Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science
Ultimatum Game Experiments

Charles A. Holt, cah2k@virginia.edu, suggestions and corrections welcome
(for online and personal use only)


Andreoni, James (1998) “The Right to Spite: The Role of Intentions in Ultimatum Games,” University of Wisconsin, Discussion Paper, presented at the Fall 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, intentions, psychology, spite. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Andreoni, James, Marco Castillo, and Ragan Petrie (1999) “New Experiments on Bargaining: The Squishy Game,” University of Wisconsin, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, fairness. Abstract: The standard ultimatum is modified by allowing the responder to choose a fraction on the unit interval to be used to scale payoffs. This includes the ultimatum as a special case in which payoffs are multiplied by 0 (rejection) or 1 (acceptance). Rabin's (1998) conjecture that this modification would reduce earnings and agreements is not supported by the experimental evidence. Average earnings are about the same in both treatments. Email Contact: andreoni@facstaff.wisc.edu

Bethwaite, J., and P.** Thompkinson (1996) “The Ultimatum Game and Non-Selfish Utility Functions,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 17:2 (April), 259-271. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, non-selfish preferences, fairness.

Bethwaite, J., and P.** Tompinkson (1993) “The Ultimatum Game -- Understanding and the Taste for Fairness,” Economic Notes, 22:1 37-48. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness.

Binmore, Kenneth, and Larry Samuelson (1995) “Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 856-90. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, learning. Email Contact: k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk

Blount, Sally (1995) “When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Casual Attributions on Preferences,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63:2 (August), 131-144. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, computerized players. Email Contact: blount@gsb.uchicago.edu

Bolton, Gary E., and Rami Zwick (1995) “Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 95-121. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, anonymity, punishments. Email Contact: geb3@psu.edu

Bornstein, Gary, and Ilan Yaniv (1998) “Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More `Rational' Players?,” Experimental Economics, 1:1 101-108. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, group decisions, ultimatum game.

Bosman, Ronald, and Frans van Winden (1998) “Behavior in a Power to Tax Game Experiment,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, tax game, earned endowments, methodology, emotions, ultimatum, fairness. Abstract: Each subject earns an initial income from a real effort task. Then they are paired and the one designated as the taxman sets a tax rate. The other decides how much of his/her earned income to destroy before transfering the tax on the remaining amount to the taxman. The focus is on the effects of earned endowments. Email Contact: fvwinden@fee.uva.nl, bosman@fee.uva.nl

Bourgine, Paul, and Benoit Leloup (1998) “Learning Process of 'Player A' in the Infinitely Repeated Ultimatum Game and Gittins Index,” Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum bargaining, repeated game, one-armed bandit problem, simulation. Abstract: The problem facing the proposer in a repeated ultimatum game is formulated as a multi-armed bandit problem, with a known optimal strategy. Simulations yield results that are consistent with results of laboratory experiments. Email Contact: leloup@grid.enscachan.fr

Boyes, W. J. (1996) “Understanding, Fairness and Reputation in the Ultimatum Game,” Economic Notes, 25:1 21-32. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness, reputation.

Buchan, Nancy, Eric Johnson, and Rachel Croson (1999) “Understanding What's Fair: Contrasting Perceptions of Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining in Japan and the U.S.,” University of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, fairness, cultural comparisons, international comparisons. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Burnham, Terence C. (1999) “Testosterone and Negotiations: An Investigation into the Role of Biology in Economic Behavior,” Harvard University, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, testosterone, biological measurements, decision errors, testosterone. Email Contact: terence_burnham@harvard.edu

Camerer, Colin F., and Richard H. Thaler (1995) “Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9:2 (Spring), 209-219. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, dictator game, fairness. Email Contact: camerer@hss.caltech.edu

Cameron, L. A. (1999) “Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Evidence from Indonesia,” Economic Inquiry, 37:1 (January), 47-59. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, methodology, incentives, international subject pool, Indonesia. Abstract: High stakes ultimatum game experiments are conducted in Indonesia. Responders are somewhat more willing to accept a given percentage the high money amount, but proposer behavior is largely invariant to increases in the stakes.

