Kloosterman, Andrew. An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric
Partnership Game Southern Economic Journal, 2018, accepted.
Kloosterman, Andrew and Paul, Stephen.
Ultimatum Game Bargaining in a Partially Directed Search Market Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, 154, pp. 60-74.
Kloosterman, Andrew and Schotter, Andrew.
Complementary Institutions and Economic Development: An Experimental Study Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 99, pp. 186-205.
Directed Search with Heterogeneous Firms: An Experimental Study Experimental Economics, 2016, 19(1), pp. 51-66.
Public Information in Markov Games Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 157, pp. 28-48.
A Simple Experimental Test of the Coase Conjecture: Fairness in Dynamic Bargaining
(joint with Jack Fanning)
In each round of an infinite horizon bargaining game, a proposer proposes a division of chips, until a responder accepts. The Coase conjecture
predicts that incomplete information about responders' preferences for fairness leads to almost immediate agreement on an equal payoff
split when discounting between rounds is small. We experimentally test this prediction when chips are equally valuable to both bargainers
and when they are worth three times as much to proposers, and compare outcomes to an ultimatum game. Behavior offers strong support for the
theory. In particular, when chips are more valuable to proposers, initial offers, initial minimum acceptable offers, and responder payoffs
are significantly higher in the infinite horizon game than in the ultimatum game, while proposer payoffs are significantly lower.
Repeated Partnerships with Multiple Equilibria and Imperfect Monitoring: An Experimental Study
I investigate finitely repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring where both mutual effort
and mutual shirking are Nash equilibria of the stage game. The treatment variable is the number of
repetitions. I find that period 1 effort rates are increasing in the number of repetitions, but subjects
use trigger strategies that switch to permanent shirking after enough failed projects so effort rates
decrease as the game progresses in all treatments. Additionally, the rate of decrease is less when
there are more repetitions. These results are consistent with a theory of strategic uncertainty in
which a subject best responds to their beliefs about whether their partner exerts effort or shirks.
Finally, I show that total effort does not vary much as the number of repetitions is increased
because the increased period 1 effort is mostly canceled out by the erosion of effort as the game progresses.
Cooperation in Stochastic Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment
This experiment investigates a stochastic version of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.
The stochastic element introduces the importance of beliefs about the future for supporting co-
operation as well as cooperation and defection on the equilibrium path. The results confirm
that subjects cooperate as beliefs predict after they gain sufficient experience. There is some
evidence in favor of alternating cooperation and defection, but conditioning on past outcomes
is more prevalent. This is confirmed with a maximum likelihood strategy estimation where the
popular repeated game strategies Grim Trigger and Tit-for-Tat are still popular here, although
they are not equilibria in this environment.
Essentially Stable Matchings
(joint with Peter Troyan and David Delacrétaz)
We propose a solution to the conflict between fairness and efficiency in matching
markets. A matching is essentially stable if any priority-based claim initiates a chain of
reassignments that results in the initial claimant losing the object (i.e., the claim is vacuous).
We study the structure of the essentially stable set, and classify popular Pareto
efficient mechanisms using our criterion: those based on Shapley and Scarf's TTC
mechanism are not essentially stable, while Kesten's EADA mechanism is. Besides
reconciling the conflict with efficiency, vacuous claims are simple and straightforward
to explain, making essential stability well-suited for practical applications.
School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance
(joint with Peter Troyan)
We generalize standard school choice models by allowing for interdependent preferences
and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used
deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not
(ex-post) stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these
results to a curse of acceptance. However, we also show that if priorities are designed
appropriately, positive results are recovered: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome
is ex-post stable, and less informed students are protected from the curse of
acceptance. Our results have implications for the current debate over priority design
in school choice.
Works in Progress
Cooperation when Defection is Risky Too: An Experimental Study
Signal Jamming and Collusion