an impediment to economic growth in today’s India. China’s more authoritarian political system may
actually be a spur to further economic reform. Growing political freedoms, according to
Overholt, have followed economic progress in the Asian experience. US policy seems to believe that political
freedom, democracy in particular, must
precede economic progress. But, Overholt
argues, the Latin American and Asian experiences might suggest otherwise.
Overholt’s book is often
repetitious but is written with great energy and covers in a sweeping fashion
the major geopolitical trends in Asia.
For Overholt, the economic growth in China is good news both for the
United States and for Asia. While China
and Japan occupy center stage, virtually every country in Asia of reasonable
size and stature gets attention in this fascinating book. There is currently a great debate over what
lies ahead in a potentially China-dominated Asia. Overholt is a must read for those interested
in following this debate.