Carter, John R., and Shannon A. McAloon (1996) “A Test for Comparative Income Effects in an Ultimatum Bargaining Experiment,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31:3 (December), 369-380. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, relative income effects. Abstract: The experiment compares ultimatum bargaining behavior in a standard treatment and in a tournatment treatment where only relative payoffs matter for final earnings. The ex ante prediction of lower offers in the tournatment treatment is not borne out. Email Contact: jcarter@holycross.edu

Cooper, David, Nicholas Feltovich, Alvin Roth, and Rami Zwick (1998) “Learning in Ultimatum Games,” University of Pittsburgh, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meetings. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, reinforcement learning, fairness, inequality aversion. Abstract: Changes in behavior over time in ultimatum games lead the authors to consider learning models. The simple reinforcement model does not provide a good explanation of dynamic patterns unless reciprocity and autocorrelation factors are incorporated. Email Contact: djc13@guinness.som.cwru.edu

Costa-Gomes, Miguel, and Klaus G. Zauner (1997) “A Social Utility Explanation of Results in Experimental Ultimatum Bargaining Games,” University of New South Wales, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, social utility. Email Contact: kzauner@agsm.unsw.edu.au

Croson, Rachel T. A. (1996) “Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 30:2 (August), 197-213. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, information. Email Contact: crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Sheryl Ball (1998) “Stars Upon Thars: Status and Discrimination in Ultimatum Game Experiments,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, discrimination. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Rob* Gilles (1995) “Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining with Outside Options: Experimental Evidence,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper presented at the 1995 Public Choice Meetings. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, outside options, fairness. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman (1995) “Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games,” Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, gender effects, social distance. Email Contact: eckelc@vt.edu

Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E.* Savin, and Martin Sefton (1988) “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 6347-369. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, dictator games, ultimatum games. Abstract: The data reported in this paper allow a comparison of behavior in one-shot ultimatum and dictator games.

Gale, J., Kenneth G. Binmore, and Larry Samuelson (1995) “Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 856-90. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, learning,.

Grosskopf, Brit (1998) “Competition, Aspiration and Learning in the Ultimatum Game: An Experimental Investigation,” Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Discussion Paper presented at the 1999 European Economics Association Meetings. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, multiple responders, learning, reinforcement learning, virtual learning, order-of-treatment effects, experimental design. Abstract: Demands are higher in bilateral ultimatum game experiments than in competitive games with one proposer and three responders. The paper proposes a modification of standard reinforcement learning models to allow for virtual learning, i.e. reinforcement of unchosen strategies. Email Contact: grosskop@upf.es

Güth, Werner (1995) “On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments-A Personal Review,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27:3 (August), 329-344. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, survey. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, Steffen Huck, and Peter Ockenfels (1996) “Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study,” Economic Journal, 106:436 (May), 593-604. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, incomplete information. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, Peter Ockenfels, and M. Wendel (1993) “Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake,” International Journal of Game Theory, 22:1 51-73. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating offer, increasing pie, trust game. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982) “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3:4 (December), 367-388. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games. Abstract: This is the first experimental study of ultimatum bargaining games. The reported deviations from subgame perfect Nash equilibria have stimulated a large subsequent literature on games unilateral proposals and responses. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, and Reinhard Tietz (1988) “Ultimatum Bargaining For a Shrinking Cake: An Experimental Analysis,” in Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, edited by R. Tietz, W. Albers and R. Selten, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, ***. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating offer. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, and Reinhard Tietz (1990) “Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 11:3 (September), 417-449. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, survey. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Güth, Werner, and Eric Van Damme (1998) “Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42:2/3 (June), 227-247. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness, information. Email Contact: gueth@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

Henrich, J. (1998) “An Ultimatum Game Experiment Among the Machiguenga,” U.C.L.A., Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, subject pool effects, anthropology.

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon L. Smith (1994) “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 7:3 (November), 346-380. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, methodology, anonymity, double anonymity, entitlements, framing effects, ultimatum games. Abstract: Subjects are shown to be more aggressive in ultimatum game demands when 1) they have earned the right to be a proposer, 2) the game is framed as a market interaction, and 3) the subjects' decisions are hidden from the experimenter in a double-anonymous treatment. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1996) “On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25:3 289-301*. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, incentive effects, ultimatum game. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (2000) “The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games*,” Experimental Economics, forthcoming. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, context, equity. Email Contact: ehoffman@uic.edu

Kagel, John H., Chung Kim, and Donald Moser (1996) “Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs*,” Games and Economic Behavior, 13:1 (March), 100-110. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, fairness. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kagel, John H., and Katherine Wolfe (1999) “A New Three-Person Ultimatum Game,” University of Pittsburgh, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, multi-person bargaining, fairness, inequality aversion. Email Contact: kagel+@pitt.edu

Kirchsteiger, Georg (1994) “The Role of Envy in Ultimatum Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25:3 (December), 373-389. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, envy. Email Contact: georg.kirchsteiger@univie.ac.at

Knez, Marc J., and Colin F. Camerer (1995) “Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10:1 (July), 65-94. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, three player bargaining, outside options, fairness.

Kravitz, David A., and Samuel Gunto (1992) “Decisions and Perceptions of Recipients in Ultimatum Bargaining Games,” Journal of Socio-Economics, 2165-84. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, perceptions, psychology.

List, John A., and Todd L. Cherry (1999) “Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers,” University of Central Florida, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum, logit, incentive effects, methodology. Abstract: On the basis of performance on a quiz, proposers are given either a high ($400) or low ($20) amount to divide in an ultimatum game. There are ten rounds of play with random matching, and one round is chosen ex post for payoffs. Responders "learn" to accept low percentage offers in later periods of the high stakes treatment, but not in the low stakes treatment. The design innovation is that the entitlement effect of the quiz produces relatively low offers, and the higher frequency of rejections allows more data that can be used to analyze rejection behavior. Email Contact: John.List@bus.ucf.edu

Marchand, Nadege, and Jean-Louis Rulliere (1998) “Envy Motive and Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Equity Reciprocity Competition Relation,” GATE, Ecully, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, three person ultimatum game, simulated players, envy, equity, reciprocity. Abstract: This paper uses experiments to test the implications of the Bolton and Ockenfels ERC model. In the competitive ultimatum game, the proposer makes a demand to a responder, who can accept or reject and earn zero, in which case the proposer can make a demand to a second responder. The non-competitive treatment is one in which the second responder is programmed to behvave like the second responder in the competitive treatment. Email Contact: marchand@gate.cnrs.fr, rulliere@gate.cnrs.fr

Messick, D. M., D. A. Moore, and Max Bazerman (1997) “Ultimatum Bargaining with a Group: Underestimating the Importance of the Decision Rule,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 6987-101. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, psychology. Email Contact: mbazer@nwu.edu

Meyer, H. -D.** (1992) “Norms and Self-Interest in Ultimatum Bargaining: The Prince's Prudence,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 13:2 (June), 215-232. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, norms, other-regarding preferences.

Mitzkewitz, Michael, and Rosemarie Nagel (1993) “Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information,” International Journal of Game Theory, 22:2 171-198. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, learning from experience.

Murnighan, J. Keith, and M. S. Saxon (1998) “Ultimatum Bargaining by Children and Adults,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 19:4 (August), 415-445. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, children subjects, subject pool effects. Email Contact: keithm@nwu.edu

Neelin, Janet, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Matthew Speigel (1988) “A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Comment,” American Economic Review, 78:4 (September), 824-836. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating-offer games, ultimatum games.

Neilson, William S. (1997) “Ultimatum Games as Auctions,” Texas A&M University, Discussion Paper. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness. Abstract: The paper presents an auction-like model of ultimatum bargaining in which players care about fairness but view others' attitudes toward fairness as draws from a population distribution. Email Contact: wsn@econ4.tamu.edu

Okada, Akira, and Arno Riedl (1998) “Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence,” University of Amsterdam, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, coalitions, social exclusion, fairness, efficiency. Abstract: The proposer in the experiment may make an ultimatum demand to one or both of two others. A responder who receives no offer earns zero, and all responders who do receive offers must agree, or the payoffs are zero for all. The pie size is largest when both others are included, so an offer to only one responder is inefficient, and it is unfair in the sense that earnings are zero for the excluded person. The perponderance of offers are directed to only one responder, and hence are unfair and inefficient. Email Contact: riedl@fee.uva.nl

Oppewal, H., and E. Tougareva (1992) “A Three-Person Ultimatum Game to Investigate Effects of Differences in Need, Sharing Rules and Observability on Bargaining Behavior,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 13:2 (June), 203-213. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, three-person ultimatum game.

Ortona, G. (1991) “The Ultimatum Game: Some New Experimental Evidence,” Economic Notes, 20:2 324-334. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game.

Rapoport, Amnon, and James A. Sundali (1996) “Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Offer Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 25:4 475-494. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, asymmetric information, offer games. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Rapoport, Amnon, James A. Sundali, and Darryl A. Seale (1996) “Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Demand Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10:2 171-201**. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, asymmetric information, demand games. Email Contact: arapoport@bpa.arizona.edu

Raynor, Michael E., and Robert J. Robinson (1999) “Group vs. Individual Performance in the Ultimatum Game: Similar Behaviors, Different Beliefs,” Harvard University, Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, group behavior. Abstract: This study compares ultimatum offers made by individuals and three-person groups, and no difference found. Group offers, however, were more consistent with their beliefs about rejection probabilities. Email Contact: mraynor@hbs.edu

Robert, C., and P. J. Carnevale (1997) “Group Choice in Ultimatum Bargaining,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 72:2 256-279. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, group choice.

Roth, Alvin E. (1995) “Bargaining Experiments,” in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 253-348. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, dictator game, fairness, negotiation. Abstract This paper surveys the extensive literature on behavior in bargaining experiments. Email Contact: aroth@hbs.edu

Ruffle, Bradley J. (1998) “More is Better, but Fair is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 23:2 (May), 247-265. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, dictator games, ultimatum games, fairness. Email Contact: bradley@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

Schotter, Andrew, Avi Weiss, and Inigo Zapater (1996) “Fairness and Survival in Ultimatum and Dictatorship Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31:1 (October), 37-56. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, dictator game, fairness. Email Contact: schotter@fasecon.econ.nyu.edu

Slembeck, Tilman (1998) “As If Playing Fair -- Experimental Evidence on the Role of Information in Ultimatum Bargaining,” University College London, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness, information, aspiration levels. Abstract: If rejections in ultimatum games are due to fairness, then providing responders with less information about the pie size may reduce this incentive to reject. The experiment produces a high number of rejections in ultimatum games even under low information conditions, suggesting the importance of other factors like aspiration levels. Email Contact: slembeck@ucl.ac.uk

Sopher, Barry (1993) “A Laboratory Analysis of Bargaining Power in a Random Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 21:1 (May), 69-90. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, bargaining power. Email Contact: sopher@econ.rutgers.edu

Straub, Paul G., and J. Keith Murnighan (1995) “An Experimental Investigation of Ultimatum Games: Information,
Fairness, Expectations, and Lowest Acceptable Offers,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27:3 (August), 345-364. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, information, fairness, expectations. Email Contact: keithm@nwu.edu

Suleiman, Ramzi (1996) “Expectations and Fairness in a Modified Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 17:5 (November), 531-554. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, fairness, expectations.

Telser, Lester G. (1995) “The Ultimatum Game and the Law of Demand,” Economic Journal, 105:433 (November), 1519-1523. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, law of demand.

Thaler, Richard (1989) “Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2195-206. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, dictator game, anomalies. Abstract: This paper reviews the ultimatum game in particular and fairness issues more generally, with an eye to explaining anomalies in observed behavior. Email Contact: richard.thaler@gsbsun.uchicago.edu

Thompkinson, P., and J. Bethwaite (1995) “The Ultimatum Game: Raising the Stakes,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10:1 (August), 439-451. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, incentives.

Vincent, Placer, and Costin Zaharia (1998) “Towards an Experimental Method to Measure Player A's Motives in Ultimatum Bargaining Environments,” Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1998 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum game, motives. Abstract: A study of behavior in ultimatum and dictator games provides support for the view that non-negligible ultimatum game offers are primarily caused by concern for others' well-being rather than fear of rejection. Email Contact: zaharia@grid.ens-cachan.fr

Vogt, Bodo (1999) “Some Criteria for the Divisions in Ultimatum Games and in Modified Ultimatum Games with Prospects as Payoffs,” University of Bielefeld, Discussion Paper, presented at the Summer 1999 ESA Meeting. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, prominence, psychology. Email Contact: bvogt@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de

Weg, Eythan, and Vernon L. Smith (1993) “On the Failure to Induce Meager Offers in Ultimatum Games,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 14:1 (March), 17-32. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, ultimatum games, methodology. Email Contact: vls@econlab.arizona.edu